



ON BECOMING
AN AMERICAN
HORACE J. BRIDGES

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IN MEMORIAM
Emil G. Beck



ON BECOMING AN AMERICAN



Arace J. Bridges

ON BECOMING AN AMERICAN

SOME MEDITATIONS OF
A NEWLY NATURALIZED IMMIGRANT

BY

HORACE J. BRIDGES

AUTHOR OF "CRITICISMS OF LIFE," "THE RELIGION OF EXPERIENCE,"
"OUR FELLOW SHAKESPEARE," ETC.



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IN MEMORIAM
Emil G. Beck

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TO

MRS. RICHARD WARREN SEARS

WHOSE KINDLY SYMPATHY AND GENEROUS RECOGNITION HAVE
ENCOURAGED THE AUTHOR TO HOPE THAT HIS
WORK MAY NOT DISHONOUR THE HIGH
GIFT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP

*THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY AND RESPECTFULLY
DEDICATED*

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PREFACE

THE acrid epigram of Johnson, that "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel," still lingers at the back of our minds, and induces a certain anticipatory distrust of a person who makes public proclamation of his devotion to the country of his birth or choice. So long as your chief reason for believing a man virtuous is that you have his own word for it, your feelings towards him will be mixed, and appreciation and confidence will assuredly not be the dominant elements in them.

Nevertheless, it would be unfortunate if this obvious consideration should prevail to the extent of preventing anybody from expressing himself, either in speech or writing, on the subject of patriotism and its obligations. The matter has great practical importance. Nowhere is this truer than in America, and never was it more true than at the present hour. Nor must we let the partizan virus of Johnson's dictum infect our feelings to such an extent that they send our judgment packing. Even the adoring Boswell felt it necessary to demur to his idol's assertion, and, in recording it, to explain what Johnson ought to have meant.

We know that it is not patriotism in which the scoundrel takes refuge, any more than it is holiness to which the hypocrite resorts. Nothing is so like a

genuine coin as a counterfeit one; but no two things are more different. The scoundrel may mask himself with a profession of patriotism, just as Mr. Chadband may soak himself in the unction of pretended piety until he reeks of it; but in neither case will the imposture stand the acid test. Johnson was thinking of a set of men who for discreditable personal reasons had pretended to a patriotism which they did not really possess. They abused this term, just as among us at the present day the fine word Politics is "soiled with all ignoble use," by persons who do not know its real meaning, and have no tincture of the spirit or the science which the term properly denotes.

Politics, we must remind ourselves, is the science that lies beyond ethics. It was in this sense that its greatest ancient master, Aristotle, understood and treated the subject. His work on *Morals* is designed and placed as an introduction to the work on *Politics* that follows it. He treats *Morals* as the science of the conduct of individual men in their personal relations; *Politics*, as the science of the conduct of cities and States. This latter is the art of counselling and serving one's country, not (as in our nauseous perversion) the art of preying upon one's country, and making the pretence of its service a cloak under which to rob it. In like manner, Patriotism denotes the spirit which is ready to live and die for the ideals of one's country, not only in war with foreign enemies, but also when its standards have to be asserted against the perverted sentiment or the irrational impetuosity of one's fellow-

citizens. It implies, accordingly, that one shall be ready to *think* for one's nation as well as to fight for it.

Now, a man may venture upon occasion to write on Patriotism in this sense, without falling into the absurdity of seeming to present himself as a model patriot. And the way, I take it, by which he may avoid this extravagance is by recognizing that patriotism is a virtue towards which he must aspire, rather than a quality of character which he has already attained. Once it is understood that patriotism is a virtue, it becomes no more offensive or pretentious to write of it than to treat of any other subdivision of the field of ethics.

Such, at least, is my *apologia* in venturing to submit these informal Meditations to the judgment of the public. But perhaps some explanation may be desirable on another point of detail.

Precedent would suggest that a book of this kind should take the form of an autobiography. Dr. Edward Steiner and the late Mr. Jacob Riis have both woven their ideas on the meaning of America and the obligations of the naturalized immigrant into the form of histories of their personal careers. More famous even than their well-known works is the entrancing volume of my brilliantly gifted friend Mary Antin, entitled "The Promised Land." In this she has given us one of those masterpieces which, under the guise of a record of individual experience, bring before us the full pulsating life of ages and nations. You read what seems to be only the artless tale of the adventures of Mary Antin,

first as a little Jewish girl living among her persecuted people in Russia, and afterwards as the budding American citizen, focussing upon herself and sensitively responding to the influences of school and Settlement and college in Boston. But before you have finished, it dawns upon you that this seemingly simple story is an epitome of the agelong tragedy of the whole Jewish people under persecution, and also of the emancipating mission of America to the oppressed of all the earth.

Evidently, however, one must either be a very exceptional person, or stand in a very uncommon position, to be justified in publishing an autobiography. In Mary Antin's case, both these conditions are fulfilled. The same was true of Mr. Riis and Dr. Steiner, and yet more unmistakably so of that finely distinguished patriot, that *anima naturaliter Americana*, the late Carl Schurz. Nor can even genius, or the wide significance of the experiences recorded, completely safeguard the autobiographer against an appearance of egotism, which, however illusory it may be, nevertheless creates in the reader's mind an impression which the most ordinary sensitiveness leads one to shrink from. Neither her genius nor her artistic success has availed to protect Mary Antin against this most distasteful imputation. To judge from Dr. Steiner's book, one cannot but think that he must have frankly taken for his motto the words, "They say! What do they say? Let them say!" With a courage that I could not emulate, he has made of himself a "subject," in the sense in which the anatomist or the psychologist would

use the term. In a manner more obtrusive even than Montaigne's, he has followed that classical precedent by making himself the matter of his book.

Now I cannot presume on any ground to place myself in competition with these eminent autobiographers, or to suggest a parity between myself and them. My individual experiences have been of the commonplace kind that deserve no record, and secure none, save in the indulgent memory of personal friends; nor have I attained any such distinction as would impart to the episodes of my life that extrinsic interest which alone can justify autobiography or biography. Quite apart, however, from the question of one's personal significance or insignificance, the plan pursued in the following pages may possess at least one advantage which is lacking to the autobiographical method, even when the author-subject possesses outstanding genius or has lived a life the incidents of which merit public consideration. This advantage is that in an abstract or impersonal presentation of the principles involved in a voluntary change of nationality, the general import of those principles is less likely to be overlooked than when the charm of a personal history competes with them and distracts attention from them.

Accordingly, I have attempted only to set forth, in the informal and unsystematic fashion suggested by the word *Meditations*, my convictions as to the deeper implications of a transaction which, although *quâ* oneself it be insignificant, derives a large and enduring importance from the fact that a great nation is a party to it. I desire to place myself upon

record as one who with deep gratitude appreciates the privileges conferred upon him by the Republic, and is not oblivious of the corresponding obligations which he has assumed.

My first impulse was to cast these chapters into the form of letters to my children, that upon their arrival at years of maturity they might learn in what spirit their father had renounced his allegiance to the land of his birth, and sworn fealty, for them as well as for himself, to the United States. Further reflection, however, suggested that this purpose would perhaps be better met if my Meditations on the subject had run the gauntlet of publication and criticism before my children scanned them.

And, as my thoughts unfolded themselves in the process of preparation and writing, I could not avoid the hope that this brief and simple statement of them might possess a certain value for other immigrants, whether of the same national origin as myself or sprung from different lands or races. At the same time, too, the recollection of the cordiality of many audiences before whom some of the thoughts I was expressing had been uttered, inspired the feeling that possibly even to born Americans my Meditations might be not altogether devoid of value or of interest. For the immigrant is, during several years, in the position of the onlooker, who proverbially sees more of the game than the players. The accident of his position, too, compels him to think out the question of his relation to his country, and to define for himself the obligations as well as the privileges of citizenship. This gives him a cer-

tain advantage over those who, having never contemplated the abandonment of the loyalty to which they were born, have never had occasion to subject themselves to any such process of self-examination.

I can but hope that these considerations will excuse the apparent presumption of a newcomer in airing his opinions concerning the process by which immigrants are assimilated into the Republic, and upon the more delicate subject of the relation between the Nation and the States. The importance of these matters would at any time make it excusable for an American to subject them to his most careful study. If a newcomer needs some additional justification for treating of them, I trust that the foregoing explanation may be accepted as furnishing it.

Several years ago, when my position was that of a visiting lecturer from England, and before I had decided to make my permanent abode in this country, some friends in New York urged me to refrain from writing a book upon America until my experience of the land and its people had become somewhat closer and more extensive. Having already felt not a little humiliated by the audacious superficiality of Mr. Wells's volume on "The Future in America," and by the remarks concerning parlour-cars and skyscrapers in Mr. Arnold Bennett's "Impressions of a First Visit," I promptly replied that nothing would induce me to attempt such a task until I had enjoyed at least ten years of familiarity with American life. No Englishman unequipped with the mask of brass habitually worn by the popu-

lar practitioners of journalism, can think without shame of the contrast between such a masterpiece as Emerson's "English Traits" and the triviality and inadequacy of many of the volumes dealing with America produced by English authors. If ever the time comes when I shall have completed the probation I imposed upon myself, it shall at least be my endeavour that any study of America which I may produce shall compensate by fullness of information for lack of the genius and insight which go so far to redeem the appalling defects of some English criticisms of America. But that time is not yet; and I refer to the matter here only to remind the friends to whom I gave my promise that this book in no sense constitutes a breach of it. It is not a book on America; it is only a sort of informal soliloquy on the meaning of Americanism, as regarded from the standpoint of one newly initiated into it.

Several of the principles underlying the latter half of this book (from Chapter VI onwards) are considered in a more general manner, and with fuller reference to history, philosophy and religion, in an earlier work of mine, entitled "Some Outlines of the Religion of Experience" (published by The Macmillan Company). Readers who feel that the treatment of the subject in these pages leaves open questions which they would care to see differently discussed, will perhaps do me the honour of turning to this other book.

H. J. B.

CHICAGO, July 4, 1918.

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ON BECOMING AN AMERICAN

“HE who freely magnifies what hath been nobly done, and fears not to declare as freely what might be done better, gives ye the best covenant of his fidelity, and that his loyalist affection and his hope waits on your proceedings. His highest praising is not flattery, and his plainest advice is a kind of praising.”—JOHN MILTON to the Long Parliament (1644).

ON BECOMING AN AMERICAN

CHAPTER I

THE PRIVILEGE OF NATURALIZATION

IN the month of August, 1913, I stood with my wife and children on the deck of a majestic steamer at Liverpool, and waved farewells to the people ashore. Our relatives and nearest friends had said good-bye to us at Euston Station in London, and now we had to take leave not of our immediate kith and kin, but of our fellow-countrymen in general, and of the dear old land itself. I had spent the previous winter in America, spying out the land, so to speak, from my own little point of view, and had decided to take my family across the ocean with me, to make a new home and discover an appropriate field for our life-work. Since my return to England in the spring of 1913, time had fled rapidly, and we had been busily occupied with preparations for our great adventure. And now the day had come. Our household gods had been dispersed — some ahead of us to America, to impart a kindly savour of the old home to the new; others to friends, to keep alive our memory and serve as links with

the bodily presence, after we were gone. We had pulled up our roots; and, like millions before us, had set out in faith to find new soil wherein, if the fates were kindly, we might "branch and blossom as before." The great ocean-palace (since, alas! sent to the depths by one of those dastardly acts of piratical assassination which have made the world-war more infamous than any that ever happened before) lay fair and spotless in the summer sunshine, awaiting its hour to glide with smooth precision down the crowded Mersey and out into the beaten path of the tamed Atlantic.

To our little ones the day was one of joyous adventure. They were faring forth into the unknown. The ship, with her marvels of science and ingenuity, was all a wonder and a wild desire. With the full flooding life of boyhood, they found the fleeting moment all-sufficient and all-entrancing. Yesterday was dead; to-day was so thrilling that to-morrow was unthought-of. America was a magic name, like Atlantis or the Hesperides. They wondered at the grave faces of father and mother, for they recked nothing of the pain to their parents that had attended the ploughing up of the soil of heart and memory, and the plucking out of roots that had struck so much deeper than consciousness. Nor did they yet dream of the years of anxious pre-occupation which we already felt ahead, — the long labour of mental and spiritual adjustment to a new world of hearts and faces, a new physical environment, new manners and customs, ideals and standards, new life-values, a new social order. Fortunate were the

youngsters, in that the change came for them at a time when their world was fluent and plastic, when they had not yet grappled other souls to theirs with the steel hoops of long love and firm-set will; when each new companion was welcome as the morning, and each older face no harder to part from than yesterday when it is gone!

But now the time has come when I have had to make a further decision: the most solemn, the most weighty, the most tremendous in its import for wife and children, as well as for oneself, that it can ever befall a man to make. In this decision I had to act not only for myself, but for my family as well. My sons were not old enough to understand what this change imports, or to share with me the responsibility for making it. I therefore write these chapters not only in the hope that they may help other men in my position to make the same decision as I have made, and to make it with intelligence as well as with a whole heart, but also with the desire that a few years hence my children may read them, and realize that in choosing for them the sovereignty under which they are to live, I did not act hastily or without careful thought.

Nationality is a very serious, indeed a sacred fact. In declaring my allegiance to America, and thereby severing the loyalty that has hitherto bound me to the land of my birth, I feel as I imagine a person must feel who changes his religion and makes solemn public profession of a new faith. A man owes it to himself, as well as to the country which is receiving

him, to interpret, as best he can, what he understands to be the significance of the occasion.

I have observed that thousands of persons go through the rather perfunctory ceremony of naturalization in this country with little more reflection or seriousness than they would display in exchanging an old coat for a new one. America has not as yet seen the need of investing the transaction with any very impressive dignity or solemnity. The formalities accompanying it are as unedifying as those that attend the filling up of a tax-return. The officials entrusted with the issuing of naturalization papers are (at all events in the city where I live) a haphazard assemblage of low-grade "political appointees," who seem to be deaf and blind to the import of the acts which it is their duty to perform and to record.¹

But America in her deeper selfhood is fully aware of the immense privilege which she freely accords to the newcomers whom in such vast numbers she has welcomed from all the ends of the earth. Though it is her way to perform her public acts with a sort of awkward casualness, and not to express their vital meaning by symbol or ceremony, she nevertheless knows that the engagement into which she enters with her recruits of foreign birth is one of vital import and irrevocable significance both to herself and to them. A man may not attach much weight to the plain bald sentences with which he renounces his allegiance to the sovereign of the

¹ See the account of Dr. Edward Steiner's experience, in his book "From Alien to Citizen," p. 247. (New York: Revell, 1914.)

country whence he came, and pledges his fealty to the Republic. Nevertheless America knows well what she is offering to him, and what she demands of him; and the days in which it has fallen to my lot to take this final step have made clear, even to the most self-absorbed and careless immigrant, the fact that he has to commit himself to an engagement much more weighty, more heavily laden with the issues of life and death, than any other relation into which he may enter — even than marriage itself.

Such a matter has many sides, and must be considered from many points of view. In this chapter we will consider it with reference to the privilege which America confers upon her adopted children.

This Republic, which owes its existence to the blood-sacrifice of its founders, offers freely to all comers the citizenship which was so dearly bought by its makers. The Roman official before whom St. Paul was haled declared that he had obtained his imperial citizenship with a great sum. The privilege of incorporation into the American Commonwealth is bestowed freely; and this is as it should be, for such a gift cannot be measured in any terms of money. It is literally a priceless thing, because it was bought with men's lives; and nothing so purchased can be valued in cash. What, then, is it that we receive thus freely?

In the first place, admission to American citizenship means participation in American sovereignty. You become at once a part of the government of your country. Nothing stands between you and

direct participation in the election of all the officials who are to conduct the affairs of your city and State and the internal and external course of the nation as a whole. Save for the fact that, by reason of foreign birth, one is excluded from the possibility of occupying the highest executive post of the Federal Government, there is no office in city, State or nation to which one is not, by the fact of admission to citizenship, immediately made eligible. One becomes automatically a voter and a potential candidate for the suffrages of one's fellow-citizens. In the land of my birth, while it was theoretically possible for one to attain to any office except the Crown, it was in practice most exceptional for anybody but those born in a small and exclusive caste to attain to any important governmental or diplomatic position. That is not the case in this country. Despite many deviations from the ideal, it remains the fact that any boy from any class of the population may become a member of the Senate or House of Representatives of his State or of the national Government. You may enter any profession, and the higher education which is necessary as a qualification for the more intellectual and scientific professions is gratuitously at your disposal. There is still a great difference in this respect between England and America — notwithstanding that England is the most democratic nation of the Old World in this direction.

The next privilege conferred by naturalization is that of moral and civic equality with one's fellow-citizens, and the guarantee, backed by the whole

physical and spiritual force of the nation, of all those rights listed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the State and nation. The philosophy underlying the Declaration of Independence was provisional and transient, and, in my judgment, has been proved in large part unsound and untenable. But this does not in any way impair the practical value and importance of the rights which it declares to be inalienable and universal. It comes to this, that the nation regards every man as being, by the mere fact of his humanity, equal to every other human being, and entitled equally with all others to security of life and property, to liberty, and the pursuit of whatever he may freely elect as the main end of his being. These privileges are conferred unconditionally. No question is raised as to one's pedigree, as to the education one has received, as to the wealth or poverty of oneself or one's forebears. No inquisition is made as to a man's religious beliefs or (with one necessary exception) his political doctrines; on the contrary, we are most expressly and solemnly guaranteed entire liberty of conscience. The nation has not established and does not maintain any form of worship or any theological creed. It believes in educating all its citizens at its own expense, because it recognizes that education is necessary to the discharge of the high responsibilities which its constitution imposes upon all of them. This education is intended not to cut men to a set pattern, but rather to enable them to think freely for themselves, and to become independent individuals, capable not only of obedi-

ence to constituted authority, but also of initiative, counsel and criticism in the conduct of the nation's affairs.

The enormous wealth of the country is also laid open to the exertions which the nation, by its system of universal free education, prepares a man to put forth. Here again, no doubt, we must allow for differences between ideal and actuality, between theory and practice. Yet there is in this country no landed aristocracy, no privileged caste of monopolists, authorized to stand between the worker and the fruits of his labours, or to take from him in the name of ancient privilege or consecrated wrong the wealth that his efforts have created. The standard of living here is high; and if prices are high, so too are wages, salaries and profits. Taxation is low. There are no costly figureheads to maintain, no irremovable parasites upon the industry of the community. Abuses, of course, there are; yet they are only such as arise from the public's unworthiness of the privileges and responsibilities which the nation confers upon it. But it lies in the very nature of democracy that the power to remedy abuses shall be as widespread as the abuses themselves. The people gets the government it deserves. Where there is corruption or maladministration, waste, parasitism or despoiling of the public funds, the remedy lies with that same electorate whose carelessness or lack of public spirit has enabled the abuses to occur. If coarse, venal, unenlightened persons are entrusted with important posts in political life or the civil service, as they often are, it is our own

fault; without our consent it could not happen. One should not, therefore, institute unfavourable comparisons between America and other countries, because in some particular respects the standard of civilization, and of dignity, patriotism and efficiency in public life, is higher elsewhere than it is here. Where else is the antidote as widespread as the bane? Where else can an admitted evil be removed as soon as the people recognize that it is an evil, and desire to remove it? Reforms which in other countries can be effected only by revolution can be brought about here at any moment, by the simple and peaceful expedient of a public vote.

And this leads us to the further consideration, that America in giving her citizenship challenges the recruit to aid her in correcting what is amiss in her present organization. With sincere humility she asks him to contribute whatever he may have or may obtain of character and insight to the upbuilding of the more perfect Republic that is to be.

What could be more unreasonable than to expect in this recently settled land the finished grace, the mature poise, the deeply ingrained culture of countries that have been loved by an uninterrupted succession of generations, and enriched with the products of their labour and leisure, for many hundreds of years? Until four short centuries ago, no white man's foot had touched the soil of what is now the American Republic. For three centuries after its discovery, it was settled by tiny handfuls of people, who for the most part had been denied liberty and opportunity in the lands of their birth: otherwise

they would not have needed to come here and undertake the desperate task of pitting their inexperience and their miserably inadequate resources against the vast hostility of an untamed continent. During the last hundred years, the ever-increasing millions of natives and newcomers have poured an incalculable sum of energy and labour into the work of transforming a boundless wilderness into a garden. Nothing in the world's history is comparable with what has been done here. We have million-peopled cities where, within the memory of men yet living, there were primeval solitudes. Trackless deserts and virgin mountains have been spanned by magnificent railways. What has elsewhere been the growth of generations and centuries has here been accomplished in years and decades.

How unreasonable, then, is the attitude of those who, standing aside from this gigantic task, sneer at America for what she has not yet done, without conceding any recognition to what has been so wonderfully accomplished! When one looks at a city like Chicago, the mushroom growth of a short four-score years, the marvel is that any set of human beings can in such a time have produced a work so stupendous. It is in large part raw, ugly, strident and offensive; but so in large part are the cities of the Old World, which have had centuries of wealth and leisure in which to repair the errors of their youth. But Chicago has already begun to put on beauty, to shed the hasty chrysalis-shell which it at first thrust out in the effort to establish its footing, and to devote itself, with ever greater strenuousness

of self-regeneration, to the task of becoming a great as well as a large city.

And yet, when every allowance has been made which truth can demand for the "rawness" of America, is not the opportunity of manipulating this material into the new world that it is to become, the highest privilege which could be conferred on any man? In the Old World you are shown the beautiful or stately products of a wondrous past; you cannot withhold your admiration for the works produced by men of old, under the stimulus of inspirations which now are extinct. In the New World, you are paid the greater compliment of being asked to contribute to the inspiration of the future, to aid in creating the miracles of art and science that unborn men shall wonder at. Instead of being overawed and discouraged by the sight of masterpieces which the present cannot rival, you are stimulated to creative originality by the sight and the use of resources out of which a civilization of undreamed-of grandeur is to be hewn. The God of America does not say to you, "Stand aside, and see Me out of this chaos create a world in six days." He says, "Here is My new experiment, as yet for the most part without form and void; but over its face My spirit broods, and by your help and through your labour it shall be made perfect." Of all the privileges of American citizenship, this is the most inspiring and the most beneficent.

CHAPTER II

THE DUTY OF NATURALIZATION

THERE are in this country great numbers of men of foreign nationality, who have lived here for many years and who expect to remain here all their lives, and yet have not become citizens of the Republic, nor have any intention of doing so. Thousands of these men are married, often to wives of American birth who have forfeited their nationality by their union with foreigners; and they have children who will never know any other home but America. Nevertheless they thrust aside the suggestion that they should renounce their allegiance to lands with which they have ceased to have any tie of direct intercourse, and tender their loyalty to the country which has welcomed them, which protects them, and which offers them opportunities for the sake of which it was worth their while to abandon their native homes and pitch their tents here. Are they right in the course they take, or are they neglecting a great duty?

Now, this is obviously a question which every man must settle for himself; and for the conduct of some of these men there undoubtedly are reasons which would command our respect if we knew what they were. It is difficult to discuss the matter without seeming to cast on one's neighbours reflections

which in many cases are assuredly undeserved. Nevertheless, since in the case of those who intend this country to be the permanent home of themselves and their children, it seems to me to be their duty to offer their allegiance to the nation, I must set forth my reasons for holding this conviction, even at the risk of seeming to cast aspersions upon those who do not act as I have done.

It is not possible for any human being to live without a supreme loyalty, save at the cost of fatal deterioration of his character. Let a man make his private ends the one sovereign object of all his activities, let him have no purpose greater than his individual gain, or that of his immediate family, and it must follow that his nature will shrink and wither, and become "subdued to what it works in, like the dyer's hand." It is a proven fact of psychology, and not a mere theological assertion, that in order to find one's life one must lose it, and that the certain way to lose it is to be concerned only about finding it. Every man or woman who for years has sacrificed and laboured for any cause that seeks to promote the general good, or to make smoother the pathway of posterity, becomes aware of a vast, indefinable difference that separates him or her from the shrivelled and atrophied person who has cared only for "miserable aims that end with self." Nothing can be more pitiable than the fate of the person who has made money-getting the sole end of his career, and has never known the ecstasy of self-abandonment for a super-personal object.

Now, the nation in which one is born, or to which

one has sworn allegiance, is and must always remain to every human being the greatest and most commanding sphere of *immediate* duty. It is quite true that we have a duty to humanity at large; but it is no less true that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the only way in which a man can discharge this duty is by working for the moral, intellectual, or even material advancement of his own nation. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of America, regarded in the light of its historic function as a land of refuge for the oppressed of all the world. What could be plainer than that the main duty of an American to these oppressed refuge-seekers is to make this country correspond to the ideal vision which its standards and professions have engendered in their minds? Not one American in ten thousand, even in war-time, can do anything directly to ameliorate the lot of the unfortunate in Russia or Galicia or the Balkans; but, by improving conditions at home, by making freedom not only an ideal but a reality, by securing substantial economic as well as political justice for all in America, every citizen can serve those to whom America is an example and potentially a harbour of refuge.

Now if a settler in this country lets his loyalty to the land of his birth wither and die out, and does not, by his own free act, assume an equivalent loyalty to the United States, he is himself the loser, and America gains nothing by his residence here. All her privileges, except those which (very rightly) are reserved for citizens, are given to him. He greedily accepts and exploits them to the uttermost.

Yet it does not seem to him at all his duty to tender anything in return, save what the State extorts from him in taxes. But if such a sentiment became widespread, if the whole population, or anything like a majority of it, were to become infected with this sordid and thankless spirit, how long could America remain the sanctuary of the oppressed? How long could it continue to deserve that name? The Republic became the land of refuge because men who loved it laboured and gave their lives to make it so. The liberty they won for us has made it possible for the self-seeker to act as he does to-day. But his spirit, if it became general, would in time destroy the heritage by which he profits. Democratic institutions in themselves are nothing but machinery; it is only the purpose for which the machinery is used that can give it beauty and dignity or make it holy. If they who owe everything to America refuse to love and serve her, she must inevitably, in time, become unworthy of the love and service of others. It is only loyalty that can make a nation great. It is only by being loved that a country can become lovable. And the thousands who prey upon America and yet condemn her; who make their homes here, and yet reserve the allegiance of their hearts for the other lands which they have deserted;—how dare they scoff at America for not being all that she should be, when it is their ingratitude, more than anything else, that prevents her from fulfilling to the utmost her ideals?

One could not venture to speak thus publicly of one's personal reasons for coming to this country,

were it not that the commonplaceness of one's case makes it typical of the situation of thousands of others. There was no coercion exercised upon me. In my native land I enjoyed political and religious freedom; I was able to earn a fairly satisfactory livelihood. It was by my own free decision that I expatriated myself. Coming here first for a holiday, and afterwards for a short professional tour, and finding that for such work as mine there was a better field here than in England, I accepted the flattering invitation extended to me by my Chicago friends to return and dwell among them. Inasmuch as I was not expelled by tyranny from my mother country, I did not fall back upon America as a mere necessity. I am in the position of a man who has married a wife, and who, having had every opportunity of knowing her and her family beforehand, cannot pretend that he was deceived either as to her character and social position or as to those of her relations. Or I am like a man who has bought a house which he had first surveyed. He knows how the house is constructed, the advantages and disadvantages of its site and the aspects of the neighbourhood. If he is not satisfied he does not buy; but when he has bought, he has no right to complain of matters about which he was fully informed beforehand.

Why then did I deliberately choose America and forsake England? Why did I come out of my country, and from my kindred, and from my father's house, unto the land which the circumstances of my experience had shown me? Not for abstract or fanciful reasons, but upon the most solidly practical

considerations. I came here because my work is more in demand and is better rewarded here than in England; because opportunities of initiative and self-development are open to me here as they were not in the Old Country; because class distinctions and considerations of birth or ancestry do not here prevent one from gaining any success which one may have energy or skill to deserve. I came here, too, because in this country I could secure a better education for my children, and give them a more auspicious start in life, than England seemed willing to provide.

In short, America is more generous to me, in regard to all my immediate interests and duties, than was my native land. It is no ingratitude to England that makes me say this. I have always loved her, and I always shall; for, though a man must needs forsake father and mother that he may cleave to his wife, it does not follow that he need cease to love his parents or to look back with gratitude to them. England has her faults, as every nation necessarily must have; but I did not abandon her on account of her faults, nor yet because I was naïve enough to think America faultless. The ideals England has taught me are noble ones; and if at times I must criticize her, I can only do so by applying the standards of moral judgment which she herself has instilled into me.

But, having made my choice, with what conscience can I do less than meet America in the spirit in which she has met me? How can I make of this land a mere convenience, and say, in the quaint

phrase of the Psalmist, "Moab is my washpot"? Where would be my honour if I came here like a parasite, to suck my sustenance from this soil and then return to enjoy it to the land whence I came? With what decency could I live here, availing myself of the freedom of republican institutions and thriving under them, and at the same time sneering at America for the imperfection of her institutions, and praising by contrast those of the country which I had left? Such conduct is in the highest degree snobbish and ungentlemanly; — not to call it by any severer term.

Consider, further, the plight of the person who has allowed his native allegiance to lapse, and has not assumed allegiance to the land of his adoption. He is that most forlorn and pitiable of all creatures, the man without a country. He is an uprooted tree, an extracted tooth, a divorcé, an organ that has lost its function, and therewith lost its meaning and its reason for existence. For a man does not take his character, his impress, his individuality, from the world as a whole; he takes it from the nation that gave birth to his soul and body. He is an epitome of the vast, continuous life of his people. His personality resumes and carries forward that of all his ancestors, through the storied centuries that lie behind him. The old saying, "Homo sum" — "I am a man" — is at best not more than a half-truth; and he who used it should have said, "Civis Romanus sum" — "I am a Roman citizen." For you never see a human being who is purely and simply human; you see men who are Romans, Greeks,

Jews; English, Italians, Frenchmen, Russians. There is no such thing as unqualified, undifferentiated humanity. Or, rather, humanity in that sense is an abstraction, — an idea in the mind, formed by isolating in imagination what cannot be isolated objectively: the common element in all people of all nationalities. The notion that the time will ever come when all that distinguishes nations from each other will be obliterated, and men the world over will be cut to the same pattern, use the same speech, inherit the same traditions and cherish an identical loyalty, is a wild, impossible dream. — But of this we must speak hereafter.

For the present, it suffices to remind ourselves of the truth that a man *cannot* effectually pull up his roots from his native soil without promptly sinking them anew in the soil of his new homeland. The life of the spirit must be fed from some source; and a man's loyalty (however he may misjudge himself when he dreams that he has ceased to have any) is in truth given, consciously or unconsciously, either to one people or to another. One may remain unaware of this for half a lifetime; but our obliviousness of a fact does not destroy the fact. Very few people consciously remember that the atmosphere has weight; still fewer could tell you exactly with how many pounds' pressure it thrusts down upon us at sea-level. Yet this utterly ignored fact is the most absolutely unescapable influence of our life; never for a single second can we withdraw ourselves from it.

And so it is with one's national loyalty. It may

lie buried in oblivion through years of self-centred absorption in money-getting or the pursuit of pleasure, or of dreaming in the Lotus-land of cosmopolitanism. But at last the hour will strike when there will come a clash, a conflict, a sharp issue on which one must decide. Then the buried flame will rekindle itself; the volcano will prove that it is not extinct; it will blaze forth anew through the cold embers of affection and instinct. And the man whose indifference, or whose mistaken theory, has made him think of himself as neither Jew nor Greek, but a dispassionate, cosmopolitan humanitarian, or a solely self-regarding individualist, will become aware that he is after all a patriot, a member of a nation, one in will and devotion with a whole people. Then, perchance, he may find that his resurrected heart belongs to the nation that he has forsaken, and that has in consequence forsaken him; and woe to him in that hour!

With what dramatic, with what tragic intensity has this truth been brought home to myriads of men, the world over, in connection with the present war! How were the anti-national theories shattered, and the icy indifferences broken up, by the swelling of the great deeps! What has become of the doctrine of those Socialists who thought that patriotism was only a decoy-duck held by exploiters before the eyes of the working people? Thousands of men who for many a year had been thinking and proclaiming this, have now by their death given the lie to the teaching they had proclaimed. The idea that the real division among men is along the line of class,

and not of nationality, — that a worker or capitalist in one country has more in common with the men of his own class abroad than with the other classes among his own people, — which had been drilled into the minds of the European working classes by the followers of Karl Marx, vanished like a thawed icicle the moment there came that awful voice which called to the deeps of human nature. “Your country” was the word of power, even to the men who had believed that one country is as good (or as bad) as another, and that their loyalty was due in equal measure to all the world.

No! the cosmopolitans misunderstand themselves. When Paine, the stalwart pioneer of liberty alike in politics and religion, declared that the world was his country, he was uttering a piece of doctrinaire sentimentality, not a rational conviction. Neither he nor any other man was ever able to live out that facile but impracticable sophism. He did not really mean to insult his American hearers by saying that they were no more to him than the Kaffirs or Hottentots, and that the summit of Fuji Yama was as dear to his heart as Beacon Hill or the site of Independence Hall. That was what he *said*, in effect; but he did not mean it, because he could not. Sir Walter Scott, in lines too hackneyed to be quotable, was literally right in saying that only a man whose soul is *dead* can cease to feel the thrill of the words, “My native land.” Paine was a trueborn Englishman. That is why, like all true Englishmen, he had grown to hate King George III and the system of Prussian tyranny which that petty-souled alien tried

to impose on England and America. The ideals he began to express as soon as he arrived in America were English ideals; for, be it remembered, the demands embodied in the Declaration of Independence are as English in origin and spirit as the language in which they are expressed.

It is clear, then, to me, that every immigrant who intends to make this country his permanent home is bound in honour to accept the privilege of incorporation into the American Republic. It is his duty both to the nation and to himself to do this. If he refuses it, he is rather shabbily sponging on America. He is a bad guest, a thankless and parasitic intruder. But he is also doing a grievous harm to himself. He has lost his share in the general life of his native land, and has no right to take any in the country of his condescending half-adoption. In case of war between America and his old country, he finds himself an alien enemy in the one, with the doors of the other closed against him. If he thinks that there are things amiss in America which he might help to rectify, he has not acquired the right of offering his counsel or criticism. With what grace, indeed, could he express himself upon such issues? America's answer, felt if not uttered, would be: "No! You are using me and exploiting me, but you do not intend to blend yourself with my life nor to share in my upward struggles. I am a convenience to you; you prefer to give your loyalty elsewhere. My effort at building up a nation, manifold yet one, recruited from all the world yet united by liberty and democracy, does not inspire your rev-

erence or enlist your allegiance. My institutions are not good enough for your sensitive spirit. So be it; but do not presume to affront me with your advice or criticism. Do I not know, as well as you can tell me, that there are many things amiss in my household? But these shall be corrected by those who love me well enough to unite with me in spite of my defects, and who have enough faith in my spirit and my future to make of me not only a place of exploitation but the object of their dearest allegiance."

CHAPTER III

WHAT CAN I GIVE TO AMERICA?

THIS country is pre-eminently the land of the doctrine of Rights. The conflict which led to its separate establishment was inspired by a sense of violated justice, and the assertion of rights is made primary and principal in the historical document by which the Colonies declared themselves an independent nation. In that composition the word "rights" occurs nine times, and the word "duty" appears only once, in a clause in which it is made subordinate to a claim of rights. The tradition thus inaugurated has continued ever since to characterize the American spirit; and, although no nation in history has evinced in its actions a finer sense of collective duty, or had (considering its very short lifetime) a more illustrious roster of sons who have freely given their lives to the sustaining of its national ideals, it yet remains true that in the thought of the average American his rights come first and his duties a somewhat laggard second. He thinks of the Government, the army and the navy as existing for the sake of securing and safeguarding his rights. The members of the legislatures in State and nation are his servants, paid to give effect to his will.

But this is a one-sided and only half-true way of regarding the situation. It has not been sufficiently

considered that the circumstances which gave rise to the conflict with King George III, and which inevitably coloured and toned the Declaration of Independence, were exceptional and transient, and that the claims of right in that document are not fitted, *and were never intended*, to be the foundation-stones of a permanent and complete doctrine of the relations of men in society under normal conditions. Although it is natural in times of war and revolution for claims of right to be thrust forward, it is no less natural and necessary that when, by the issue of the conflict, the rights in dispute have been secured, the emphasis should be transferred to those Duties of Man from which all rights are necessarily derivative, and upon which they are dependent.

The primacy of our duties over our rights is a truth which does not need any very elaborate or subtle argument for its demonstration. The fact that a man is born at all is the evidence of an effort, so to speak, on the part of the universe, which began millions of years ago and has needed the co-operation not only of all the forms of life, from its very beginnings, but also of the vast energies of the inorganic world. This far-drawn cosmic pedigree of ours is vividly described in a passage in Henry Drummond's book entitled "The Ascent of Man," from which I may be permitted to quote a few sentences:

Those who know the Cathedral of St. Mark's will remember how this noblest of the Stones of Venice owes its greatness to the patient hands of centuries and centuries of workers, how every quarter of the globe has been spoiled

of its treasures to dignify this single shrine. But he who ponders over the more ancient temple of the human body will find imagination fail him as he tries to think from what remote and mingled sources, from what lands, seas, climates, atmospheres, its various parts have been called together, and by what innumerable contributory creatures, swimming, creeping, flying, climbing, each of its several members was wrought and perfected. . . .

Even to make the first cell possible, stellar space required to be swept of matter, suns must needs be broken up and planets cool, the agents of geology labour millennium after millennium at the unfinished earth to prepare a material resting-place for the coming guest. Consider all this, and judge if Creation could have a sublimer meaning, or the human race possess a more splendid genesis.

But even in this eloquent passage, the specific basis of duty is not made clear. Whatever we may owe to the unconscious forces of nature, the fact that they *are* unconscious makes it impossible for any relation of the nature of duty to exist between us and them, or for us to feel towards them any sense of gratitude, save by the exercise of poetic imagination. When, however, out of the interplay of mindless energies manifested in the suns and stars, the beginnings of conscious, self-directing life had emerged,¹ the situation underwent a radical change. Social evolution would have remained for ever impossible, had not man from the very beginning accepted the stern condition that he should not live merely for himself. In proportion as he rose

¹ The philosophic reader is requested kindly to note that this statement does not involve any admission that consciousness is a product of matter or physical energy, but only that certain determinations of these are necessary conditions of its manifestation.

above animality, his activities have ever been forward-looking and other-regarding. He has pitted himself against the hostile forces of nature in the interests of wife and child, of tribe and nation. Our life to-day would have been impossible but for the unrecorded struggles of the cave-men and the ploughing and sowing of the nameless, forgotten generations.

When, therefore, one speaks of duty coming first, far from stating a mere arbitrary dogma, one is only expressing in a shorthand phrase the indisputable fact that each human being owes to mankind a debt far vaster than any activity even of the longest and most gifted life can possibly discharge. And when to this we add the fact that the rare gift of the genius is itself something that has been conferred upon him by the human race, — something which he could not and did not create for himself, — the convincingness of the plea is rendered overwhelming.

This being the case, I do not feel it necessary to apologize for discussing what the immigrant can give to America before raising the question of what America can give to him. My contention is that anybody who rightly considers the circumstances of human life and is not a monster of egotism or ingratitude, ought to approach his country in the spirit that asks "What can I give?" rather than "What can I get?" Patriotism, indeed, has for its basis a recognition, often instinctive and unconscious, of the facts I have here briefly indicated. To each individual person the nation stands as the representative of humanity at large; and because our immediate

debt is to the nation, and because, moreover, it is to the nation only (as a general rule) that we are able to render any direct assistance, it is right that the service of our country should be the channel in which our activities should run.

As in the following paragraphs I shall occasionally be constrained to speak somewhat personally, I desire to guard myself against the supposition that I am a ridiculous egotist, or that I have any excessive idea of the contribution I can make to the well-being of the Republic. Obviously, one has no right to speak for immigrants in general, since the very value of immigration into a democracy lies in the fact that each group of different national or racial origin may contribute something which the others cannot give. If I were a Russian or a Greek, I should naturally have to answer the question which this chapter asks in a very different fashion. This portion of my book, accordingly, cannot pretend to apply to immigrants of other than British origin, except in so far as the duties of citizens are the same universally, and except that it may possibly induce others to put to themselves the same question that I am proposing to myself and to all Americans who hail from Britain.

1. In the first place, all newcomers can contribute to America their *labour*; and any study of the industrial and physical development of the country during the last hundred years will show how great their contribution in this kind has been and continues to be. But not less important — nay, more important — than the actual work is the sense of

the social ends which all honourable labour subserves. It is these alone which can give it dignity and make of it a means for the education and spiritual development of the labourer. The ploughman and his horse are both workers; but the difference between them is that the ploughman has (or can have, and therefore ought to have) a vision of the distant populations who are to be sustained by the produce of his task, whereas the horse has presumably no consciousness of the ends which he is promoting. Not the least of the tragedies of modern life, and especially of the life of the labouring class, is the fact that their work is so often gone about in a dull, routine spirit, without any enlarging consciousness of the place of each man's task in the common life, and the remote and splendid goals toward which it is directed. We seldom or never think of ordinary wage-work as a means of education. We think of the man as a mere tool or instrument. We speak of him only as a "hand," and of workers collectively as "help." We thus betray the fact that we are unconscious of the worker as an end in himself, or of his work as a means to the enrichment of his life and the development of his distinctively human powers. If I am to be a worker, I must insist, as a human being, that I be permitted not only to exercise the strength of my body and the craft of my hands, but to enter with my will and intellect into the purpose of my work. Not only has nobody a right to degrade me to the level of a mere tool, but I have no right to suffer myself to be thus degraded. The immigrant, who gives his

labour, may render to the commonwealth a pressingly needed service by contributing also the conception of labour as a means to the common ends of the nation, and therefore as a means to the development of the higher human attributes of the labourer himself; for these alone constitute the true wealth of a democracy.

2. Every man, moreover, who swears allegiance to the United States must do so with the clear consciousness that that oath obliges him, should the need arise, to offer *his life* in the service of the country against any foreign enemy. It is perhaps in this connection that the perfunctory manner in which the naturalization ceremony has hitherto been carried out is most to be regretted, since the solemnity of the obligation thus assumed is apt to escape the attention of the person who undertakes it. Your vow to the United States is a vow that in case of need (*which need is to be determined not by you individually, but by the constituted authorities of the Republic*) you are ready to take arms against the land of your birth, and to give your life in fighting for America against those who have hitherto been your fellow-countrymen.¹ Bethink yourself carefully of this tremendous pledge, and face the situation at its possible worst before you take it. If you

¹ The language of the statute governing the admission of aliens, though somewhat gauche, is decisive on this point. "He [the person naturalized] will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." Act of June 29, 1906, § IV, par. 3. This does not mean, of course, that he is to bear true faith and allegiance to all enemies, foreign and domestic. It may seem to say so; but that is only the playful little way of our legislators.

are not ready to do this, you have no right to take the oath of naturalization, for you will be forswearing yourself. When such an exigency arises, as for vast numbers of American citizens it lately arose, those who are faced with so awful a responsibility are entitled to our fullest sympathy; and every immigrant who takes the oath may well pray that he shall never be called upon to fulfil this most tragic of all freely chosen duties.

Nevertheless, it must be insisted that whenever the crisis does arise, no foreign-born citizen shall shirk his duty, or be permitted to pretend that he did not know to what he was committed. The terms of his contract with America are as clear and explicit as language can make them; and if a man is not willing to carry out the contract, he ought never to enter into it. He is not compelled to be naturalized, and it is inexcusable in him to hesitate or refuse his duties as an American, after he has, freely and with open eyes, made his final and irrevocable choice.

I am a naturalized immigrant. I was a British subject, but I am so no more; for I have, with full consciousness of the import of my act, "renounced for ever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland." This means that if, in the whirligig of international politics, a state of war should arise between the United States and Great Britain, I am sternly bound in honour to give my service, whenever called upon, to sustain the cause of America against Great Britain. It may mean that I shall have to engage

in murderous contest with my own brother or with my oldest friends. If so, I must set my teeth and go through with it. Or it may mean that the Republic will ask my sons of me for the same grim duty. That, if anything can, would be a heavier burden than the other; but again I must neither hesitate nor countenance any hesitation on their part. For the choice of nationality is one of the irrevocable and irreversible finalities of life. It is *Either-Or*; *if you are an American, you can be nothing else*. Other Englishmen before me have made this choice, and have not failed in their duty when the time of testing came. Were not "Common Sense" and "The Crisis" written by an Englishman? Thousands of men of German origin, too, are at this moment proving that human nature is equal to the heavy demand. Give, then, your pledge to the Republic, with open eyes. Do all that a man honourably can to prevent war, and especially the tragedy of war between the two great English-speaking democracies. But if, in spite of reason, in spite of all that should make for the fraternal co-operation of peoples, such a tragedy should occur in your time, remember to what obligations you have unchangeably committed yourself.

3. A third gift which the immigrant may bring is that of *faith in the institutions of America*, despite the defects and perversions of their present working. And it may be that the experience of an Englishman is peculiarly calculated to prepare him for this service. For he has known what it is to live under democratic laws and customs, to enjoy and

profit by them, and recognize them as blessings, even though at the same time he were in constant rebellion against the injustices of incomplete democracy, the tyrannies of aristocracy and capitalism disguised under democratic trappings, and the selfishness and self-assertion of those who misuse the opportunities of power and self-realization which democracy gives. He has thus learned to discriminate between the democratic ideal and the sometimes unsatisfactory actualities of a democratic community. He is therefore less likely than others may be to take the sins and stupidities of a republic as a proof that republicanism must needs be sinful and stupid. He knows too well that, with the best constitution in the world, the actual state of a nation will still depend, and must for ever depend, upon the character and capacity of its citizens. He cannot be deceived by the frothy platitudes of the demagogue or the spread-eagleism of the jingo. He knows that the idolatry of flags and phrases may be to the full as deceptive and pernicious as the idolatry of crowns and monarchs; and that a paper Constitution can as readily be perverted into a means of destroying the very things it was intended to promote as can the consuetudinary prerogatives of a House of Lords or an established Church.

For men whose younger years have been spent under the rule of efficient autocracies, it is a not unnatural, though a wholly erroneous inference, that the waste, carelessness, speculation and general inefficiency often to be observed in republics (*e.g.*, in France and America before the war) are the neces-

sary and the only possible fruits of democracy. Such observers are convinced that the average man is a stupid and selfish person. They hold with Machiavelli, that —

in the general men are ungrateful, inconstant, hypocritical, fearful of danger, and covetous of gain. Whilst they receive any benefit by you, and the danger is at a distance, they are absolutely yours; their blood, their estates, their lives and their children . . . are all at your service. But when mischief is at hand, and you have present need of their help, they make no scruple to revolt; and that prince who leaves himself naked of other preparations, and relies wholly upon their professions, is sure to be ruined.¹

They therefore look upon the attempt to organize a nation on the basis of universal freedom and self-government as a crazy dream, and are convinced that the only enduring instruments for the securing of a people against the chances of the world are arms, wielded by the strong-willed. "Men," says Machiavelli elsewhere, "are either to be flattered and indulged or utterly destroyed—because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves, but for great ones they cannot: so that injury is to be done in such a manner as not to fear any revenge."² This is the basis of the doctrine of *Macht-politik*: a belief in the baseness of mankind. All men will be either exploiters of their fellows or exploited by them; the wise man, accordingly, will take care that he shall do the exploiting, and do it on so grand a scale and with such thoroughness that none shall be able to withstand him.

¹ *The Prince*, cap. xvii.

² *Ibid.*, cap. iii.

Whoever holds such a belief must look with amused contempt on any community that seeks to build itself upon faith in human nature and in the capacity of the average man to think clearly upon world-issues, and to decide justly, even when a just decision makes against his personal interests. Nor can it be forgotten that there is always enough corruption in every republic or democracy to give to such a view a superficial plausibility. But when a half-truth is isolated, it is invariably transformed into a whole falsehood. The democrat and republican takes his stand upon the fact that no autocracy has ever endured; and that, in every case where tyranny has collapsed, or where schemes of world-conquest have broken down, — from the days of Xerxes and Alexander to those of the Pan-German conspiracy, — the failure has been due to the ignoring of the high and heroic potentialities which are always present even in those people whose ordinary conduct is mean, grasping and selfish.

An Englishman, then, can pledge his faith to America with a firm belief in the soundness of her ideals and a convinced preference for her institutions over those of other nations, without for a moment closing his eyes to the wrongs that are prevalent under them. His contribution to the Republic is this faith and this insight, born of his experience in his native land. He has enjoyed enough of liberty to know that it can only be preserved and kept pure by eternal vigilance; but also that it is unconditionally worth the price. He knows that if the manifest shortcomings of men had been held in the past as

a sufficient reason for despairing of their possibilities, the liberties that the British race has achieved for itself and the world by a thousand years of struggle would never have been won, for the struggle would not have seemed worth while. But he also knows that not until heroic demands are made on men does the best element of their nature disclose itself and begin to grow.

Now, it is painfully easy, not only for foreigners to indicate conditions in American political and social life which are a disgrace to the name of democracy, but for Americans themselves to see these things. Indeed, in the few years that I have lived in this country, I have heard far more railing against America from Americans than I ever heard from foreigners, either here or in Europe. Many of my American friends seem to have taken it for granted that, in political life at all events, their fellow-countrymen were such as Machiavelli declared all men to be. They did not expect common honesty in the public service, or ordinary, everyday business capacity from the officials in charge of city and State affairs. They have often hinted to me that corruption, selfishness, speculation and inefficiency were such common and constant attributes of political life that anything different would be like a miracle. Of course I have never believed this; neither, I suspect, did those of my American friends from whom I have heard it. My reason for referring to it here is to make clear that an immigrant, at all events when he has had experience of democracy elsewhere, is neither to be deceived about American institutions by

the flamboyant rhodomontade of the Fourth of July orator, nor yet rendered cynical by the contrast of the reality to the ideal picture.

The first lesson that we have to learn in dealing with our fellow-men is that we must not expect too much of them. But if this sounds cynical, let me hasten to add the second lesson, which is that every human being can at times rise above his record, and that we are often put to shame by finding how we have under-estimated men's possibilities. The same is true with regard to those collective activities of mankind which we call political systems. No polity is exempt from abuse; no nation lives constantly up to its ideals. There is corruption everywhere, the main difference being in the degrees of coarseness and blatancy with which it is displayed. Undoubtedly we have had in this country too much of the saloon-keeper in politics, and it is inevitable that corruption in a saloon-keeper should be characterized by the offensive coarseness which is usually associated with his trade. But one cannot forget that England has occasionally raised brewers to the peerage, and placed them in the House of Lords, there to obstruct by their veto every measure of temperance legislation that threatened to touch their profits. Nor can I see why it is worse for an American saloon-keeper (who, after all, has to get, by hook or crook, the support of a majority of his constituents) to sit in a city council or State legislature in the interest of his trade, than for a Lord Bass or a Lord Burton to buy his way into the House of Peers, where he has the power both to

initiate legislation and to veto that passed by the House of Commons, without ever having to solicit a vote, and being unremovable from his post of vantage by any protest of the electors. Both things, of course, are wrong, and I am not apologizing for the saloon-keeper here. My point is only that corruption may exist even where all its associations are those of outward charm and culture.

But as no rational Englishman despairs of England because of such unjust anomalies as those to which I have alluded, so neither has any American the right to despair of the Republic because its institutions are capable of abuse. I have formed my impression of the working of the machinery of public life in this country not from the disparaging comments of my friends, but by my own observation, and by a reading of such admittedly authoritative studies as Lord Bryce's book on "The American Commonwealth"; and from these sources I have acquired a deep respect for the flexibility of American institutions and for their ready responsiveness to the impact of public opinion. To revert for a moment to what was mentioned earlier, the fact that startles a newcomer is the rapidity with which things in this country are changing for the better. Not only is it true that the personnel of local administrations tends steadily to be drawn from better educated and more honourable sections of the community, but the pressure upon political bodies exercised by self-created or unofficial organs of the higher public opinion grows ever greater, ever more irresistible. Indeed, the very critics whose cynical com-

ments would lead the unwary to despair, betray their amiable inconsistency by admitting that things are much better than they used to be; — and this after denunciations implying that things are now so bad that they never could conceivably have been worse.

One of the advantages of coming from a community with a much longer history is the habit a man forms of comparing the successive stages in the development of a nation's life. Nobody who has any idea of what English political life was like in the eighteenth century, in the days of Walpole and of Wilkes and Junius; nobody who has read the tremendous indictment of even so moderate a reformer as Edmund Burke; nobody who recalls Dickens's picture of the election at Eatanswill, and remembers that that flaring and delightful satire scarcely exaggerates the corruption that permeated English political life less than a century ago; — nobody, I say, who compares all this with the present state of things in England can ever again despair of a democracy, or fail to recognize that, as freedom extends and becomes more of a reality and less of a pretence, a nation is certain to go forward in the path of self-regeneration and self-purification.

4. A fourth contribution which every immigrant can bring to America consists in the positive good which he has derived from *the civilization of his native country*. It is at this point that one may seem to be setting oneself up, in a ludicrously pharisaic fashion, as an example. I must therefore beg the reader to understand that in what I am about to say I am thinking not of what I am, but of what any

Englishman ought to be. I must also repeat that on this subject the testimony of each immigrant will be different according as he hails from one nation or another. I contend that the British contribution to American civilization, great and splendid as I believe it to be, is yet only the chief among diverse elements that have entered into the life of the Republic. Nobody dreams that America is, and no enlightened thinker will desire that it should be, a mere reproduction of Anglo-Saxondom, or an instance of what a community of purely British origin would become under republican institutions. The value of the American experiment would be lost if this nation became conformed exclusively to the type of any one of the nationalities which have entered into its composition. The business of America is to produce a new type of national character and civilization, by the cross-fertilization of the many culture-types which the Republic has absorbed and is absorbing. Let it, then, be understood that I here enumerate the possible contributions of the British immigrant merely as contributions, and not as an exhaustive characterization of the American people.

5. The first, then, of these contributions is *the historic memory* which British birth and education give to a man. He inevitably escapes the shallowness of a retrospect that is bounded by 1776 or 1619, or even by 1492. Even though his philosophy may not have accustomed him to apply the formal doctrine of evolution to human societies and institutions, he still cannot forget that in our life to-day, and in the standards of right and wrong by which

we appraise or condemn our present surroundings, the forces that were at work in the fifth century and the tenth, and the thirteenth and fifteenth and sixteenth, are still present and active. He knows himself to be not a new creature, but the latest pulsation of a universal rhythm, the continuation of a spirit that was "hoary with exceeding eld" before the American continent was known to the European adventurers. He is at home in the pages of Chaucer; he remembers the demands made upon the Norman kings for the restitution of the laws of Edward the Confessor. The name of Alfred the Great is no myth to him, and he consciously participates in the perennial and indomitable struggle for freedom, over the older and obscurer efforts of which that name sheds its imperishable lustre. He finds himself on familiar ground and among his own people when he contemplates the quietly serviceable higher life preserved, amid the welter of constant warfare, by the monks of Jarrow in the seventh century, and reflected in the quaintly charming pages of Bede. The characters of Shakespeare are not to him remote and unfamiliar figures, for he has lived among their counterparts and talked with them. The struggles of the seventeenth century were still pulsating and reverberating in the forward movements among which he was bred.

To him, therefore, the spirit of 1776, when he meets with it in American history, is neither new nor strange. He knows that long before there was a man George Washington, there had been one Oliver Cromwell, who, as Boswell's father pithily

remarked to Dr. Johnson, "Gar'd kings ken that they had a *lith* in their necks"; that before Benjamin Franklin there had been such men as Hampden and Pym and Russell and Algernon Sidney. Being familiar with the spirit which in 1649 executed Charles I as "a tyrant, a traitor, a murderer and a public enemy," he responds at a glance to that indictment of George III which we call the Declaration of Independence, and knows quite well its antecedents. With such a memory, it would be surprising if he were out of sympathy with that long struggle for freedom which is English history as well as American history, or did not in some measure share the spirit which made that struggle and has been made by it.

If, then, all this has not gone for nothing with him, there should be something of worth in the patriotism that he offers to the land of his choice. He must feel his trusteeship for the spirit of Hampden and Falkland, of Milton and Halifax, of Burke and Macaulay, of Cobden and Gladstone. They should be to him a present influence, an enduring standard. His aspiration should be that he and his children shall prove no worse Americans than these were Englishmen, that his thought shall become no more provincial than theirs, that his service shall be as magnanimous and disinterested, his vision as far-reaching, his grasp of principle as clear and tenacious.

6. With such a standard, the quondam Britisher will also be able to contribute a certain *dissatisfaction with the actual* which is the animating spring

of all improvement. Major Ian Hay Beith, in his delightful little essay entitled "Getting Together," gives some advice to an Englishman as to what he should remember in conversing with an American, and to an American as to what he must bear in mind in talking with an Englishman. To the Englishman he says, "Remember you are talking to a man who regards his nation as the greatest nation in the world. He will probably tell you this." To the American he says, "Remember you are talking to a man who regards his nation as the greatest in the world. He will not tell you this, because he takes it for granted that you know already." As satire, nothing could be more delicate and charming; but the patriotism of a man who derives his spirit from England ought to wean him from any such complacency as Major Beith attributes both to Englishmen and Americans. It may lead him to determine that his nation shall *become* the greatest in the world, but never to take satisfaction in the belief that it already is so. The Englishman has the reputation of being a grumbler, and quite often it is true that this disposition degenerates into mere petulance and querulousness. Yet, as Aristotle would remind us, every vice is a deteriorated virtue; and the spirit of complaint, when it is not morbid, is a spirit of wholesome criticism. The Englishman turned American will neither say nor think that America is the greatest nation in the world; but he will sternly determine to do all in his power to make it greater than it is. He chooses it because he is convinced that by promise and potency it is destined to an incalculable

development, that it carries the seeds of the richest blessings both to its own population and to the world at large; but his very consciousness of the ideal will forbid him to be blind to the imperfection of things as they are. Nor will he condescend to flatter the ignorant egotism and vanity of the populace, whose braggadocio and contempt for the foreigner are at once the proof and the measure of its own unworthiness of the American ideal.

Indeed, we do not reach the level of a truly discriminating and humane patriotism until we abandon the use of the comparative and superlative degrees in estimating the position of our country among the nations of the world. Not only ought we to cast out from ourselves the transfigured vanity and tribal egotism which we display when we speak of our nation as greatest, but we ought also to realize that the world as a whole will never become truly the kingdom of man until all nations are great, and until each is recognized by all the rest as embodying and contributing to the world some distinctive excellence which belongs to no other. Our ambition for our own country, accordingly, should be not to over-top or eclipse its sister nations, but to develop the moral and spiritual implications of its own ideal in the service of mankind at large. It is only when we attain this level that we are true to the standard expressed in classic and imperishable form by President Wilson, in the series of public utterances by which he precluded and proclaimed our entrance into the European war. For nations as for men the standard should be: "He that is greatest among

you shall be your servant." The spirit, whether in man or State or nation, that talks of itself as "biggest and best," that takes pride in the fact that its population or its wealth is larger than that of others, is a tawdry, provincial, nauseating spirit, of which the only thing to be said is that, so long as it is satisfied with its own greatness, it can never be truly great.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT CAN AMERICA GIVE TO ME?

WITH a sense of relief, I turn from the somewhat embarrassing theme of the preceding chapter to one on which there seems less danger of one's purpose being misunderstood. But this feeling is speedily qualified by the recognition that into this chapter I must somehow manage to compress a well-nigh inexhaustible story. How in a few pages shall I even catalogue the benefits which I am conscious of having already derived from America, to say nothing of those "good things to come" of which I have a lively presentiment? The undertaking seems desperate; but as the attempt must needs be made, I must throw myself upon the reader's indulgence, confident that he will not too severely condemn an effort to compass something palpably impossible.

1. In seeking to analyze and assort the elements in my own consciousness which I owe to my contact with America, the first great and definite benefit which rises into clear outline is that of *emancipation from the burden of the past.*

When out of the silence of the ocean one passes into the deafening clamour of the streets of New York, and again when one journeys on into the yet more raucous and bewildering (and unnecessary)

shrieks of the Chicago "Loop," one seems for a time to be lost amid the turmoil of chaos. But after awhile one becomes aware that there is a spirit brooding over this chaos; and gradually, as the inward ear grows accustomed to the noises, they translate themselves from mere confusion into a thunderous assertion: "Behold, I make all things new." It is the Oversoul, the living spirit of America, — the power which makes Americans but is not made by them, — that thus communicates its presence and intention to the puzzled stranger.

I have already intimated that a sense of the reality and meaning of the past is one of the things that Americans frequently lack, and that its European recruits may do it a service by contributing. Let me therefore hasten to add that America repays such a service in advance, in generous over-measure, by liberating a man from the thralldom of an excessive pre-occupation with and subservience to the past. Such a thralldom is one of the penalties of age, alike to the nation and to the individual. Under its spell the creative, inventive and originative powers are apt to grow benumbed and atrophied, and one becomes incapable of conceiving an order of things radically different from that by which one is surrounded. The wisdom of your ancestors is so imposing, and has left so many magnificent survivals, that it seems like the presumption of an upstart to think of superseding the institutions they devised.

It cannot, of course, be asserted that all Europeans are so steeped in conservatism as this bald statement might seem to imply. Many of them

would laugh at the idea that they are thus trammelled and impeded; but I think it may safely be said that this great force of social inertia is much more powerful, even over people of radical and innovating temperament, than they themselves imagine. Their conscious active intellects reject its jurisdiction, and they are as free in asserting that it *ought* not to prevail as any American. But the unconscious and subliminal parts of their mental and psychic life continue to be swayed by it, despite their conscious revolt.

I will put the difference between England and America in this respect into a deliberately exaggerated aphoristic form, in order that the direction of the two tendencies may stand out clearly:

In America, it is an objection to a thing that it was used and approved by our grandfathers; in Europe, it is an objection to a thing that it was not.

Or, to borrow a phrase from a brilliant article by Mr. Alfred Zimmern that appeared a few years ago in the London *Sociological Review*, America "replaces the philosophic 'Why?' of Europe with the unanswerable 'Why not?'"

General tendencies of this kind disclose themselves in a thousand ways; sometimes in ludicrous details. I had, for instance, two dear old great-uncles, who were elderly men when I was a boy, and who died not many years ago, at the ages of eighty-one and ninety-three respectively. They had retired from business, and their chief occupation in life when I was growing up was to sit at the fireside and expatiate on the degeneracy of England as com-

pared with the good old days they had known in their youth. Their house was lighted with kerosene lamps, because gas was dangerous. Even the oil lamp was looked upon with squint suspicion as a parvenu, but the old gentlemen had got it into their heads that the kind of candles their parents had used were no longer obtainable. (As a matter of fact, I believe they could have been bought at any oilshop in London.) They insisted that in their youth the poor had been far better off than now, and were entirely invulnerable to the statistics which demonstrated the universal rise of wages and fall of prices. One gathered from their conversation that the race of great actors and preachers had become extinct somewhere about 1850. All praise of Irving and Terry, of Melba and even of Patti, fell athwart their ears; for what could be the value of the testimony of a generation that had not known "the giant race before the flood"? One of these dear old buffers was a great reader, but he kept alive his faith in the unapproachability of the older English literature by resolutely refusing to read a line of Swinburne or Browning, Ruskin or Huxley, or to imperil his convictions by comparing the novels of George Meredith with those of Thackeray and Jane Austen. When questioned as to whether Dickens's pictures of the now obsolete debtors' prisons did not demonstrate that a marked advance in humanity and civilization had occurred in recent years, they were either silent, or would take refuge in references to some contemporary scandal. In the early '90's they were impenetrably certain that

the "horseless carriage" was an impossibility; and though they lived to ride in motor-omnibuses and taxicabs, their faith that the conquest of the air could never possibly be achieved did not moult a feather. One of them was lying ill on the day when the Channel was for the first time crossed by an aviator (M. Blériot), and I am to this day convinced that my ancient relative's end was hastened by that melancholy portent. No matter how urgent the business on which I wished to consult them, I could never get a telegram out of either of them; and I am certain that they would have felt guilty of a species of witchcraft if they had ever tried to use a telephone. Peace to their ashes!

I still find it almost impossible to believe the testimony of my own eyes and ears, and I almost despair of inducing others to believe me, when I record the fact that in 1898 and '99 I talked with a considerable number of agricultural labourers in the county of Berkshire who had never seen a railway train. This was at a village among the hills, between Newbury and Wantage. The nearest station was about four miles distant, and that was on a branch line of the Great Western Railway, where about two toy trains arrived *per diem*. These people had actually never journeyed four miles from the cottages in which they were born; and their condition was in no important respect different from that of their Anglo-Saxon serf-ancestors of the days of King Alfred. Many of them could neither read nor write; for even those who had been taught to do so in childhood had forgotten how. The Church of England

(which, as Samuel Butler somewhere remarks, has not found it necessary to change a single one of its opinions in three hundred years) was the chief influence to which they were subjected; and the difference between the village parson who preached to them on Sundays (for ten whole minutes at a stretch) and one of the turnips in their fields was scarcely visible to the naked eye. The squire, who practically owned them, and whose lightest word they would never have dreamed of questioning or disobeying, was a charming fellow, who according to his lights was kind and affable to them; but he, like the parson who taught them to obey him, had scarcely a religious or political idea in his head later than 1562, — or whenever it was that the XXXIX Articles were put into their present shape.

It may be objected that I have deliberately chosen extreme instances of British conservatism. I admit this, but would remind the objector that such instances were by no means rare, and also that extremes are the best illustrations of a general tendency. The state of things in my Berkshire village was repeated in a hundred others. Only in a country where the hand of the past is almost omnipotent would it have been possible for such things to continue down to the dawn of the twentieth century. It may also be objected that in remote districts of America there are similar survivals of the conditions of the later Middle Ages. But though this be true, it is not true that the American mountain communities which still speak sixteenth- or seventeenth-century English are within hailing distance of the

great centres of civilization, nor do they have living among them an aristocracy educated at the great universities, accustomed to foreign travel, sitting in Parliament and received at Court, and abreast of all the latest movements of social and scientific advance. The villagers with whom I conversed lived within twenty miles of the city of Oxford, that glorious "home of lost causes and forsaken beliefs, of unpopular names and impossible loyalties"; but they had no more idea of what Oxford meant or was like than they had of Damascus.

For myself, I can testify with absolute conviction that it was not until I had twice visited America that I finally succeeded (if, indeed, I have even now succeeded) in ridding my soul of the oppressive sense that a man is fettered to the particular place in society in which he happened to be born. I was brought up, like all good little Anglicans, on the Church Catechism, the chief ethical teaching of which is conveyed in the following paragraph: —

My duty towards my neighbour, is to love him as myself, and to do to all men, as I would they should do unto me: To love, honour, and succour my father and mother: To honour and obey the King, and all that are put in authority under him: To submit myself to all my governors, teachers, spiritual pastors and masters: To order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters: To hurt no body by word nor deed: To be true and just in all my dealing: To bear no malice nor hatred in my heart: To keep my hands from picking and stealing, and my tongue from evil-speaking, lying, and slandering: To keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity: Not to covet nor desire other men's goods; but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living; and to do

my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me.

The emphasis here on obedience to the King and his appointees, on submission to governors, teachers and the clergy, on lowliness and reverence to one's "betters," — all elaborated in the sixteenth century, — is sufficient, when inculcated (as it is) by a clergy who for the most part still think themselves the natural superiors of the laity, to stifle all radical or republican sentiment, and to produce in the mind of a child the feeling that if any ideas of revolt ever enter his head, they can only be suggestions from the devil. Not, indeed, that this is the necessary meaning of the injunctions; but this is the meaning read into and deduced from them for the benefit of the catechumen. Indeed, I am constrained to confess, absurd as the admission may seem, that until my twenty-seventh year, I was firmly convinced that the closing words of this passage of the Catechism were: "To do my duty in that state of life unto which it *has pleased* God to call me"; and I remember with particular pleasure that it was an American friend who drew my attention to the mistake. I received my training in the Anglican Church from Tory High Churchmen who thought political Liberalism as vile as atheism, and were indeed the counterparts of Macaulay's

Doctor Humbug, who proved Mr. Canning
The Beast in St. John's Revelation.

Consequently it had convinced me that God's call to the individual was made unchangeably before

his birth; insomuch that I ventured on a small wager with my American friend that his reading was the wrong one. When he showed me the actual words in the Prayer Book, I was dumfounded with astonishment.

By making a compendious end of all these survivals of feudalism, and of the mood of resignation which they induce, America renders an inexpressible service to its adopted sons. It delivers them, if not from the sense of original sin, at least from the sense of the sinfulness of originality. If the foregoing passage from the Catechism (which was drilled into every English child for centuries in the same spirit in which it was drilled into me) may be taken as typical of the older spirit of British conservatism, at least in its extremest form, we may contrast it with a not less extreme embodiment of the radical and revolutionary spirit of America by citing the familiar words of Whitman: —

This is what you shall do:
 Love the earth, and the sun, and the animals;
 Despise riches;
 Give alms to everyone that it will help;
 Stand up for the stupid and crazy;
 Devote your income and labour to others;
 Hate tyrants;
 Argue not concerning God;
 Take off your hat to nothing known or unknown, nor to
 any man or number of men;
 Go freely with powerful uneducated persons, and with
 the young, and with the mothers of families;
 Re-examine all you have been taught at school, or church,
 or in any book;
 Dismiss whatever insults your own soul.

What a contrast! and how clear it is that wisdom lies between the two extremes! Yet it was necessary that the new extreme should be set up to defy and counteract the old, in order that the victims of the old might be shaken out of the slumber that it had produced.

Applying the generous spirit, if not the eccentric letter, of Whitman's doctrine, America asks what a man can do, and accepts him for that. It does not inquire about his ancestors or his paper credentials, and dismiss him if these fail to satisfy the Heralds' College. Here and there (in Philadelphia and Boston, for example) one meets with a certain inquisitiveness about pedigrees which smacks rather of Europe than America, and the way in which — even in Chicago — a plain citizen finds himself be-doctor'd and professor'd shows that even in a Republic, which has deprived itself of the right to confer titles of nobility, the hankering after such "additions" may not be wholly extinct. Yet the fashion in which all doors are opened to demonstrated ability in any department, and the beginner or newcomer is greeted with faith and encouragement, makes of the United States a veritable new world as compared with Western Europe.

2. The next specific benefit which I am personally conscious of owing to America is that of confrontation and intimate association with representatives of all the races and nationalities of Europe. It has been my fortune to live for several months in a settlement house on the West Side of Chicago, and at various times to spend many weeks in the Uni-

versity Settlement in New York and in similar institutions elsewhere. There is nothing like a discipline of this kind to take the insularity and provincialism out of a man, if only he has enough flexibility of spirit to profit by it. Ordinary foreign travel does not produce the effect which I have in mind. When you dwell for a holiday season among Frenchmen or Italians, you do not seek to pierce through the barrier of foreignness that separates you from them. You are not associated with them in the performance of civic duties or the furtherance of social ends. Here, however, you rub shoulders with them from the first upon the understanding that they and you are to be fellow-citizens. Usually they have learned to speak your language, whereas, when you encounter them in their old homes, you have to make ungainly efforts to speak theirs. In this country you do not find merely what Italians think of Italy or Germans of Germany; you have the much more profitable experience of estimating their outlook upon American conditions, and their influence in modifying the environment into which they are being assimilated. One's views on the subject of immigration become, I fancy, considerably more catholic and tolerant when one is an immigrant oneself.

It is an astonishment to me that so few Americans seem aware of the great educational opportunity which lies at their doors, through contact with their fellow-citizens of alien origin. One would have expected *a priori* that familiarity with foreign languages would be much more general among Ameri-

cans than among any other people. Yet the fact, I fear, is precisely the opposite of this. My impression, tested on a fairly large scale, is that among native-born Americans there are comparatively few who are really at home in the languages and literatures of continental Europe. The feeling of many Americans in this matter seems to be identical with that of a certain English duchess, who, when travelling with her sons in France, heard them talking French to the servants; whereupon she exclaimed: "Boys, you ought not to talk to those people in that way; it only encourages them."

The Hollander in his own country makes it his business to learn the speech of the people whom he daily meets. Even the boot-black in your hotel can generally express himself passably in French, English and German; and there is reason to think that he can even speak Dutch. The Pole usually knows Russian and German, as well as his native tongue. In Switzerland you can hardly find a schoolboy who has not three languages in tolerable repair and in constant use. But where in America do you find the born American, even though he lives in a community of Swedish or German antecedents, who has condescended to learn the inherited speech of his neighbours?

It is right enough that the immigrant into an English-speaking nation should learn the English language; — indeed, my own feeling is that no such person should be allowed to vote until he can not only speak English, but read and write it as well. But, on the other hand, it is altogether desirable that

Americans should broaden their own culture by learning from the immigrant as well as by teaching him. In no other way can the possible benefits of the amalgamation of national and racial types be secured. Yet, in this most cosmopolitan of all countries, hardly any of the newspapers have the typographical equipment to print correctly a sentence in French.¹ Their renderings even of French names produce upon a stranger an impression of incredible illiteracy. In every large city we have many newspapers printed in foreign languages, but these constitute an unknown world to most of the Americans who see them daily on the news-stands and in shop windows. Now, the business of learning to read a language (as distinct from writing and speaking it) is a fairly easy and quite delightful occupation, and in no other way can the horizon of the mind be so vastly enlarged at the cost of so little effort. But, owing to our unwillingness to make this effort, we are in serious danger of perpetuating the barriers which ought to be broken down between ourselves and our neighbours. We quite rightly ask them to abandon their old loyalties; but we shall be incredibly foolish if we also constrain them to forget the culture they have inherited.

It makes a man's teeth ache to hear how foreign names are commonly pronounced by Americans, and one's sympathy goes out to the unfortunate bearers of these names, who are compelled to acquiesce in their mutilation and vulgarization. I

¹ See the delightful article entitled "Accents Wild," by Charles Fitzhugh Talman, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1915.

shall never forget an incident which occurred in my early days in America. When sitting with some friends at a café, one of the party asked for a bottle of beer with a well-known German name. This name, in a fit of absent-mindedness, he pronounced correctly, — only to find that the waiter did not understand him, and to be humiliated by having that functionary admonish him in loud tones of his error! I have now (for my sins) been travelling for six years in the street-cars of Chicago, and I am at last beginning to recognize the name of Goethe Street as variously rendered by the conductors. We blame our foreigners for their clannishness. We resent the fact that they sequester themselves among people of their own race, and do not take the trouble to understand our language or our history and institutions; but we are guilty of an exactly analogous piece of provincialism when we betray our unwillingness to learn from them, while expecting them to learn from us.

This is all the more surprising and disappointing in view of another great benefit which America is conferring upon its children and its adopted citizens, — namely, the genuine democratization of higher education. The free high school and university (the former of which is a recent innovation and the latter non-existent in England) are preparing the way for an immense enrichment of the life of future generations. But, by general admission, these institutions remain seriously defective on the cultural as distinct from the utilitarian side. Yet, amazingly enough, many persons conscious of this defect propose to

remedy it, not by improving the teaching of the so-called cultural subjects, but by eliminating them altogether. I gather from the propaganda of Mr. Flexner that because Latin and Greek are badly taught, and are (so he erroneously asserts) useless to persons who do not know them completely, they should be dropped from the curricula of our high schools and universities. Other complaints are made about the uselessness of grammar (though nobody who reads our newspapers can do their writers the injustice of supposing that they have sacrificed much time in studying the laws of correct speech and writing). It would seem to a plain man that the right way to remedy the defects complained of is not to abolish the studies in question, but to teach them thoroughly. The specific culture of America must, of course, be a new thing; but it is fantastic to imagine that this new thing can be produced otherwise than by growth out of the many older cultures of the world, and by cross-fertilization between them.

No reasonable thinker will plead that everybody should learn Greek and Latin; that would be almost as bad as saying that nobody should learn them. But it may be asserted without exaggeration that every pupil who goes through our universities, or even our high-schools, no matter what may be the fields in which he is to specialize, ought to be given a sound working knowledge of at least three languages besides English. It has been demonstrated that such a knowledge can be given, when rational methods of teaching are employed, in six months for each language, — provided, of course, that the

pupil is not abnormally deficient in the kind of memory and mentality which the subject requires, and provided that he is taught the essentials in a natural manner, and not required (as is too often the case with Latin and Greek) to perform conjuring-tricks upon the grammar or to learn rules for the manufacture of worthless verses. Things far more difficult than foreign languages are taught successfully in as short a period as six months; for instance, the art of stenography. Having once had occasion to acquire that art myself, I can testify that it demanded more labour than the learning of two languages.

If we insist not only on dropping Latin and Greek, but upon bringing about a general oblivion of the living languages which are to-day spoken among us, we shall cut ourselves off from our spiritual roots, and become the most provincial nation upon the face of the earth. Even our own older literature (the works, for example, of Lowell and Emerson) will become unintelligible to us. But this will not happen; for we shall not allow Mr. Flexner, and the exceeding great army of the philistines which he leads, to triumph over us.

3. I have reserved for the last of these random instances of the benefits which America bestows on the newcomer, that one which I think most important. It is the universal conviction of Americans that a life of idleness is disgraceful, no matter how great may be the wealth of the person who indulges in it. England, like Europe in general, is still unconsciously dominated by the idea, surviving from feudal times, that work and trading are the heritage

of slaves, and beneath the dignity of the upper classes. The fact of being a merchant or manufacturer is still a stamp of inferiority and a barrier to social acceptance. It is not felt to be in any way wrong for a man who inherits a landed estate or a fortune to pass through life without ever engaging in any form of productive or socially useful labour. The tradition still survives that for a gentleman there are but four possible professions: the Army, the Navy, the Law and the Church; and these are the only things that Oxford and Cambridge fit a man for. A member of the "gentleman class" may indeed be a shareholder in commercial enterprises, but he may not sully his hands by active participation in them. In Samuel Butler's cynical novel, "The Way of All Flesh," we have an over-true picture of the fashion in which English upper-class education fails to prepare a boy for the real business of life.

All this, of course, is rapidly changing under the stress of the inexorable demand for efficiency, especially as this has been brought brusquely home by the unprecedented exigency of the war. But even when such changes take place, the mental and psychic dispositions that correspond to the older order are apt to survive its disappearance. One could wish, for the sake of the English upper classes, that every one of their sons and daughters should be obliged to spend two or three years in America, either before or after completing their university education. This would rid them for ever of the notion that there is anything inferior or degrading in honest work of any kind, and would force them to realize that an idle

life, no matter what may be the charm of its culture or dignity, is itself the worst of vices. Of all the things that I owe to America, there is none for which I am more grateful than for its universal assertion and enforcement of this truth.

CHAPTER V

THE RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN LOYALTIES

IT is important that one should realize clearly and fully what is involved in the demand which America makes, that upon becoming a citizen here a man must renounce all foreign allegiances. The actual terms of the contract are bald and legalistic, and they cannot and do not disclose all the depth of significance which the transaction carries with it. A man, moreover, who enters upon his new citizenship in a generous spirit will feel bound in honour not to minimize the obligations he assumes, but to give of his loyalty in full measure, and rather to exceed than to fall short of what the Republic asks of him. In clearing up my ideas, then, as to what I am about when I exchange my British citizenship for that of the United States, I conceive it to be incumbent upon me to search out the underlying principles of the compact, and in my demands upon myself to go further than the strict letter of the covenant, instead of falling short of it.

For instance, so far as the mere terms of the bond are concerned, there is nothing to prevent a man from becoming a naturalized citizen even though he believes in monarchy,—and in the divine right of kings to boot. It is only asked (a) that he shall abandon his allegiance to the particular sovereign

of whom he was formerly a subject, and (b) that he shall be a believer in *some form* of governmental organization of society. He is *not* asked to affirm that he believes in the republican type of constitution as more humane, just, and desirable than that of monarchy or oligarchy. He has to swear that he is not an anarchist; but he is asked no question as to whether he would think it right to work for the overthrow of the existing Constitution of the United States and the establishment of an hereditary kingship or a military despotism in its place.

Now, it is evident that a person of a casuistical turn of mind might readily take this oath, even though he considered a republican government and democratic institutions to be the invention of the devil, and were determined to do all in his power to abrogate them. But everybody with an unsophisticated sense of honour and truthfulness will feel that he has no right so to act. You ought not to become a citizen of this or any republic unless you are by conviction a republican. The principle upon which you should act is one which is expressed in an historic utterance by Edmund Burke: "Not what a lawyer tells me I may do, but what humanity, reason and justice tell me I ought to do." The casuist may show you how, for sinister purposes, it is possible for you to comply with the letter of the covenant while your intention is to violate its spirit; but untainted honesty will insist that such a course is worse, by reason of its subtlety and hypocrisy, than open and flagrant perjury.

It would, then, be "conduct unworthy of a gentle-

man" for a man to subscribe this oath, unless he believed (as I believe) that kingship by divine right is a superstitious imposture; that governments are the servants of the people, who have a right to call them to account, and to change them, if they do not work honestly for the ends for which they are appointed. In choosing the sovereignty under which for the rest of my life I am to live, I am exercising a right which I believe to inhere inalienably in all men and in all nations. It may be true that in the far past monarchy was inevitable; it may long ago have been the only possible means of securing unity of national action and responsibility in government. But I believe that at best it was a necessary evil, and that the idolatrous reverence for the person of the king, and the irrational belief in the supernatural quality of his authority, were nothing short of a curse upon mankind. Accordingly, I renounce for ever all allegiance and fidelity, not merely to foreign princes in general and to the King of England in particular, but to monarchy as a form of government, to the institution of kingship, and to any scheme whereby the powers of government are entrusted to a person or class selected only because of the fact of birth in particular families. And I believe that nobody can be or become a good American who does not from his soul pledge himself in this sense.

It goes without saying that, no matter what the statutes of other countries may permit, it is morally impossible and practically intolerable for any man to accept the privilege of American citizenship with-

out utterly renouncing his former loyalty. Until some forty or fifty years ago British law formally refused to its subjects the right to expatriate themselves. It was not that the law authorized a man to swear allegiance to another Government with a mental reservation, or provided machinery by which, while professing to become a citizen elsewhere, he could retain the privileges of membership in the British Commonwealth. That, thank heaven, was never the English way of doing things. It was simply that the British Parliament did not recognize any contract by which a man absolved himself from his native allegiance. But this unjustifiable law was abrogated more than a generation ago.

A much more recent enactment dealing with the same problem was passed by the Prussian Government not long before the outbreak of the world-war. According to that statute, a German subject residing abroad may take the oath of allegiance to the Government under which he lives, but at the same time, by making an arrangement with the German Consul in the place of his residence, he may retain the prerogatives of his German citizenship. It might perhaps be instructive to inquire into the motives of this extraordinary arrangement; but, whatever they may have been, it is quite clear that no nation which is alive to its own dignity, or conscious of the dangers to which it may be exposed, will accept the proffer of allegiance from any man who does not most solemnly bind himself not to take advantage of such a statute. Still plainer is it that, at least so far as the American declaration of citizen-

ship is concerned, no man could avail himself of this German law without committing perjury. For the statement that the applicant "renounces for ever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince" means nothing less than it says; and if anybody were to make it, after having arranged with the Consul of a foreign Power that he was not to be deprived of that Power's citizenship, he would be guilty of perjury, and the Consul and the foreign Government would be guilty of aiding and abetting him in that crime.

There is one further stipulation in this oath of naturalization which, when we peep beneath the surface of its wording, opens up for many people a tremendously important problem in the obligations of loyalty. The applicant is required to swear that he is "not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy." To most civilized men this will not seem very much to affirm. Nor, indeed, is it; the doctrine and practice of polygamy being an accompaniment of barbarism. But the point that arrests one's attention when one comes to take this oath is that the State, in making belief in monogamy a condition of citizenship, tacitly claims to possess independent and inderivative authority in the sphere of morals and conduct. Whoever subscribes to this affirmation impliedly admits the right of the State to make this claim.

Now, it happens that there is one foreign prince who claims the right, by divine commission, to exercise supreme authority in the domain of morals and conduct, and denies that any State possesses

authority in this sphere. He assumes the right to regulate marriage, and to override or pronounce void any marriage law of any Government which he disapproves. The foreign prince in question is the Pope; and there are many points at which his claims (which in theory are binding upon all members of the Roman Catholic Church) come into violent conflict with the sovereignty which all democratic States claim and exercise. For instance, in the Encyclical and Syllabus of Errors issued on the 8th of December, 1864, it is declared to be an "erroneous opinion," "fatal to the Catholic Church and the safety of souls," and indeed *an insanity*, that

liberty of conscience and of worship is the right of every man, and that in every well-constituted State this right ought to be proclaimed and sanctioned, and that citizens have a right to put forward their opinions openly and in public, whatever they may be, either by word or in print or otherwise, without limitation by ecclesiastical or civil authority.

These opinions, together with many others enumerated in the same document, are reprobated "by our Apostolic authority." "We proscribe them," proceeds the Encyclical; "we condemn them, and we desire and command that all the children of the Catholic Church should hold them as entirely reprobated, proscribed and condemned."

Now, it is difficult to see how anybody who recognizes the authority of the Italian autocracy by which this decree was promulgated, can with a clear conscience take the oath of allegiance to the American Commonwealth, which claims the authority to assure, and actually does assure, liberty of conscience

and of worship to every man *as a right*, and maintains that freedom of speech and of publication of opinion are also rights which a well-constituted State is bound to uphold. The distinction commonly drawn between temporal and spiritual affairs is nugatory, for the simple reason that many so-called temporal affairs are purely spiritual, and that all of them have spiritual implications. Every question of conduct, for example, is palpably both spiritual and temporal. The Pope, in condemning liberty of conscience and worship, and denying the right of free speech and free publication, aimed a blow at the sovereignty of this Republic, and of all other Governments which do not accept him as an absolute arbiter.

Nobody can doubt that there are millions of American-Roman Catholics who are really loyal to the Republic, and who, if the latent clash between its sovereignty and that arrogated by the Pope ever came to an open issue, would be faithful to their nation. But these men can maintain their fidelity to their country only at the cost of an intellectual inconsistency. Nobody dreams for a moment of questioning their right to hold the Catholic faith and practise its worship. All that is in question is their allegiance to an Italian prince who professes to be the infallible custodian of that faith, and to possess authority above all human jurisdiction to govern the morals and conduct of Catholics. The Catholic faith is something which the American Republic guarantees men the right to hold, to observe, and to propagate by speech and writing. Loyalty and obedience, however, to a foreign dictator is a

totally different matter. This is something which the very principles of the American Constitution prohibit a man from entertaining. It is no more possible, in logic or in honour, for an American to be a subject of the Pope than it is for him to be a subject of the German Kaiser.

How sharp is this latent conflict of sovereignties becomes still more manifest when we read, in the same Syllabus of Errors from which I have already quoted, the condemnation of State education. Among the errors "proscribed, reprobated and condemned" is the following:—

The entire direction of the public schools in which the youth of Christian States is educated, except to a certain extent the episcopal seminaries, may and must pertain to the civil authority, in such a manner that no other authority whatsoever shall be recognized as having the right to interfere in the discipline of the schools, the course of studies, the taking of degrees, or the choice and approval of masters.

This means that the Pope, and the clergy to whom he delegates his powers, are by right the sole custodians of all education. From such a point of view, the American public school, with its studies decreed by laymen and its teachers chosen by civil authority without reference to their theological beliefs, is an abomination. And there are actually American-Roman priests who preach and publish the doctrine that the State transgresses its legitimate authority when it establishes or maintains schools or prescribes the curriculum of studies therein.

One such priest is the Rev. James Conway, S.J., of Canisius College, Buffalo, N. Y., the author of

a pamphlet entitled "The Rights of Our Little Ones; or, First Principles on Education, in Catechetical Form." This pamphlet, copyrighted in 1890, appeared in a third edition in 1905, with the imprint of Messrs. Benziger Bros., printers to the Holy Apostolic See; from which edition the ensuing quotations are taken. The author has an admirable gift of clear and lucid exposition, so that there is no possibility of misunderstanding his position or his purpose. He believes that by natural and divine law the whole business of education is reserved to parents and to the Church (by which he means the Roman Catholic section of it). He deduces this from what he calls the natural law and the divine law, the latter consisting of texts of Scripture interpreted in accordance with his own preconceptions. As his very bright and lucid little statement is now apparently out of print and unobtainable, it may be interesting to present the reader with a few of his questions and answers:—

Question 21. Is education an exclusively parental right?

Education is a parental right to the exclusion of all interference on the part of civil authority.

Q. 33. Are parents, therefore, free to choose teacher and school for their children?

Parents are altogether free, *despite all legislation to the contrary*,¹ not only to choose teacher and school for their children, but also, if it seems good to them, to educate their own offspring themselves, either personally or with the aid of others.

Q. 40. Does education lie within the scope of civil authority?

¹ Italics the present writer's.

Education does not lie within the scope of civil authority, wherefore the State cannot, without violating higher and holier rights, usurp the right and discharge the duty of educating the young.

Q. 41. What rights does the State violate by usurping the work of education?

By usurping the work of education, the State not only *thwarts the intent of the Creator*;¹ but also violates —

a. The *personal right* of the child to enjoy the education intended by the Creator;

b. The *domestic right* of the parents to educate their offspring in the way it seems best to them;

c. As we shall see, the *divine right* of the Church to discharge the educational mission entrusted to her by her Divine Founder.

After these refreshingly unambiguous assertions, Fr. Conway proceeds to explain that the modern policy of State education originated in countries where the Roman Church had been robbed of its temporalities by Protestant Governments. He tells his readers that these proceedings led to such a decadence of education that the Governments in question “found it necessary to erect schools at the public expense; which institutions they considered themselves justified in exclusively controlling.” He then delivers himself of some astonishing and romantic statements about the results of State education; as thus: —

(Answer to Q. 44, p. 26.)

a. The introduction of State education has been everywhere attended by an enormous increase of crime, which cannot be attributed to any other cause. In our own country proportionally by far the greater share of crime is committed

¹ Italics the present writer's.

not by the illiterate, or by foreigners, but by those who enjoyed all the blessings of a public school education; and, what is most surprising of all, as has been statistically proved, the increase of crime has kept even pace with the efforts and expenditure made for public education.

b. The leaders of anarchists, communists, socialists, nihilists, and, in short, all those who endanger the social order and disturb the peace of nations, are for the most part the outgrowth of State or public school education.

c. The same might easily be shown of the lukewarm in religion, of agnostics, and professed infidels of the school of Ingersoll.

Q. 45. What are the effects of State education on civilization in general?

While State education removes illiteracy and puts a limited amount of knowledge within the reach of all, it cannot be said to have a beneficial influence on civilization in general.

After this we learn that "the State cannot justly enforce compulsory education, *even in the case of utter illiteracy*, as long as the essential physical and moral education are sufficiently provided for."

In the fourth chapter of his little book, the author lays it down that the Church has the right (which nobody has ever disputed) to establish schools at its own expense and run them without any control from the secular authorities.¹ He also claims that where there are different types of schools, the Church has the right "to exercise such supervision over the secular instruction in all schools to which her children are confided as to assure herself that there is nothing in the subject-matters taught, or in the means of conveying them, or in the adjuncts,

¹ Q. 68, p. 40.

which might endanger the faith and morals of the youth";¹ also to examine teachers for *all* schools, to remove them if necessary, or, where schools are not fully under the control of the Church, to *exact* the removal of incompetent teachers.² He insists that Catholics "cannot in conscience send their children to American public schools, except for very grave reasons approved by the ecclesiastical authorities."³

It would be superfluous, and irrelevant to my present purpose, to take up the points of controversy involved in these assertions and these exorbitant claims. My only desire here is to point out that the position which Fr. Conway presents, with such admirable honesty and lucidity, is a denial of the sovereignty which the Republic has always claimed and exercised. He demands for a foreign jurisdiction, for an alien prince and Government, a monopoly of the moral and religious education of the children of America, and at least an inquisitorial jurisdiction over their education in all so-called secular subjects. In the name of this foreign Government, he does not hesitate to tell American citizens, in so many words, that they cannot without grave sin suffer their children to be educated in our public schools. He makes the demonstrably false assertion that the introduction of State-controlled schools has caused a great increase in crime wherever it has occurred. One would like to be favoured with the statistics upon which this assertion is based, since the official returns of various Governments give it

¹ Q. 68, p. 39.

Ibid., p. 40.

² Q. 89, p. 50.

the lie direct. One could also desire to be informed as to the bearing of the assertion, that State education originated in European countries whose Governments had robbed the Roman Church of its temporalities, upon the establishment of State schools in this country. Supposing that the exceedingly partizan statement of Fr. Conway were true, what discredit could it throw upon the schools of America, where neither the Roman Catholic nor any other sect has ever been robbed of a pennyworth of its temporalities? Even if State education had originated in this way abroad, the fact would no more reflect discredit upon it here and now than the fact that the Catholic Church in antiquity took over by violence the temples of other worships, and converted them to its own uses, reflects upon present-day Catholicism.

We have here, then, a potentially dangerous conflict of sovereignties; and we have a Roman-American priest defiantly asserting the supremacy of a foreign Government over our own. He talks much of the rights of parents, but he denies that the national or State Governments, *which are the organs of the will of the vast majority of parents in this country*, have any right to establish the kind of schools those parents desire, or can possibly possess an authority superior to, or even co-ordinate with, that of the despotic Italian prince in whose name he speak.

Now, Fr. Conway's doctrine may possibly be good Catholicism (though there are plenty of good Catholics ready to aver that it is not), but it is certainly

bad Americanism. The most subtle and insidious of all foreign loyalties, and the one which, before all others, ought to be renounced by the citizens of a free commonwealth, is this loyalty to a man who claims to be the irresponsible arbiter of morals and conduct. It may be wise to let sleeping dogs and sleeping dogmas lie; but, if I mistake not, this particular dogma is very far from sleeping. Its eyes are not more than half closed, and its teeth and claws are ready for use the moment a propitious conjuncture of circumstances shall arise.

I swear allegiance to America, in the conviction that my oath necessarily carries with it the rejection of the claims of the Pope to override the sovereignty of democratic nations. I understand the American Commonwealth to maintain that every nation has the right to unquestioned autonomy in spiritual matters, like education, as well as in so-called temporal ones, like taxation. I admit that claim; — which, indeed, is only a deduction from the right of every man to freedom of thought and conscience. There are millions of Catholics who are not Papists; which demonstrates that Papalism has nothing necessarily to do with Catholicism. The pretences of the Pope are an indefensible usurpation of a sovereignty that belongs, by divine right, to the democratic nation itself; and I understand my oath to mean the rejection of these pretences, as much as of the allegiance I formerly owed to the King of Great Britain.

It may possibly be replied to the foregoing argument that Roman Catholics are no longer bound by the Encyclical of 1864. I may be told that Fr. Con-

way, being a Jesuit, does not represent the general attitude of the Roman Catholics of this country, or of their priesthood. Nothing would be more gratifying to clear-headed Americans than to have this assurance *made officially on behalf of the American-Roman clergy*. It will be easy enough for them to disavow the assumptions of the Vatican, if they are in a position to do so; and by doing it, without equivocation or mental reservation, they will free themselves from an imputation which many of the laity, at least, undoubtedly do not deserve, but which at present stands as a barrier in the way of whole-hearted communion in the service of the Republic between them and their fellow-citizens. Let them acknowledge that the State possesses an original and imprescriptible authority to secure freedom of conscience and of worship to all, and to endow schools and control the teaching therein. Let them declare that free thought and speech, and the public school, exist *de iure*, and are not merely to be tolerated because they cannot at present be got rid of. As soon as men see that Roman Catholics, clergy as well as laity, are free to take this stand without condemnation from Rome, all difficulty and distrust will be at an end.

NOTE. — I wish to repeat, with the strongest possible emphasis, that the foregoing pages DO NOT CONTAIN OR CONSTITUTE AN ATTACK UPON CATHOLICISM, or upon any article of the Catholic creeds, or upon the usages of Catholic worship, or upon the orders of the ministry, or upon the Pope in his spiritual capacity. They are a criticism and a rejection only of the Pope's claim to exercise a sovereignty rivalling the just sovereignty of nations over their citizens, and superior to that of nations. All that I have said could perfectly well be subscribed to by any believer in the entire Catholic faith; indeed, I have but expressed what is actually held by many Catholics, and what is implicitly held and expressed in practice by millions of them.

CHAPTER VI

TO WHAT DOES ONE SWEAR ALLEGIANCE?

THE answer to this question is less obvious than at a superficial glance it would appear to be. One gives one's pledge to the Government of the Republic, through its legally authorized officials; but it is far from being merely a declaration of personal loyalty to the Administration which happens to be in office at the time when it is made. In a republic you do not become a subject; you are made a citizen: and this means that your allegiance is given not exclusively to any person or group of persons, but to something far more enduring, far more powerful, and yet far more elusive. You become incorporated into the nation, and it is to the nation that your fidelity is vowed.

But what is a nation?

It is when we begin to think about this question that the complexity of the problem discloses itself. It is quite clear that a nation (in Mazzini's words) is "not a mere zone of territory"; for a child can see that the territory of the United States existed before the American nation had begun to come into being, and would remain though the nation were utterly destroyed; and besides, the idea of pledging one's allegiance to three million square miles of land is ridiculous. You can be loyal to a personal being

or to an ideal, but not to a stretch of country. It is only when the land has become, so to speak, drenched with the ideals of its people that it can begin, even in a figurative sense, to constitute a part of the object of a man's loyalty.

Nor, again, would it be correct to say that one's allegiance is tendered to the hundred millions of people who happen to be living under the Stars and Stripes at a given moment. For again it is clear that the nation existed before they were born, and will continue to exist after they are dead. The nation was already alive and active when the Declaration of Independence was drawn up, and every American hopes and believes that it will continue to be alive and active after Macaulay's New Zealander shall have crossed the Atlantic and meditated among the ruins of New York. Again, as Americans have been insisting ever since the Revolution, and more particularly since the Civil War, the nation is a single and indivisible unity. It is the "One out of many" referred to on our coinage; and neither a hundred millions of people nor yet forty-eight States can properly be called One, save in a sense that it needs careful analysis to disentangle.

The plot thickens, and begins to take on almost the air of a metaphysical riddle, when we have realized that neither the existing generation nor any of its predecessors can be said to constitute America. For every American now living would find it impossible, — indeed, every American who was living in 1776 would have found it impossible, — to deny that it was America which had made him.

Each native-born citizen of this country is the outcome of a history, an ideal, a tradition, and a unique collective life. It is not merely that men are the products of their environment in the biological sense; it is also the fact that that environment has itself been moulded and changed by the more elusive spiritual forces which determine the history and constitute the identity of the nation in which they inhere.

In these hidden potencies the nation really consists. Every American at birth becomes a part of it; but he can do this only because it existed, complete and living, and ready to absorb him, beforehand. It may be likened to a fire, into which successive increments of fuel are thrown. Each of them becomes a part of the fire, and contributes to its heat and flame; but they could not do this if the fire had not been burning before they were cast into it.

And yet the comparison fails us; for the truth about a nation is subtler than any physical image can represent. We must remind ourselves that, whereas a fire does not create the things that are thrown upon it, the nation does create its citizens.

To express the connection between the Republic and the States, we use the phrase "*E pluribus unum.*" But how is it possible for the One — the nation — to be derived from forty-eight States, thirty-five of which did not exist when it came into being? Yet nobody, I suppose, will deny that the relation of vital interdependence between the nation and, let us say, Oregon or California, is *now* as close and real as that between the nation and Pennsylvania or Massachusetts. Whatever may have been

the case with regard to the original thirteen Colonies, all the rest of the States have unquestionably been created by the nation; although, to be sure, the moment they are made, they in turn become parts of that which has created them.

But we must push the problem further back, and recognize, even though it appear at first blush to be in defiance of the historic facts, that it was the nation which made the first thirteen States. They had been mere Colonies; that is to say, offshoots of another nation; and their transition from the rank of Colonies to that of States was possible only because there was already a new nation to confer upon them their higher status and prerogatives. None of them singly could have made itself a State. It was the living power which we call America that did this. It was *the new will*, which had grown up in and through the exigencies of Colonial experience. The moment this will became conscious of itself, the moment its identity in all the Colonies was recognized, the American nation was born. This means that it had existed before the first Continental Congress had convened, its first unmistakable expression being the impulse which led to the convening of that Congress. From then till now, by an irresistible process of self-development, the nation has been growing towards the consciousness that it is the one truly autonomous, sovereign entity in all these three million square miles, and over all these successive and ever-multiplying hosts of human creatures.

The States at first imagined that the little child born to them was inferior to them, — that it pos-

sessed no original and inderivative powers of its own, but, like all good children, was to do what its parents told it, and not presume to arrogate to itself any rights or functions other than those which were specifically delegated to it. At first the child was obedient enough; but it was not long before the parents discovered that something incalculably great and strange — something which they could not control, but which was predestined to control them — had come into life. It was impossible to arrest the growth of the child; and in little more than seventy years the young giant had developed to such an extent that he was ready to turn upon his begetters, and threaten with destruction those of them that refused to submit to his will.

The essence of the Civil War was the clash between the theoretical idea with which the original States had set out, and the massive and unescapable reality which in the meantime had been growing up. To-day, if we prefer scientific precision to the flattery of local vanities, we shall have to recognize that the Republic is in truth not only a single nation, but also a single State. For it is the Republic in its unity which alone possesses and exercises the distinctive prerogatives of Statehood, — those, namely, of entering into relations with foreign States, of imposing and removing tariffs, of making treaties, appointing and commissioning ambassadors, and determining the issues of peace and war. Any Power which can do these things is a State; one which cannot do them is not accurately described by that term.

It was the half-unconscious recognition of these realities which led to the War of Secession. Mistaking words for things, the Confederacy imagined that the locally self-governing units composing it were free to secede from the Union into which they had voluntarily entered. *Had they been truly States, this would unquestionably have been the case;* but because, like their Northern neighbours, they were in reality not States, but only constituent parts of the one American State, it was not in their power or within their right to sunder themselves from the indivisible Republic.

Evidently, then, the America to which at naturalization we pledge our fidelity is something vaster than what can be seen and touched at any moment; it is something more even than the Constitution and laws, to which the statute demands our allegiance. It is the over-arching and informing Spirit out of which these have come. It is the mighty Will, which has been growing to self-consciousness and self-determination from the days of the Pilgrim Fathers to our own. It was not made by the Revolution; it made the Revolution. While, to be sure, it can act only through the persons who at a given moment constitute the population of the country, it is nevertheless true that by it those persons have been made what they are.

There is, in strictness, no such thing as "accident of birth"; a man's character, up to the point at which it becomes free and self-determining, is the outgrowth of definitely traceable causes, spiritual as well as physical. America embodies itself anew

in each of its sons. Unique as their individuality may be, original and independent as their genius and temperament often are, they yet owe their very inmost selfhood to this super-personal and super-temporal spirit of the nation, from and into which they are born. It is this spirit which demands of the newcomer his loyalty and the renunciation of all other allegiances. It is this mighty mother of free-men, this inspirer of a people's ideals, which says to its children, as the genius of the Hebrew nation said to the Jews of old, "Thou shalt have none other gods before me."

Nothing is more striking than the fashion in which these deeper truths about the nature and meaning of nationality emerge into men's consciousness upon the pressure of any great crisis or shock of danger. Never was there a population whose national character was more marked than that of Americans; yet never has there been a people that in ordinary times was so unconscious of the reality, the presence and power of the forces that had made and were for ever re-making it. The great utterances of the American spirit all belong to times of war or national peril; they have all been inspired by the presence of danger, either from within or from without. And of late, with a war of unprecedented magnitude upon our hands, history has repeated itself. Last year, for example, Mr. Franklin Lane, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, discussing the question why we were at war with Germany, expressed the true nature of America in these eloquent words:—

America is not the name of so much territory. It is a living spirit, born in travail, grown in the rough school of bitter experiences; a living spirit which has purpose and pride and conscience; knows why it wishes to live, and to what end; knows how it comes to be respected of the world, and hopes to retain that respect by living on with the light of Lincoln's love of man as its old and new testament.

It is more precious that this America should live than that we Americans should live.¹

"America is a living spirit." "This America" is substantive; "we Americans" are adjectival. The very collocation of the words shows the priority of the nation to its people and their derivativeness from it. Now, when a man uses such phrases, is he merely sentimentalizing, is he embroidering upon the facts a lacework of poetic fancy? Is it only a flight of imagination, to which the speaker is impelled by the exaltation of the moment?

Nay; rather it is the exaltation of the moment which lifts a man out of the ground-mists in which our pedestrian daily life is enshrouded, and discloses to him the truth that can only be seen in the light of the upper air. America is in literal truth a living spirit; for what save life can beget life? What but a living spirit could create men and women as America creates her children? What but a mighty personal or super-personal power can engender soul and character, impart individuality, and make the difference between the South Sea Islander and the proud and self-reliant American?

Mr. Lane speaks of "Lincoln's love of man"

¹ From a report in *The Springfield Republican*, weekly edition, June 7th, 1917.

as the old and new testament of America; and again he is meticulously exact, for that love of man was old in America before it was made new in Lincoln. It was the Old Covenant, the divinely appointed thing, which had given rise to and justified the separate life of America. From her, Lincoln himself derived it; his glory is that he was, in Lowell's words, "the first American," — the first in whom what had always been implicit in the American genius became explicit, fully conscious, and powerfully active. This love of man, we may say, without irreverence but with closest truth, was the American Word, which had been from the beginning, by which all things American were made; and in Lincoln it was made flesh.

"But where," it may be asked, "are we to *look* for this America? What evidence can be adduced to show that it is anything more than a dream, an ideal, a fleshless, lifeless abstraction, or the aspiration of a few enthusiasts? Granted that once in a century there comes a man like Lincoln, do we not delude ourselves if we think that there is anything peculiarly American in his spirit and genius? Would he not have been the same Abraham Lincoln if he had been born in France or England?

"And," — so we may imagine our objector reasoning, — "seeing how utterly different Lincoln was from the mass of his fellow-countrymen (who, on your own showing, are just as much products of America as he), is it not fantastic to credit his virtues to this mystical American spirit of which you speak? At all events, if we grant that America is

entitled to the praise of his virtues, must not the vices of other Americans be equally debited to it?"

These objections may be most simply answered by pointing to the fact that in the history of America, as of every nation, there can be traced a certain general tendency, which is at first obscure, but which with the years grows into clear definition. This is the movement towards complete and fully articulated democracy. Western civilization as a whole has during the last four centuries manifested this tendency; but in each nation the common urge has taken a specific direction. It has had to encounter not only a special set of circumstances and events in each country, but also a national character in the people, distinct and individual in each case, the outcome of their former history and of many other factors, too complicated for analysis.

This tendency towards democracy has proceeded fastest and farthest in Britain and America. Although it had made important progress in Britain more than a century before the American Revolution, it moved much more rapidly in America, once it had got started on the national scale, than in Britain; for the simple reason that in America the obstacles, in the shape of tradition, national temperament, and vested interests in antiquated institutions, were immeasurably less powerful.

If, now, we consider American history, as a single evolutionary movement, from 1776 to the present day, we shall see that the spirit which Mr. Lane calls "Lincoln's love of man" has been growing more clearly conscious of itself throughout the

process. In the Revolution, the stream of tendency which subsequent growth proved to be the dominant current of American life was only one among a number of rills, trickling towards their confluence. At the outset, the emphasis on liberty and equality might seem to have been mainly dictated by the exigencies of the moment. The very men who raised this standard were in many cases slave-holders. And certainly the formulation of the Constitution and the establishment of the national Government was marked by an extreme hesitancy, an obvious reluctance to give freedom its head, a pronounced disposition to bridle and saddle it with all sorts of checks and balances; insomuch that many critics (such as Walter Bagehot, in his book on "The English Constitution") have declared that the democratic movement in England has been much less trammelled, in the absence of a written Constitution, than in America, with its social contract drawn up on paper.

Yet, nevertheless, the impulse which is expressed in the doctrine of inalienable natural rights has cut its way through all the reticulations by which it was impeded. Freedom has "broadened down"; and at point after point of domestic policy, and still more of foreign policy, America has become aware that she must either stand for her organic principle, her structural ideal, or lose her reason for existence. The stand taken by President Wilson, and endorsed with such eloquent unanimity by the Congress, in the matter of the European War, is only the latest of a series of illustrations of the truth for which I

am contending. America has avowedly undertaken to make the world safe for democracy; — meaning, of course, in the first place, to make the world safe for the United States; but, at the same time, to make it safe for Russia and France and Switzerland, and even for the democratic spirit which has so long been fettered and cast into dungeons in Germany.

A man, it is said, only learns to know himself when he is subjected to temptation. Similarly, a nation only learns to know itself when it is confronted with those great moral issues in which the fate of all mankind may be involved. It is her dealings with the rest of the world, even more than with the exigencies of her internal development, that have revealed to America her own real nature and spirit; and she has always found, and we trust always will find, that when such issues arise, she must stand for an ever-increasing measure of liberty, self-government and social justice. She realizes when the crises come that, like Luther, she can do no other.

The answer, then, to our objector's first question leads us to the answer to the others. The living spirit of America, of which Mr. Lane spoke, is not a dream. It is the determinant energy which governs and unifies and directs the will of the American people. This is, if you please, an ideal; but then, all thinkers (except extreme materialists) are aware that ideals are the most real of all things and the most potent of realities.

It is the presence and activity of this ideal which accounts for the specific character and conduct of a representative man like Lincoln. He is distinctively

and peculiarly American; and it is idle, or rather meaningless, to say that he would have been the same man had he been born in any other country. It might as well be argued that the "Divina Commedia" would be the same poem had Dante been born elsewhere than in Florence, or at another time than the close of the thirteenth century. The representative man (who must be most carefully distinguished from the average man) is representative because he cannot be detached from the context of history and psychology in which we find him. He is like the budding-point on the tree, to which its life converges; whereas the average man is like the bark, the passive husk which only tells of the kind of life that is within. It may, for the sake of argument, be conceded that the same identical assemblage of native predispositions which went to the making of Lincoln might have been embodied in a single man in France or England or Russia — though even this, at bottom, is an unthinkable hypothesis. Yet, if this had happened, the whole of such a man's post-natal impressions and experiences would inevitably have canalized his predispositions in quite different directions. Such powers as Lincoln's would, of course, raise a man to some kind of leadership anywhere and at any time. But in England, for example, class distinctions, the emphasis on ancestry, and the monopoly of university education by a particular religious denomination, would have prevented a man of Lincoln's antecedents from struggling to the headship of the nation; and analogous hindrances would have had the same effect in any European country.

Again, the special moral and political issues with which a statesman is called upon to deal, are not something wholly detached or separable from his personality. On the contrary, his individuality comes to be what it is by reason of the fact that he is confronted with these issues rather than others. They act upon him as much as he acts upon them; and it is out of the wrestling that he wins the blessing of his peculiar and distinctive greatness. Not only, then, would Lincoln not have been the same man had he been born and reared abroad, but he would not have been the same even had he been born in America twenty years earlier or later. It was the pressure of the special events of the eighteen-forties and 'fifties upon a unique spirit which was then growing to its rich maturity, and which found itself through its reaction to those events, that gave America its unprecedented and induplicable hero.

The question whether, if we credit America with the virtues of her great men, we must not also debit her with the vices of her small ones, can best be answered, like those we have already considered, by discovering what is the main trend of American development, and then ascertaining whether that course of evolution is such as must lead to the elimination of the vices which have flourished among Americans. Freedom is always dangerous, because there are always vicious propensities in human nature, and the absence of outward restraint is naturally conducive to their manifestation. America, in the few decades of her youthful life which have thus far elapsed, has had to suffer the penalty of her

daring faith in man. She has been the land of "wilful men," of unbridled individualism. The bestowal of almost unlimited opportunity has led hosts of men to think in terms of their own aggrandizement, and to care little or nothing for the general well-being. Yet the history of the last forty years has shown conclusively that this anti-social egoism is hostile to the real trend of America, and that, unless it be eliminated, the American spirit itself must perish. Hence have followed the many movements of education and legislation to bridle the wild self-assertion of the individualist, and to inculcate — if need be by force — the truth that men must care first for the Republic.

Hence, too, springs the conclusion that the virtues of Lincoln exemplify that in America which is truly American, whereas the vices that are common amongst us are extraneous and hostile to the spirit of the nation. The good is constitutional and organic; the bad is of the nature of disease, which is no more American, even when it is epidemic among our population, than a cancer is a normal part of the human body in which it grows, and which, if not removed, it must destroy.

To this Living Spirit, then, our allegiance is sworn.

CHAPTER VII

THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT

WHEN God decided to make man in His own image, He must have had His misgivings. The venture of creating a being capable of revolting against his Creator was undeniably a daring one. It is magnanimous, but slightly reckless, for a God to impart His own divine freedom and power of initiative to a new spirit, who will in all probability misuse it. And yet, when one comes to think of it, there is quite a good deal to be said in God's justification. Think of the boredom of a solitary eternity! What is the use of being God if there is nobody to be aware of the fact? Where is the advantage of possessing infinite wisdom, if there is no finite folly to give rise to situations that will necessitate its exercise? And surely it would be otiose to be endowed with perfect justice, love and mercy, if through all eternity there are to be no injustices to set right, no enmities to be overcome, no crimes to be forgiven. In one of the Roman Catholic liturgies, there is a reference to the sin of Adam as "*certe necessarium*," "clearly necessary." One may be disposed to credit the formulator of this phrase with a brilliant sense of humour; but at the same time one must admit that he had great psychological insight. God's Godship could only be dis-

played in relation to lesser beings who should defy it, and its triumph could only come about when those beings had freely, and of their own motion, accepted it and made its eternal and inherent law the law of their own will.

This little excursus into theology (which I trust is not seriously unorthodox) leads us on to the justification for the daring experiment called democracy, and particularly for that highly advanced instance of democracy which we call the American Commonwealth. The unification of the human race in the bonds of peace and fraternal co-operation has been the dream of thinkers throughout the ages, and many notable attempts have been made to translate the dream into actuality. But about all the efforts hitherto made there have been two fatal defects. One was, that the world-wide brotherhood was expected to be brought about by some single agency; the other was, that those by whom it was to be effected thought that they were to become and to remain the dominant force in the world, and that to their benevolent purposes the rest of mankind were to submit willy-nilly.

Thus, for instance, the ancient Jews, with the noblest intentions in the world, aspired to become the leaders of the human race. They thought of themselves as "chosen" for this purpose. But, unfortunately, they fell into the habit of thinking that they were chosen for their own sake, rather than for that of the other peoples; and they were also convinced that all other nations would have to accept their doctrines on the subject of God and His laws,

and to look upon their capital city, Jerusalem, as the metropolis of the universe. It was painfully easy for their national egotism thus to mar an ideal which in principle was entirely admirable.

Nothing is so insidious as the temptation to national self-righteousness, and the belief in your own people's superiority to the rest of the world. You display this perversion of your ideal the moment when, — not content with believing in your own God and insisting that your own people shall have none others before Him, — you go on to insult the Gods of the other peoples, and declare that they are nothing but idols. You can never get your neighbour to give an impartial and dispassionate consideration to the claims of your own God until you have shown yourself capable of a courteous and respectful estimate of his. When, like the ancient Jews, you go the length of insisting that you will not even eat with your neighbours, or recognize them as entitled to spiritual equality with yourself, unless they adopt your tribal customs as permanently binding upon them, your ideal is fundamentally perverted, and all chance of its realization goes glimmering. — Such I take to have been the gist of the criticism which St. Paul found himself constrained to offer to his apostolic colleagues in the Jerusalem Church.

Christianity, under the inspiration of St. Paul's common sense and relatively humane catholicity, made a memorable effort to revamp the Jewish ideal, purged of its narrowness and intolerance. And, of all the efforts thus far made to bring about the

spiritual unification of the human race, Christianity has been the most widely and permanently successful. Nothing but hostility or historical illiteracy could make it possible to deny this. No other religion and no political system has drawn and held together so many different racial and national types, or succeeded so remarkably in adapting itself to the imperious demands of such habitually self-assertive and unruly peoples. Buddhism has been a practical failure outside Asia, its gospel of resignation and quiescent passivity being totally unadaptable to the turbulent, forward-looking, chronically discontented peoples of Europe, who, in virtue of these characteristics, have beaten out the road of human progress and led the way over it for the last two thousand years. Mohammedanism has in similar fashion failed, both because of the bloodthirsty method of propaganda which its founder adopted, and because of the system of despotic government to which it always leans. The appeal of Christianity to the individual, its assertion of his unconditional preciousness, its demand that he shall work out his own salvation, and its ineradicable principle that no man's allegiance is worth anything unless it is voluntary and unconstrained, made it adaptable to many more of the exigencies of the historic situation, and to many more racial and national types, than any of its rivals could cope with.

But every ideal undergoes some perversion in the effort to actualize it; and the Christian experiment suffered by getting itself mixed up with the traditions and methods of Roman imperialism. The

Roman Empire was a notable, and in some ways a highly successful, attempt at the unification of mankind. Its area was practically co-extensive with the known world, and wherever it went it contributed largely, at least in externals, to the civilization of the peoples it subdued. Its weakness lay in the fact that its one fundamental method was the imposition of force. Although its object was to unify, it sought to rule by dividing. The difficulty, when you set out to establish a world-empire by such methods, is that you must always be stronger than any possible combination of those whom you oppress; and that is a condition which no human organization has ever been able permanently to fulfil.

In its later years, the Roman Empire became conscious of this weakness, and began to cast about for some mode of discipline which would enlist the voluntary loyalty of its widely scattered subjects. Hence Constantine's adoption of Christianity as the State religion. He and his advisers displayed great sagacity in selecting this system of doctrine and discipline; but their inspiration came too late to achieve that particular kind of success which they desired. Nevertheless, the course of history has demonstrated the soundness of their political instinct. We may say, indeed, that they got more than they bargained for, although not precisely what they needed or expected. They set up an institution which was not able, indeed, to avert the political collapse of the Empire, but which was able to secure a secular immortality for the spirit of the Empire after its body had been destroyed. It was the

Church which, alone of Roman institutions, inspired awe and reverence among the barbarian conquerors, and thus became the channel through which was mediated to them such part of the heritage of Graeco-Roman civilization as survived the deluge.

Unfortunately, however, as the Empire became Christianized, Christianity became imperialized. The Papacy, although for the most part it refrained from the direct use of the sword as an instrument of spiritual suasion, nevertheless did rely upon force and constraint for the establishment of its world-wide dominance. The creeds which men were forced to accept, the forms of worship which they might not criticise or revise, the hierarchical organization, run by Rome, which imposed itself according to a uniform type upon all the nations, — these were the methods employed; and in these there was as much of force (although of force in a different guise) as in the methods of Julius Caesar and his successors. It was by adopting these devices and modelling itself too closely upon imperial precedents that the Church lost its hold of the genius of Christianity, as this had been understood and applied by Jesus and St. Paul; and it was because of this substitution of imperial Roman for Christian methods that the great experiment of the Catholic Church ultimately failed.

With one hand, the Church propagated a doctrine of freedom and spiritual autonomy. This it could not suppress without destroying the New Testament and losing altogether the Christian character. But meanwhile, with the other hand, it

imposed the constraints and outward rule of a world-empire of the old type. The institution of the Inquisition is at once the evidence of the Church's widest departure from the genius of Christianity, and the confession of its greatest failure. These instruments of coercive imperialism could be employed successfully only during the boyhood, so to speak, of the new nations that arose out of the politically dismembered body of the Roman Empire; but as soon as the most advanced of those nations had grown to something like maturity, the long-postponed struggle between the two principles broke out, and the Christian element in the synthesis renewed its claim to precedence. First in England, then in Bohemia, and long afterwards in Germany, the standard of revolt was raised; and the battle ended in the emancipation of the two most progressive races of Europe from the transformed Roman dominion which had been exercised by the Pope.

No scholar now needs to be told that the changes in theological doctrine, which began in England in the fourteenth century and were consummated there and in Germany in the sixteenth, were the merest accidents and incidents of the historic development, the essence of which was the struggle of the claim for spiritual freedom and national autonomy, against the cosmopolitan despotism of the Papal system.

But meantime the revolted nations had themselves lost sight of another vital element in the Christian ideal. They had forgotten that in the purpose of its founders the Christian movement was intended to bring about the establishment of

just relations among men *in this world*. Jesus and St. Paul were out for the establishment of a real *kingdom*. They used this word not as a far-fetched figure of speech, but to describe actual human society; and their goal was not the supersession but the salvation of the world. It was not for nothing that they had inherited the Jewish tradition, which had never wholly lost itself in dreams and speculations about the life after death. Although they perceived the necessity for freedom, and understood that no enforced allegiance could be worth while, they never fell into the anarchistic heresy of thinking the governmental organization of society useless or sinful or pernicious. Their millennium was a just and righteous organization of the life of men and women, of cities and States, in this world. However fantastic may have been their conception of the means by which this consummation was to be reached, there was nothing preternatural in the end which they proposed to themselves.

After their death, however, the world suffered from an epidemic of pessimism. Four centuries after Jesus and St. Paul, St. Augustine had given up this world as a bad job, and had perverted the healthy and hopeful idealism of the founders of his faith into a doctrine which consigned all human society to merited destruction, and looked only for a *civitas Dei* to be established in another world after death. St. Augustine was a thinker of massive intellect and the master of a tremendously effective literary style; he was also (like most men) an epitome of the prevailing temperament and outlook

of the age in which he lived, which was an age of ruin and collapse. He therefore proved more persuasive to his contemporaries and successors than Jesus and St. Paul were any longer able to be. It transpired, accordingly, that when, centuries later, the new spirit broke out in England and on the Continent, the leaders of the movement of revolt, although they had instinctively got hold of the Christian end of the stick, were bluffed out of their own intuition by the terrifying ghost of the Augustinian conception of mankind and its fate. They therefore continued to locate their goal in the clouds, and construed their religion as a method of escaping from hell and attaining to heaven; — always with the misunderstanding that the hell to be escaped was not the wretched state of society in which they then lived, but something still worse after death; and that the heaven to be attained was not the state of society into which their own might be transformed, but something unspeakably beatific into which they were to be admitted after death, provided they had previously established the right kind of relations with its authorities.

From this it followed that the Protestant reformers misunderstood the very inspiration by force of which they were working, and that the nations which accepted their guidance came to conceive of religion almost exclusively as a direct, unmediated relation between the individual souls of men and the transcendent God. Christianity was dwarfed and atrophied into a *mere* system of prayer, worship and preparation for the hereafter. The plain and

striking reminders of very different functions which survived in the structure of the Church shrank to the proportions of rudimentary organs, the meaning of which had been forgotten. With the unmistakable language of the Book of Acts and the Pauline Epistles staring them in the face, men obliviously denied that Christianity had any rightful connection with government, politics, taxation and the organization of national life. Things that to the Christian founders were altogether secondary or tertiary have in the last three hundred years been made primary in religion; — questions, that is, concerning minutiae of doctrine, the kind of club-houses in which Christian societies should meet, or the precise method of attiring their officials and conducting the proceedings of the assembly.

So far had this perversion gone that when, in our own time, thinkers like Sir John Seeley¹ and Canon Fremantle² began to show, from the actual language of the New Testament (which we were supposed to have been reading all our lives), that government and national organization were the primary things that the early Christian leaders had set themselves to establish or to permeate by their spirit, we felt as though we were listening to something altogether new and strange and heretical.

Thus the Augustinian and Protestant perversions have caused men to lose sight of religion as a means to the spiritual unification of mankind and the establishment of a just order of human society on earth.

¹ In *Ecce Homo* and *Natural Religion*.

² In *The World as the Subject of Redemption*.

Among the many regrettable consequences of this is the necessity, under which I labour at this moment, of reminding the reader that the American experiment in nation-building is an undertaking identical in all essential respects with the life-work of Jesus Christ and the enterprise which He entrusted to His followers; — even though it may differ in some secondary details from this, its greatest historic precedent.

Yet surely it is evident that when we speak of an order of ideally just relations among men, to be established on the basis of individual freedom and collective autonomy, we are using words which describe with close precision both the Christian enterprise, as it is depicted for us in the works of St. Paul and the Evangelists, and the Commonwealth which the fathers of this Republic sketched out and began to actualize at the close of the eighteenth century. The loyalty of the Christian to God was an allegiance to an invisible and intangible but nevertheless real Power, the inherent Power of Righteousness which makes for fullness of life, and which must be unconditionally obeyed, upon peril of the failure of the whole enterprise of the human race. The loyalty of the American is offered, in similar fashion, to an ideal, which *quâ* ideal is indisputably real, and which cannot be seriously swerved from except at the cost of wrecking the purpose with which the Republic established itself in the world. America (as we learned in the previous chapter from Mr. Franklin Lane) is a living spirit, with a will and purposes of its own. It is the first great effort in

history towards the spiritual unification of the human race which has not been marred by the two defects to which, a few pages back, I drew the attention of the reader. It does not attempt to produce the fraternal organization of the entire world by its single agency, nor does it imply that the American people, or any class or group of them, are to hold a position of hegemony or mastery in the world-organization which is sketched and prefigured in the federal Republic.

Instead of the too colossal task of organizing the whole earth by one agency upon a single principle, the American experiment confines itself to furnishing an example and working model, upon which other cognate agencies may pattern themselves, in their own time, according to their own judgment, and with whatever modifications they desire. It demonstrates how, by means of a new socio-political invention, men of all races and nationalities can weld themselves into a voluntary unity, and how all the differences of culture-type, religious creed, and racial or national aspiration, which have hitherto constituted impassable barriers to such unification, can be turned into fraternal bonds and made to contribute to the enrichment of the whole. It shows how this can be done without imposing undesired constraint upon any element of the synthesis; but rather by according to each of those elements a fuller measure of liberty and self-expression than they had previously enjoyed.

This new invention is the Federal system, which is as truly a product of American ingenuity as the

telephone or the linotype machine. The plan of creating an indissoluble union of indestructible provinces, each of which enjoys complete autonomy on all matters save those in which it is vitally dependent upon or interdependent with the others, was a new piece of governmental mechanism. The blessing, the enormous and inestimable blessing, which it has brought to the world has been the demonstration that the obstacles to human fraternity which hitherto have always been found insurmountable can be scaled. Demands for different kinds of liberty, different modes of self-realization, which elsewhere have led to hatred and war, can be harmonized. Not only can the desire of each element for its own type of theological creed and religious expression be gratified, but, through the mutual confrontation of all the creeds on a footing of equality, the points which, exacerbated by strife and rivalry, have elsewhere assumed an adventitious importance, sink naturally and easily into a position of relative insignificance.

Under our Constitution it is possible for every type of social organization, every scheme of municipal government, every method of advancing science or overcoming specific evils, which in Europe has been found successful, to be appropriated and utilized. We can adopt or adapt whatever attracts us in English democracy or philosophy or religion, without having to take with it the stratified, semi-feudal arrangement of society which still survives in England. We can borrow from Germany whatever is useful in its municipal developments and in

its applications of science, and whatever we may choose of its philosophy and poetry, without having to import with these the curse of Germany — the intensely militarized and centralized policy of the Prussian State, and its doctrine of the divine and indefeasible authority of an hereditary monarch. By reason of the multiplicity of our centres of legislative authority, we can try, on a limited scale, experiments in the suppression of disease, the prevention of bad heredity, or the removal of capitalized vice, or new devices in government, taxation, and the control of industry and property, which if successful can afterwards be adopted by the nation as a whole, or which, if they fail, can be abandoned, after affecting only the single autonomous unit which undertook them.

And withal, and more than all, we have eradicated from this great area of the North American Continent even the possibility of warfare. Never again will the American people be rent asunder by civil strife. The fact that each of our provinces is sovereign within its own borders, and at the same time is a constituent of the central Government, ensures us against the possibility of a disaster like the European conflict occurring among us. Each of our States enjoys all the liberty that any European people could reasonably desire, and yet is exempt both from the temptation to aggress upon its neighbours and from the possibility of its neighbours aggressing upon it. None can secede from the Union; but none can be deprived of the benefits for the sake of which it entered the Union. Each, in-

deed, is encircled by all the others; but encirclement is no bad thing when it has been voluntarily chosen and can by no possibility be used as a means of injury. If ever the present distribution of local sovereignty should be modified, it can only be with the spontaneous assent of the areas affected, and in the interest of a yet closer union, a more perfect freedom.

What an object-lesson for Europe! What a glorious presage of the future federation of the world! No myth, no utopia, no dream out of the ivory gate, but an actual living, working, triumphant commonwealth; the creation neither of transcendent virtue nor of miraculous assistance, but simply of common sense, democracy and humane reason.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FALLACY OF THE MELTING-POT

WHY does not somebody, other than a professor of logic, write us a book on *The Tyranny of Words*? Nothing is more needed; for in every department of thought, from theology and philosophy to parochial politics, we are misled and obfuscated by metaphors and figures of speech. We need a book written by a layman for laymen. There are plenty of logic-books already, but nobody ever reads them except under compulsion, — unless it be brother-logicians anxious to confute their professional rivals. I verily believe that serious mischief has been caused to the historic development of America by the influence of two or three figurative phrases which have masqueraded in our minds as literal descriptions of fact.

1. Take, for one example, the fanciful phrase fastened for all time upon this Continent by its discoverers and early explorers: the phrase “*New World*.” Little did the inventor of that unlucky term dream of the harm he was perpetrating. It could not have occurred to him that this innocent little flight of his imagination would survive to produce in future generations a radically false sense of their own nature and position in the world, and of their relation to Europe and to the past. And yet

this is what it has done. Popular thinking in this country has been unconsciously distorted for more than a century by the illusion that America bears to Europe a relation analogous to that in which the moon stands to the earth. We have imagined that we could make what use we liked of Europe as a happy hunting-ground for our trippers, as a market, and as a source of recruits for our population, but that, at the same time, we could arrange our foreign policy and determine our own future evolution on the supposition that Europe did not exist, or at all events that it need not be considered by us.

This fallacious idea of newness, too, led us to ignore our own roots in the past, to think of ourselves much as Adam may be supposed to have thought of himself, and to write our history not from 753 B. C. or 55 B. C. or 800 A. D. (where it ought to begin), but from 1776, or 1619, or, at farthest, from 1492 A. D. We have been oblivious of the psychological and historic truth that America became *a part of Europe* the moment the keels of Columbus entered the waters of the Gulf, and consequently that its history is an organic growth from that of Europe, without familiarity with which it is unintelligible.

2. In the same way, the celebrated metaphor about "entangling alliances," employed in regard to a particular and transient conjuncture of circumstances by Washington, has muddied the waters of our thought, and thereby has affected our national decisions in an injurious fashion. Whenever we

quote or think of those words, the picture of a net projects itself before our eyes. We dream that the alternative confronting us is that of either keeping our feet completely out of its meshes, by making no alliances with foreign Powers, or of walking into the net by contracting alliances and getting tripped up.

But the truth is that it is only a treaty, an alliance, — a definite understanding and specific working agreement, — which can save us from becoming entangled. We are knit to the other nations of the world by a thousand strands of common descent, culture, religion, commerce, and mutual aid through science and art. These relations are inevitable, and inevitably destined to become yet closer and more intricate. By letting things drift, by obstinately refusing to come to any understanding as to the value we place upon these bonds, or to state under what conditions and to what extent we are willing to join with others in preserving them, we become automatically entangled. We are under obligations to various European nations, of indefinite amount and unspecified character; and they are in similar fashion indebted to us. The only way (as any business man would at once recognize) to *avoid* entanglement, to prevent the raising of expectations which we do not intend to gratify, and to escape being charged with ingratitude or suspecting others of ingratitude to us, is to come to a clear understanding upon the whole matter, and then to ratify it in writing. And this is, in all probability, what our share in the European War, and still more our share in

the world-agreement by which it must be terminated, will constrain us to do.

It was repeated a thousand times by Americans (before they had found Germany out) that the great war was brought about by the entanglements of the European peoples with one another. The idea apparently was that if the Entente Cordiale between France and England had not existed, or if France and Russia had not been committed to each other, or if the Triple Alliance had not led Germany to imagine that she could count upon Italy's assistance in prosecuting her aggressive designs, the war would not have broken out. I affirm, on the contrary, that the war occurred because there were not enough treaties and alliances among the nations, and because those treaties that did exist were for the most part not truly national, having been made in secret by persons and cliques who were not representative. Had each nation been isolated, there would have been many wars, long before this one occurred. If, on the other hand, the *exact* relations between England, France and Russia had been known to all Englishmen, Frenchmen and Russians, and above all to Germany;—if Germany had known for a certainty that she would have England and Italy as her active enemies, instead of England neutral and Italy on her side;—and, more especially, if she had been informed beforehand that her methods of warfare would infallibly draw the United States into the field against her;—it is morally certain that the peace would have remained unbroken. When we say that Germany wanted war,

we speak, I believe, the sober truth; but that does not mean that she wanted *such* a war. What Germany wanted was the victory of which her unexpected enemies — first England, then Italy, and lastly this country — have come in to deprive her. Now, a thorough public understanding would have made it certain in advance that the war would be a universal disaster, and that the aggressor would be crushed instead of obtaining from it the plunder he desired.

The President, although under the influence of the American tradition he felt constrained to say (on January 22nd, 1917), "I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances," yet showed that he had grasped the truth for which I am here contending when he added, "There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power." Alliances are entangling only when they are indefinite, secret, or made by persons who, not being vested with democratic authority, do not represent their nations. When these conditions are avoided, written treaties are the one way of preventing the entanglements which arise from the indefinite, unwritten alliances of blood and benefit that exist, and must exist, between us and Europe.

3. Another of the verbal images by which, within the last few years, our minds have been led astray from the right track of thought, is the one which Mr. Zangwill selected for the title of his celebrated play, "The Melting-Pot." It would be unfair, of course, to hold Mr. Zangwill responsible either for this term or for the mental muddle which it stands

for and which it tends to perpetuate. Both things originated in America. During his brief and hurried visits to this country, Mr. Zangwill heard his American friends use the word "melting-pot" to describe what is going on here as a result of our tremendous and heterogeneous immigration. It was no part of Mr. Zangwill's business as a dramatist to think the situation out or to put us right in our sociology. That we must do for ourselves. Nevertheless, one cannot but regret that he lent the apparent sanction of his keen intellect and his brilliant reputation to a figure of speech which, instead of directing us into the true path, points us clean away from it.

I do not desire to quarrel with anybody over a mere phrase. The *word* "melting-pot" would not be of the slightest importance, were it not for the fundamental errors which it masks, and for the limitless consequences to which these errors may give rise. We must therefore ask ourselves what the term suggests to our minds, and whether it is true that the human increment which we have imported from abroad does undergo a process in any way comparable to the melting of metal and its subsequent working up into pre-determined shapes. We must ask further whether it is possible for the invisible, intangible thing which we call consciousness, personality, humanity, to receive such treatment.

The answer to these questions is that it is neither true nor possible. You can take a piece of metal and, by melting it down, entirely destroy its previous form; and when you have done this, you have a material that is plastic, and can be moulded or beaten

into any shape you desire. The metal has no history, in the sense in which that term applies to living things. To use the terminology of M. Bergson, it has no duration. Time does not bite into it. At any moment it is possible (at least theoretically, and in large measure practically) to reverse all that has happened to it and restore it to the form in which it was taken from the earth.

With living beings, and above all with conscious beings, on the other hand, this process is a stark impossibility. *You cannot reverse the past of humanity — whether of a nation or of an individual person.* There is no such thing as humanity-in-general, into which the definite, heterogeneous, living creature can be melted down. I remarked in an earlier chapter on the fact that every man and woman is an epitome of the vast, collective, time-spanning life of vanished multitudes. The forms of our ancestors have perished, but their life lives on in us, and their experience is written in the tissues and nerves of our bodies and in our souls. Your selfhood at this moment, friend reader, is not merely a living synthesis of all your own experiences from birth onwards, it is also a living synthesis of the life of your ancestors and the history of your nation. You cannot unmake yourself; America cannot unmake you; nay, God Almighty could not take you back to the condition of relative simplicity in which you were born, or even reverse a single moment of your past. The characters traced by the pencil of experience are indelible. All that lives carries with it into the future its ever-augmenting past. Instead

of fading with the years, the effects of our experiences, like inscriptions cut into the living bark of a tree, grow ever deeper and more definite. It may be possible to annihilate your consciousness, but it is not possible to reverse the set of the current of your life or to destroy the channel which it has created. For a human personality may be defined as a prolongation of the past into the present.

Since, then, there is no humanity-in-general, save in abstract thought, and since it is impossible to treat a man like a piece of metal, it follows that the term "melting-pot" and the idea which it implies are inapplicable to America and to the process of assimilation which the immigrant undergoes.

But the metaphor is misleading also in another way. When you melt down metal, your purpose is to work it up afterwards into a shape *determined upon in advance*. You do not deal with it unless the mould into which it is to be poured is ready to your hand and is of the precise shape which you intend your metal to take. To justify, therefore, this figure of speech, it would be necessary that *the American type, into which the immigrant is to be transformed, should be finally fixed, definitely agreed upon and accepted*.

But there is no human mould in America to which the spiritual stuff of the immigrant is to be patterned. Not only is there as yet no fixed and final type, but there never can be. All life is miraculous, in the sense that it perpetually defies its antecedents, and presents us with more in the effect than was contained in the cause. The difference between the organic

and the inorganic world is that, whereas the inorganic is the sphere of repetition, of calculability, of equivalence between antecedent and consequent, the organic world is the world of variation, of individuality, of manifestations which no calculus can reduce to equivalence with their antecedents, and which no conceivable extension of our knowledge could enable us to predict in detail.

The very genius of democracy, moreover, must lead us to desire the widest possible range of variability, the greatest attainable differentiation of individuality, among our population. It may be convenient in a military autocracy to have men as much alike as possible, to curb or amputate their eccentricities, to cancel their individual differences and originalities. Such a State, being formed on the analogy of a machine — that is to say, being designed to have no will and purpose of its own, but to act always in a determinate fashion at the will and purpose of its controllers — is hampered and inconvenienced by originality and individual initiative. The characteristics which lead men to think and to act differently from their predecessors and their fellows are a menace to it. This, however, is the antipodes of the democratic conception of society, the very *raison d'être* whereof is the encouragement of independence and originality. It follows, then, that America should wish to do unto the immigrant the precise opposite of what this fallacy-breeding image of the melting-pot suggests to our minds.

Americans desire, moreover, that the immigrant

shall modify them as well as that he shall be modified by them. Or, at all events, whether this be desired or not, the nature of man makes it inevitable that it will happen. The newcomer is, or should be, welcomed for the reason that his presence here leads to contact and contrast between our minds and his, between our culture-type and that of the race or nation which he represents. Molten metal conforms by rigid necessity to the shape of the container into which it is poured, while the container itself remains unaffected. Whenever two men meet, on the contrary, the result of their contact must be a mutual modification. This is the very condition of life and growth. The business of America is to get rid of mechanical uniformity, and, by encouraging the utmost possible differentiation through mental and psychic cross-fertilization, to attain to a higher level of humanity. Not, indeed, that America is, or ever has been, perverted by the despotic superstition of the Superman; her ideal and function is to abolish the gulf dividing Sub-man from Man. She may not pray with Browning, "Make no more giants, God," but she does pray, "elevate the race at once!" Instead of despising common humanity, she believes in its uncommon possibilities. She has an unswerving faith that liberty and just relations will call forth in common men powers and virtues which, in an unjust or undemocratic society, must remain for ever latent and unsuspected even by their possessors.

The truth is, this image of the melting-pot is derived from a doctrine about the ultimate destiny of human society which in the last few decades has be-

come exceedingly widespread, and which awakens the enthusiasm of many well-meaning people who do not take the trouble to think out its implications. I refer to the doctrine called Cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan believes in the Brotherhood of Man. He loves to take that noble phrase upon his tongue. But he forgets, while doing so, that the very possibility of human evolution depends on the fact that brothers, instead of being mere replicas of each other, differ incalculably and unpredictably. He dreams that a worldwide human fraternity can be achieved by obliterating all national and psychic frontiers and transforming the world into a single nation, a single State, with one tradition, one loyalty, one flag. He ignores the psychological facts which show that such a future for mankind is impossible, and would be horribly undesirable even if it were possible. He forgets that the evolution of all life is away from homogeneity and towards heterogeneity, and that, even among the lower animals, the chance of perpetuity for a species increases as the number of its varieties multiplies. The greater the number of varieties, the greater is the range of adaptability, and the wider, consequently, is the environment in which the species will be able to survive and develop. In this matter, human evolution, spiritual evolution, presents the same law that we discover in the sub-human world.

The Brotherhood of Man? Yes! But not by the obliteration of variety and distinctness; rather by seeing to it that there shall be free scope and favouring environment for as many and as widely varying

types as man's purposive evolution can create. And this means that there must be separate and distinct nationalities as well as separate and distinct individualities. It is a fantastic heresy to suppose that two nations can melt wholly into one another, or that a single people can pass away, without the world becoming poorer. We cannot suffer the extinction even of primitive tribes like the Tasmanians or the Australian aborigines without a loss to the universe. We cannot turn Indians into imitation New Englanders, or Danes or Poles or Frenchmen into imitation Germans, — God forbid! — without destroying something infinitely precious, because irreplaceable. The cosmopolitan ideal would mean Chinese isolation universalized, and Chinese history repeated on the scale of the whole world; for it would exclude the possibility of intercourse between dissimilar culture-types. The nineteenth century has already mechanized and stereotyped us far too much. But in the future, if a wise policy prevails, we shall make machinery our servant instead of permitting it to be our master, as hitherto it has so largely been.

For we must grow towards the perception that the two indispensable conditions of human advancement are freedom and variety. Instead of the Cosmopolitan, we must set up the International ideal.¹ There must be many nations, and every nation must be made unconditionally safe against aggression.

¹ Many Socialists and other cosmopolitans thought they were preaching internationalism when what they were really preaching was anti-nationalism. The two ideals are poles asunder. Internationalism presupposes nations, and national patriotisms, and divergent types of character and culture; anti-national Socialism would obliterate all these.

The conception of patriotism must be expanded, until it acquires the universality which is a necessary characteristic of every sound ethical principle. It must come to mean that the very devotion of a man to his own country shall constrain him to respect the devotion of all other men to their countries; that the idea of inviolability, which haloes his own nation, shall attach itself equally to every nation. On this line, and on this alone, may we look for a genuine fraternity of the human race; and also for a development of the spiritual potentialities of humanity to which no limit can be assigned by the most piercing vision. Mankind is one; but it must be One-in-Many, a Unity-in-Variety. Upon this condition we have hope, progress, and the open road. The cosmopolitan plan would mean arrest, stagnation, and a closed horizon.

Of all possible modes, then, for the assimilation of immigrants into America, that suggested by the image of the melting-pot is the least possible and the least desirable.

CHAPTER IX

THE NATIONAL-GROUP IDEA, AND THE ANTI-NATIONALISTS

MANY people may agree with the arguments advanced in the preceding chapter, and yet may proceed to draw from them a conclusion as erroneous as the theory against which I have set them forth. "If the melting-pot idea is unworkable," they will say, "it must follow that the right course is to preserve unchanged the identity, to keep unmodified the racial and national memories and the inherited cultures, of the various groups which have been added to our population."

Accordingly, they will think it right that Greeks and Czechs, Slavs and Italians, Germans and Irish, shall as groups have their distinct local habitations and retain all the peculiarities which they brought with them to our shores. Separate nationalistic societies, each with its special organ, and the use of "a leash of languages" for the purposes of our common political life, will seem to be the right alternative — nay, the only alternative — to the policy prescribed by a doctrine which our examination has shown to be fallacious.

I must, however, request the favour of a patient hearing in my attempt to explain why I think this idea no less mistaken than the one to which the last

chapter was devoted. We must distinguish. There is a thoroughly sound and legitimate work to be done by the nationalistic societies and their organs, but it is *not* that of merely preserving untainted and unchanged the language, the traditions and the culture of the newcomers.

That the argument which I am about to submit is neither a merely academic nor a superfluous one is shown by the extent to which this backward-looking conception of the relation of immigrant groups to America and to each other at present prevails. The segregation, clannishness and in-breeding of our national groups has been notorious. Sometimes by conscious intention, perhaps more often by accident or economic pressure, or perhaps through sheer failure to think out any theory of their moral obligations and of their American destiny, our foreigners have herded together, and transformed the areas in which they live into mere detached fragments of the lands from which they came. They rendered themselves as impervious as possible to the seeping in of American influences. In this they were sometimes abetted by that Papalistic policy which, as we saw from Fr. Conway's pamphlet, would deliberately prefer utter illiteracy to the kind of Americanization our public schools seek to effect. Nor is the Papal sect by any means the only one which resorts to this policy, for the Greek Church and various Protestant bodies have acted in similar fashion. All around us we find churches and schools and homes in which the Polish, the Greek, the Italian or the German language is exclusively employed; with the natural

and inevitable — and often, one must add, the consciously designed — result that *the most sacred things are dissociated in men's minds from the life and ideals of the nation.*

Nobody is better aware than your carefully trained Jesuit priest of “the effect of early education in sealing up the mind against all access of new ideas that seem to conflict with early impressions,” — to use the language of the Rev. M. P. Hill, S.J., in his able treatise entitled “The Catholic's Ready Answer.” Implant your foreign language first, and drench your pupil's entire sub-conscious life, with all its emotions and sentiments, in the feeling that that language is the only appropriate means of lifting the soul into the presence of the divine; and the result must necessarily be that he will always feel towards America as towards something secondary and secular, something unworthy to be the object of the highest loyalty of the heart. The spontaneous affection of a person so brought up will cluster for ever around the source from which his language and his religious faith have come to him. No matter what may be the new ideas, or even the rational judgments, of later life, his mind, as Fr. Hill puts it, will be *sealed* against them. Every attempt which such a policy dictates to keep him a foreigner, in so far as it succeeds, prevents him from becoming a true American.

If, in addition to the early influences of church, school and home, a man's adolescent and mature life find all their satisfactions in association with persons and influences of the same provenance as his first language, the invisible barrier that secludes

him from vital contact and interdependence with his nation will be all the more impenetrable. If America means to him psychologically an outer, unhome-like world, in which he works because he must, but all his gains from which are merely a convenience to augment the pleasures and satisfactions which he seeks within the ring-fence of his parental nation, his essential foreignness must remain almost complete.

I am here speaking, be it remembered, not hypothetically, but on the basis of experience. We have all known persons born and educated in this country, and never subjected by travel to immediate European influence, who nevertheless have remained as thoroughly foreign in spirit and in their heart's allegiance as the last arrival from Ellis Island. We have all met persons who, despite their American birth, speak English haltingly and with difficulty, and can express themselves spontaneously only in some other tongue. We have all seen evidence of the contempt which such persons sometimes entertain for the Constitution and the laws of this country, as contrasted with their ecstatic adoration for the institutions of other lands, which they know only by tradition. Many of us have heard them say that if there should come a clash between this country and the lands to which they looked back, as Adam and Eve may be supposed to have looked back to paradise, America would mean nothing to them.¹

Such being the effects of segregation, what believer in the integrity and spiritual worth of the

¹ I heard this from more than one German-American before we went into the war.

Republic can find it tolerable? What patriot can bear to think that his neighbour, born under the same flag, living under the same institutions, voting at the same elections, yet regards this country as something merely to be endured and preyed upon, and as altogether wretched and contemptible in comparison with some European State? To any sincere lover of this country, the thought of its being thus regarded and thus exploited is more unbearable than the thought of being himself treated as a mere tool for the advantage of others who look down upon him with scorn.

The remedy, however, for this state of things need not be any such violent action as has lately been recommended by Colonel Roosevelt. There is no occasion to suppress all the foreign-language newspapers; and even if this were done, it would not destroy, but would rather intensify, the spirit to which Mr. Roosevelt objects. But there is occasion to see that those newspapers become organs of the American spirit, centres for the propagation of American ideals, and instruments for the education of their readers in the high privileges and responsibilities of American citizenship.

Having already pleaded that Americans should learn from the immigrant as well as teach him, I can now without inconsistency express my desire to see every American a regular reader of one or more foreign-language newspapers, and, at the same time, my wish that every immigrant or child of an immigrant should be a reader of one or more newspapers in the English tongue, as well as of the journals

printed in the language of his forebears. Nor, in bare justice, can one refrain from adding, while on this subject, that our foreign Press does frequently voice the American spirit and inculcate its principles in a way that would put many of our English-using newspapers to the blush. But in order that it may fully justify its delicate and seemingly anomalous position, the foreign Press must consciously and unequivocally accept the Americanization of its readers as its constant major goal. Its political influence ought always to be exerted to induce its readers to think and vote as Americans and with a single eye to the well-being of America.

The spectacle of appeals at our elections, made on behalf of candidates of native citizenship, *to foreigners as foreigners*, urging them to support the recommended candidate because he is a friend to the nation whence they came, is, I suppose, so familiar to born Americans that they have come either to ignore it or to accept it as a part of the natural order of things. Yet, as a newcomer, I cannot refrain from expressing the horror and the sense of outrage which the sight and sound of these appeals has awakened in me.

Before the last mayoral election in Chicago, I was shown a post-card, printed in the German language, urging the *Germans* of the city (as though any citizen and voter in Chicago could be a German!) to vote for a candidate with a German name, on the unspeakable ground that his election would have great weight with the authorities at Washington, and might lead to a modification of the policy

of the Republic in favour of the Central Powers. There was perhaps a touch of ironic humour in the fact that the person who showed me this card was the son of a German immigrant, who, having neglected the culture of his ancestors, was unable to read it, and therefore appealed to an Englishman to tell him its purport! After translating the message, I read my acquaintance a homily on the enormity of the offence which this post-card represented, and upon what I understood to be the honourable obligations of citizenship. I rejoice to say that the candidate on whose behalf this treasonable appeal was made did not win the election; — though, to be sure, when one remembers who *did* win it, there seems little enough reason for satisfaction. On another occasion, when a vacancy in the United States Senate was to be filled, I saw a printed placard pasted up on the walls, which read: “Deutscher! Stimmen für ——. *Er ist unser Freund!*” Again I rejoice to testify that this infamous mandate failed of its object.

Of all the forms of political corruption by which our democracy is vitiated, this form, in which there is no question of money-bribery or “graft,” but in which the debauchery is spiritual, is immeasurably the worst. No person who permits such an appeal to issue in his name ought ever again to be allowed to offer himself as a candidate for any public office. Indeed, for one offence, he ought to be deprived of civil rights and committed to the penitentiary. We may say on paper that in times of peace the crime of treason cannot be committed against the United

States,¹ just as we may say on paper, if we choose, that in time of peace water shall not be permitted to flow downhill; but in truth the one statement is as false and idle as the other. Treason can be, and is, committed against the Republic whenever a local or national question of American politics is manipulated for the purpose of encouraging in citizens a loyalty which they have forsworn with their lips, and ought to have renounced with their hearts. Treason can be, and is, committed whenever any candidate for an American office designs, or even pretends to design, to use the office, if he gains it, in the interests of a foreign Power.

Scarcely less reprehensible than such practices is the habit, notoriously prevalent among our politicians, of appealing not to the American loyalty of their constituents, but to their tribal pride as members of some European race. But for the testimony of my own ears, I could not have believed that a responsible American citizen of national fame would urge an audience mainly composed of Southern Italians to vote against a candidate for the Presidency on the ground that many years earlier, in a published work, that candidate had made some uncomplimentary comparisons between Southern Italians and other immigrant groups. Yet such an appeal I actually heard made by an eminent Progressive, when advocating the candidacy of Mr. Roosevelt against that of Mr. Wilson in the year 1912.

It needs but a slight knowledge of history and

¹ "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." — Constitution, Art. III, § 3.

of the world to make one realize that no other nation would dream of tolerating such abuse of its hospitality, such insidious and traitorous misuse of its freedom. If the ignorant immigrant, new to this land, unfamiliar with its history and ideals, makes the interests of Italy or Germany the main consideration determining his vote, our feeling of resentment may be cooled by consideration for his position. But when responsible Americans, with no such excuse, thus flagrantly prostitute the interests of the Republic in the effort to advance their own political fortunes, one can find no language of a printable description strong enough to characterize their conduct. We have but to remind them how they would fare if in similar circumstances they pursued the same course in England or France or Germany.

If they would refrain from such conduct in those countries, what would be their motive? Fear of the police? Terror of the odium and contempt, to say nothing of the prison sentence, which it would probably bring down upon them? If so, what are we to think of persons whom nothing but terror can induce to behave with common decency? Is America, which trusts to their honour and attaches no penalty to such offences, to be exploited and insulted in requital of her magnanimity?

The national function which I would assign to the foreign-language newspaper is also the only one which can justify the existence of societies composed of Americans of alien origin. By every principle of honour, and also indeed by every principle of

enlightened self-interest, they are bound to make their efforts subservient to the Americanization of their members and the inculcation of the spirit and principles of the Republic. In this way, but only in this way, they can achieve a legitimate and a useful end. Let them keep alive Italian and German music and literature, Balkan handicrafts, and the folk-lore and folk-dances of the Old World; — not for the sake of the Old World, but as elements contributory to American culture. Let them spend as much time in bringing the spirit and meaning of American institutions home to their members as in bringing home to Americans the spirit and meaning of their European traditions.

It may seem inappropriate to discuss the attitude of the anti-national political theorist in the same chapter in which we consider the error of those who devote themselves to the preservation of national loyalties incompatible with American patriotism. Inasmuch, however, as, *quâ* America, the practical effect of both these wrong policies is the same, I cannot think it out of place to devote a word here to the duty of all political parties to be animated by loyalty to the Republic, to inculcate this loyalty in their members, and to make the spiritual and material development of the nation the be-all and end-all of their efforts. I have already cited instances of the fashion in which members of the two dominant national parties are sometimes false to this duty. But there is another influential party, the Socialist, many of whose members regard all nations alike as

their enemies, and teach that men's only loyalty should be given to their own class throughout the world.

This is, of course, the familiar doctrine of Karl Marx, as understood and reiterated by the most prominent of his followers in many countries. For reasons which it is not necessary here to adduce, I maintain that this Marxian heresy has nothing whatever to do with Socialism in its true sense. The very genius of that movement is the plea for *nationalization*. Its watchwords are, and have always been, the nationalization of land, capital, and all the instrumentalities of production, distribution and exchange. To preach the abrogation or supersession of nationality in the same breath with this doctrine is a childish inconsistency. What could be the programme which should aim simultaneously at nationalizing all resources and destroying the nation? But, unhappily, the proletariat to which the evangel of Socialism is commonly preached is for the most part at a childish stage of intellectual development, and consequently is unable to detect the transparent fallacies and sophistries of its exhorters.

On the very day on which I first wrote this page, I read in the newspaper of a public demonstration addressed by leaders of Socialism in Chicago, who informed their hearers that America's entrance into the European War was motivated not at all by the humanitarian and democratic ideals expounded by the President, but by the vicious desire of capitalists to profit financially through it. This, be it remembered, in face of the notorious fact that our capitalists

gained immensely more by our neutrality than they could possibly gain by our belligerency; in face, also, of the equally glaring facts that members and sons of the so-called capitalist class volunteered to risk their lives in the nation's service in far greater proportion than members of the working class volunteered, and that the selective conscription laws apply to all classes alike. What can be the curious twist in the minds of educated men which leads them to support their cause by such disgraceful falsehoods?

I speak, perhaps, with the more heat in this matter, because I feel in some measure personally compromised by the outrageous conduct of these perverters of the populace. For a number of years I have been a member of the British Fabian Society. This is a group of thinkers who for thirty years have been demonstrating that the ideal of Socialism is thoroughly consistent with nationality and with the most ardent patriotism; that it does not need the support either of the anti-national heresy of Marx or of his dogmatic and unphilosophic materialism and economic determinism. The Fabian students have shown, further, that the measures by which the transition from competitive individualism to the co-operative commonwealth may be brought about need not involve any wide social upheaval, or any revenge upon the beneficiaries of the existing order. No man who has come under the influence of these sane teachings,¹ no man who has sat at the feet of Mr.

¹ Which have latterly been made widely known among us, thanks to the enterprise of *The New Republic* in reprinting the Programme of War Aims and the Programme of Reconstruction of the British Labour Party.

Sidney Webb and his distinguished colleagues, can witness patiently the attempts of anarchists and anti-patriots to pervert the ideal they profess into something far more hideous than the worst of the injustices against which they are ostensibly in revolt.

It is neither ethically nor psychologically, neither historically nor economically sound, to believe that the nation can ever be superseded; nor is it sound to hold that the immigrant groups in America should remain permanently segregated from each other and from the nation at large. While retaining and developing the culture which they bring, they must at the same time transform it into American culture, and themselves into depositaries and channels of American ideals and principles. They must assimilate the older culture of the American people and that of their fellow-immigrants of other race, to the end that, through the mutual penetration of these many embodiments of the human spirit, something greater and finer than any of them may be produced.

CHAPTER X

THE RIGHT METHOD: CULTURAL CROSS-FERTILIZATION

IF the reader's patience has not been exhausted by the analysis of "how not to do it" in the two preceding chapters, I may now submit for his consideration a brief outline of what I take to be the true method of realizing the cultural promise of the American nation.

The heterogeneity of our population, which so many people deplore, is in my judgment not at all a thing to be regretted, but is rather the very fact which enables us to entertain a rational hope that America will take rank among the foremost, if not as the foremost, of the nations of the world, in elaborating the mental, aesthetic and material civilization of the next few centuries. My belief in this possibility is rooted in a study of history, not indeed so broad or deep as I could wish, but sufficiently so to convince me that we have in the Republic to-day precisely such a set of conditions as in the past has always preceded and caused every notable efflorescence of national or racial genius, every marked advance in the cultural development of mankind.

For such developments have always resulted from the meeting and blending of contrasted culture-types. This is a rule to which, I think, there has

been no outstanding exception. Formerly, indeed, the high achievement of the Hellenic peoples used to be regarded as a spontaneous or, so to say, parthenogenetic quickening of the higher genius of a nation. But modern research has demonstrated that, here as elsewhere, the general law is exemplified. We now know that not until the crude art and philosophy of early Greece had been brought into intimate contact with the older cultures of Egypt and the East did the rapid ascent begin. Through its colonies on the coast of Asia Minor, through intercourse with the ancient civilization of the Nile Valley, and through what it derived from the wonderful culture of the so-called Minoan period in Crete, the genius of the Greek peoples was stimulated to the point at which the glories of Periclean Athens — the sculpture of Pheidias, the philosophy of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, and the drama of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides — could arise. Had Greece been spiritually isolated, or had its tribal egotism and contempt for foreigners forbidden it to profit by the opportunities of association with other nations, it would in all probability have remained until the end at a dwarfed and poverty-stricken level of civilization.

The manifestation of the same principle in the case of Rome is so clear that it needs no emphasis. It is generally recognized that Roman literature is for the most part a pallid imitation of that of Greece, — an imitation which sometimes sinks to the level of flat plagiarism. Every step in the development from the primitive times of the Republic to the

magnificence of the Augustan era has been shown to have resulted from the appropriation by the Romans of some of the ideas of the peoples whom they conquered. Just as their army became a composite, formed from all the peoples of the known world, so their civilization was a blend of the cultural achievements of every nation. Even the religion which, as we have seen, was the one great heritage transmitted by Rome to its barbarian conquerors, was a fusion of ideas, doctrines and practices blended together out of many varieties of Paganism, and organized about a Judaeo-Christian nucleus. No single or "pure" cultus could have won the allegiance of so many nations as accepted the Roman Catholic faith. A glance at the Athanasian Creed, or even at the much earlier Prologue to the Gospel of St. John, reveals the large extent to which the theology of the Church was indebted to the philosophy of Greece. Its ritual, its hagiology, and its festivals testify to a similar indebtedness to many of the cults which it superseded.

Again, it should not be forgotten that the English nation is the product of a blending of tribes and races which continued for a thousand years. An English immigrant to this country cannot, therefore, be moved to despair by the multiplicity of tongues or the sharp and even incongruous contrasts of race and culture-level which he discovers here, unless he feels that his own people have proved themselves a failure in the world. For what is the story of Britain, from the year 55 B. C., and earlier, to 1066 A. D. and later, but just such a welter of immigration

and assimilation as that to which the term "melting-pot" has been applied in America? To be sure, the amalgamating elements were fewer, the experiment was on a more limited scale, and the time which it occupied was very much longer than the whole life of America has thus far been. Nevertheless, the outcome of the process, as shown by a comparison between the contributing elements and the synthesis into which they at last blended, justifies the conviction that America's repetition of the experiment will indubitably lead to something finer than any single one of the factors which co-operate to produce it.

The ethnological antecedents of the race or races which Julius Caesar found in Britain are very uncertain, and for our present purpose of no great importance. It suffices to remind the reader that the "Ancient Britons" were neither destroyed nor wholly driven into Wales and Cornwall and Brittany. Large numbers of them were enslaved or otherwise assimilated with their conquerors. After the withdrawal of the Roman armies at the beginning of the fifth century, the country that is now England was for nearly five hundred years the hunting-ground and battle-field of predatory and warlike tribes from all the northern lands of Europe. Many Germanic stocks established themselves in petty kingdoms on the eastern coast, and afterwards spread inland. These were followed and fought by Danes and other Scandinavians. The relations between the successive floods of newcomers and those already in possession were, of course, alter-

nately martial and marital. Christianity, widely prevalent during the period of the Roman occupation, was temporarily submerged by the Paganism of the Angles, Jutes and Saxons, to be subsequently re-established by a missionary propaganda directed from Rome.

At length, in the eleventh century, there came the Norman Conquest — a conquest, that is, by Northmen who had been racially diluted and culturally modified by a century and a half of Gallic environment. The kingdom of William the Conqueror was thus a violent fusion of two broadly differentiated peoples, each a composite derived from many stocks. But within three centuries the inevitable process of physical and psychical cross-fertilization between these two types had resulted in their disappearance and replacement by a new people, different from both. Just as the English language, by the time of Chaucer, is neither Anglo-Saxon nor Norman-French, but a new creation, immeasurably richer and more flexible than either of the elements from which it had sprung, so the English people is no longer Angle or Saxon or Jute or Scandinavian or Norman, but a new entity, in which the physical stigmata of the various contributory races can perhaps sometimes be traced, but which would never have come into being had those races remained segregated and "pure."

The term "Anglo-Saxon," which many people proudly use to describe themselves, or the modern English nation, or those elements in the American Republic which are of British origin, is recognized

by anthropologists to be scientifically worthless. No Englishman can venture to say, without making himself ridiculous, that he is of undiluted Anglo-Saxon or Danish or Celtic or Norman descent. Every one of us is in this sense a hybrid, a product of miscegenation. If we are to use the term "Anglo-Saxon" at all, we ought to restrict it to the psychic characteristics which have been dominant in this much-mixed people since its emergence as a distinct unity, or to the political ideals and social institutions which it has evolved for itself and planted throughout the world. As a sociological term, in this sense, the word may be justified; but for purposes of ethnology it is worse than useless.

The instances already cited, and many others with which it is unnecessary to weary the reader, establish the thesis that the enrichment of a civilization is always by way of the crossing of comparatively unlike types. The process may or may not involve the physical inter-breeding of different races, but it must involve the mingling of variegated ideas and ideals, aesthetic standards, religious beliefs, and philosophical and scientific lore. The physical blending of races, provided they are not too markedly divergent, has usually brought about an improvement of the stock. The contact of culture-standards always causes a widening of the mental horizon of the peoples concerned, and a stimulation of their creative power.

Reverting for a moment to the religion of Europe, we must remind ourselves that this religion was originally the cultural tradition of the Jewish nation.

To be sure, it was already composite before it had begun to spread among the Western peoples; but, relatively to them, it may be regarded as a single and simple factor. The adoption, therefore, of Christianity by the Western world was, from the sociological standpoint, an instance of cultural cross-fertilization. It was the acceptance of the ideas and ideals of a foreign people; the borrowing of that people's literature, and its elevation to the rank of divine revelation. All the peoples of Europe, however little they may have been physically modified by infusions of alien race, have thus been spiritually impregnated by an influence from without; and this influence, as we have seen, was for many centuries the dominant factor in their lives, the condition, indeed, of their emergence into distinct and self-conscious nationhood.

More restricted geographically, but not less markedly effective, was the spiritual blending which occurred when in the Middle Ages the literature of ancient Greece was re-discovered. The term "New Birth," — Renaissance, — which has so generally been applied to this event, is something more than a mere metaphor, the event being a real case of biogenesis on the spiritual plane. The words that ancient Greece spoke unto mediaeval Europe, they were spirit and they were life. This is proved by the fact that they engendered life after their own kind. They gave a wholly new direction to the mental activities of the Western peoples. They made and marked the difference between the mediaeval and the modern world.

We may say, then, that if there are any "pure" races, they are the least civilized and the least progressive races in the world. If there are civilizations which have received no infiltration from contrasted cultures, they are so obscure and undeveloped that they have contributed nothing to the general progress of mankind. No doubt the pre-Columbian races of Mexico and Peru were relatively "pure," but that, with their isolation, was the very reason for their arrested development; that was why, when discovered, they were so inferior to the civilization of the discoverers. Purity, in the queer technical sense in which the term is applied to nations and their cultures, is a synonym for poverty. Pure languages are always poorer than those which have assimilated alien elements. The Germans foolishly pride themselves on the comparative freedom of their tongue from foreign adulteration, which they do their utmost to resist. They profess contempt for French, and particularly for English, on the ground that these are hybrids. But it is precisely their hybridity which has given them their wealth, their flexibility, their power to express the entire gamut of emotions, the subtlest shades of meaning, and the most abstract metaphysical conceptions. The prevalence of French as the language of diplomacy, and the spread of English over the world,¹

¹ A curious episode recently occurred, according to a Church newspaper, at a conference of native Christians in China. The delegates were from all parts of the country, and the difference of Chinese dialects is such that no one of them was intelligible to all present. So, in order that all the Chinamen might understand each other, the proceedings were conducted in English.

are in large measure due to their adaptability to every need of the mind.

The fate of the Aztec civilization, of the aborigines of Australia and Melanesia, and even of the highly developed culture of China, reads this lesson to the world: that it is not good for a civilization to be alone.

The conclusion seems irresistibly to follow from a survey of history that the conditions which prevail in America to-day, if understood aright and wisely handled, contain the promise and the potency of a new epiphany of the human spirit, which shall be as much higher and grander than that of contemporary Europe as contemporary Europe is higher and grander than the Europe of two thousand years ago. All the more does this seem possible when we remember that the conscious providence of humanity is now far more developed, and equipped with far more potent instruments for the fulfilment of its will, than at any previous period in the history of the world.

The mastery over the earth's resources which applied science has given us, although, as we see to-day, it can all too easily be degraded into a means of collective suicide, nevertheless needs only good will and humane purpose to transform the world into a paradise. It even contains the promise that we may turn what has hitherto been a fortuitous and accidental development into a consciously controlled process. For the minds of men, and the general mind of society, have their uniformities no less than the outer world. Although we are now only be-

ginning to understand these, it seems not irrational, following the analogy of our experience of the outer world, to indulge the hope that a fuller knowledge of our own nature's laws will enable us to plan our future mental evolution. It may give us the possibility of psychic and spiritual, as well as of bodily eugenics.

But the wise utilization of our present opportunity in America does not require us to wander off into the nebulous regions of prophecy and speculation. Our practical duty clearly is to see that none of the elements of civilization represented by the many races among our population shall be suffered to become extinct until it shall have crossed its genius with that of others, and thereby given birth to something higher than itself. We need all the varieties that are at hand. We cannot spare the ethical mysticism of the Jew or the imaginative sacramentalism of the Catholic. We need that Italian soul which has lived in Dante and Savonarola, in Petrarch and Boccaccio, in Michel Angelo, in Mazzini and Garibaldi, and which is not dead and cannot die. We need the hardihood of the Northman and the dreamy yet sturdy spirit of the Russian. We must preserve the scientific thoroughness and metaphysical profundity of the pre-imperial German, and his genius for music and poetry. All these must fructify and blend with the equally differentiated and indispensable gifts and energies of the French and British stocks.

By way, then, of a practical programme, I would venture to set over against the notion of the melting-

pot and the opposite doctrine of the segregation and in-breeding of our national groups, the following suggestions:—

(a) That every immigrant should be a member of a society of his own national origin, and also a member of an international society, composed of representatives of as many different peoples as possible. This would enable him to keep alive and develop the culture inherited from his own race, and to recognize that his business with that heritage is to engraft it upon the new civilization which America is evolving. It would protect him against the provincialism which inevitably results from isolation. Fellowship with Americans of different origin in an international society would lead him to renounce the vulgar prejudices of race against race and nation against nation, to respect his neighbour as himself, and to value the cultural traditions of other peoples as highly as his own.

(b) That each native-born American should also be a member of an international society. This would wean him from the conceit that the New England Puritan type, or the Southern cavalier, or indeed any mere modification of what is called the Anglo-Saxon race, is the final cast of Americanism, upon which all newcomers, now and hereafter, are to be moulded. It would enable him both to learn and to teach, both to receive and to impart the quickening impulses of mental and spiritual life.

(c) That there should be intermarriage between persons of different national descent;—between Jews from Russia, from Germany and from Galicia,

and also between Jews and Gentiles of every origin; between Americans who have been Russians or Hollanders or Italians or Czecho-Slovaks and Americans of other race.

But the essential element in the plan which I am sketching is the deliberate crossing, by means of education and association, of the various *cultures* represented; and its success need not depend upon an extensive physical inter-breeding of racial and national types. Although I believe profoundly in the beneficence of "mixed marriages" of this kind, I yet recognize that the spiritual element in the process is the most important one from the national standpoint, and that this can be secured, if necessary, without the other.

(*d*) One important factor in such an enterprise would be the establishment of State or municipal theatres, which should not be confined to the production of plays in English, nor yet restricted (as our foreign theatres now are) to the work of any single race or nation. I look for the time when we shall have polyglot theatres, maintained at the public expense (for there is no more objection to the public endowment of a theatre than to that of any other kind of school), in which, on alternate days or weeks, there shall be plays in English, French, German, Swedish, Russian, Italian, and Yiddish, presented by members of those races who have been bred in the traditions which the plays reflect. I also hope that when this time comes, such plays will attract audiences not only of persons of the same antecedents as the performers, but of citizens of

every origin. We shall not be, relatively to our opportunities, an educated nation until every one of our citizens is able to appreciate plays in at least four languages. To remain content with less than this is as foolish a neglect of our spiritual resources as it would be to leave our coal mines unworked and use only wood for fuel.

(*e*) As the readiest means of rendering such a scheme possible and profitable, we should inaugurate in our high schools and universities a systematic study of what has been called the Science of Civilizations. For this idea I am indebted to Professor Felix Adler, of New York, who has already set on foot a number of efforts towards its realization. This science might, for practical purposes, be grafted on to the study either of history or of sociology. Its concrete details (such as the preparation of text-books and the delivery of courses of lectures by persons expert in the culture-history of particular nations) could readily be worked out by any body of educators, as soon as they had caught the vision and appreciated the high promise of the scheme.

The conception which we are to realize, in working out our national evolution, is that which was so well expressed by Mazzini, when he said that "Nations are the citizens of humanity, just as individuals are the citizens of a nation." The American doctrine of equality, in the only sense in which it can be true at all, is true of peoples collectively as well as of men individually. The peoples of foreign birth or descent in this country are here because America needs them as much as they need America. Had

they not been needed, they would not have been permitted to come. Each national stock is the bearer of some mental or spiritual gift which is unique, and which we cannot afford to lose. But immigration is a failure unless it is so dealt with as to produce reciprocal benefits both to America and to the newcomers whom she receives. The fusion of these many cultures will result in each of them shedding whatever is undesirable or unadaptable to the American environment; and, at last, in the merging of them all into a distinctively American civilization which shall transcend them all.

It is in the nature of such a new enterprise in human evolution that its final outcome should be unpredictable. But if it be undertaken with due regard to the lessons of history, and in the catholic spirit of American democracy, it cannot be doubted that the result must be of surpassing excellence. Indeed, the very reason why it cannot be predicted is the certainty that it will be nobler and more splendid than anything we can now imagine. No observer in England, in the days immediately following the Norman Conquest, could have foreseen the work of Geoffrey Chaucer, or the richly diversified and yet unified nation which lives immortally in "The Canterbury Tales." Nor could any thinker in Chaucer's time have prophesied the advent of Shakespeare and the world he mirrored. When the seeds of the Renaissance were sown, the harvest, although certain, was incalculable. The discovery of the New World, the unprecedented outburst of mental life and genius in many lands, the invention of printing,

and the power, through science, of achieving the *imperium hominis* of Bacon, were all hidden in the haze of the morning twilight. Yet, looking back, we now can see that these divine achievements of the race were the natural results of the causes to which we trace them.

And so, although it doth not yet appear what America shall be, we know that, if she be true to her own genius and respond worthily to her unrivalled opportunity, her achievement, like her resources, will be more precious for mankind than that of all earlier times. Rich as her history already is in great men, superb as is the accomplishment represented by the names of Lincoln and Washington, of Emerson and Lowell, and of her great inventors and men of science, her future history will prove all these to have been but

August anticipations, symbols, types
Of a dim splendour ever on before.

CHAPTER XI

“MY COUNTRY, RIGHT OR WRONG”

A NAVAL officer, flushed with enthusiasm and perhaps just faintly exhilarated with wine, proposing a toast after dinner, is hardly the person to whom one would look for a satisfactory and universally applicable code of patriotic ethics. If he had not been dining, and could not be suspected of wining, it seems fairly obvious that the code which such a gentleman might propound, even though it were entirely sound in its application to men of his own profession, might not be the right one for citizens in general. The naval or military officer is pledged to a discipline and an unquestioning obedience to the constituted authorities of his Government which make his position radically different from that of the lay citizen.

The business of a fire brigade is to put out fires, not to let them burn while they discuss their causes. The business of an army and navy is to win wars, not to debate their origin or to suspend action until they have independently satisfied themselves that the cause in which they are commanded to fight is a perfectly just and equitable one. The house would burn down while the firemen were investigating; the war would be won by the enemy before the army and navy had concluded their deliberations. While

in his capacity as citizen, and when not engaged upon professional duty, the soldier or sailor has the same right to form and express opinions on national policy as the rest of us, the situation for him becomes entirely changed when he is on duty.

We might concede, therefore, that the dogma of Decatur (which a Chicago newspaper has for years been reciting daily, with the somnolent regularity of a Churchman reciting his Creed) is true and valid for sailors and soldiers in their official capacity, and yet deny its truth and validity for the rest of the nation. But, as we shall see, there are strong reasons why we cannot make even this concession.

For it cannot be said that a dogma, whether of theology or of politics, is true and valid for anybody so long as it is expressed in such loose terms that it has no single, definite, and unmistakable meaning. Now this is the trouble with the phrase from Decatur's toast. It may mean at least five or six different things, every successive one of which is worse than the others. But let us first construct a few parallel watchwords on the same principle: —

“ My mother, drunk or sober.”

“ My wife, faithful or unfaithful.”

“ My religion, true or false.”

“ My city, good or bad.”

“ My partner, honest or dishonest.”

Can anybody point to a single reason for rejecting these variations which would not be equally decisive against the original theme? Why may not a priest, at the command of his superiors or from regard to a declaration made years ago, proclaim doctrines

which he no longer believes to be true? Why may not a merchant endorse or profit by the dishonest procedure of his partner? If a man's mother, while drunk, smashes his neighbour's windows, why should he not declare her justified and refuse to make amends? On the other hand, if these courses are morally impossible, as they are, how can it be right to preach or act upon the parrot-cry of "My country, right or wrong"?

But, waiving for the moment the obvious moral objections to the maxim, let us set forth the case against it on the score of its many possible meanings; — reminding ourselves, while doing so, that if a word or phrase may mean anything it actually means nothing. The saying, "My country, right or wrong," is susceptible at least of the following five interpretations: —

(a) "I will stand by my country whether she is right or wrong. I will fight for her with the same enthusiasm, and back up her demands for annexations or indemnities with the same zeal, whether these are just or unjust."

(b) "I will give up the whole question of rightness or wrongness, and close my mind to the inquiry. My country's decision shall be to me as the word of God, which I will accept with unquestioning reverence. The President and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs shall be to me as a Pope and a Cardinal Penitentiary, and what they decide I will accept as the devout Romanist accepts a pronouncement *ex cathedrâ* from the Vatican. In short, I will believe my country right even though all the rest of the

world declares her wrong and I know nothing about the matter of my own knowledge. If her authorities put an onion in my mouth and tell me it is an apple, an apple it shall be.”

(c) “I will swear that my country is right, whether I believe it or not; and with all the more emphasis if I don’t. What is a lie, that one should hesitate to tell it for the honour or advantage of one’s country?”

(d) “If I think her wrong, I will keep silence, and allow others to assume that I believe her to be right. This would only be a lie of silence anyway, and surely that is common enough in daily life, as well as in international politics!”

(e) “Even though I know my country to be wrong, and confess as much to myself and to my fellow-countrymen, I will so speak and act that the rest of the world shall believe that I think her right.”

In whichever of these senses the aphorism be construed, *it is a justification, gratuitously and generously presented by its American author and his followers, to any present or future enemy of the Republic.* Whether Mr. Roosevelt and the rest of those who repeat it intend this use to be made of it is not clear. Presumably they do not; but that it can and will be so used is certain. When the President of the United States drew his distinction between the German people and “the Government that speaks for them,” what was to prevent their answering that in tolerating that Government and backing it in all its piracies and murders they had only acted

upon the principle which so many influential Americans have accepted from Stephen Decatur? "Place whatever interpretation you like upon the maxim," they might have said, "we shall maintain that all that we have done at the behest of our Government for the last forty years, and particularly since August, 1914, is compendiously justified out of your own mouths."

And unless we are prepared to take the ground that what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander, — unless we claim that America is free to make her own code for her own exclusive use, while the rest of the world must abide by the standards of ordinary morality, — we shall never be able to rebut this defence. The invasion of Belgium and the plundering and enslavement of its people, the hideous devastation of French territory, the massacre of the Armenians, the wantonly illegal assassination of sleeping civilians by bombs from the air and of passengers and non-combatants by torpedoes from beneath the sea, can all be whitewashed if the maxim "My country, right or wrong," is once admitted to be binding upon citizens. According to this doctrine, the English who supported George III against the American Colonies were patriots and heroes; and there never has been and never can be an unjust war, unless it be one not commanded by the constituted authorities of any nation.

At this point, however, we may be impatiently interrupted, and told that there is another possible meaning to Decatur's maxim which we have thus far omitted. It may mean (we shall hear) that, inas-

much as my country is my country, I must, willynilly and inevitably, stand by it right or wrong; but that, while doing so, I am under no necessity to stifle my moral judgment or to refrain from using my utmost efforts towards inducing my country to take the course that I believe to be right. Suppose, for example, that my country engages in a war which I think unjust. When hundreds of thousands of my fellow-citizens are risking their lives in that cause, it is inconceivable that I can attempt to obstruct the furnishing of them with food, munitions, and other supplies. But I should still be free to denounce the Administration which had caused the war, to insist that peace be made, and that compensation, in money or territory, should be given to the victims of its aggression. I should thus be standing by my country even when I thought her wrong, but should at the same time be doing everything in my power to set her right.

Let us consider a concrete instance from recent history. During the Boer War there was a large party in England upon whom was fastened the epithet “pro-Boer.” These men and women, rightly or wrongly, were convinced that the Tory and imperialistic Government which was then in office had forced the war upon the Transvaal Republic in the interests of the gold- and diamond-mining capitalists and of the megalomaniac imperialism of Mr. Cecil Rhodes. They conducted an agitation all over the country, by public meetings and in the Press, their chief spokesman being the brilliant (and then bitterly hated) Mr. David Lloyd George. Their cry

was that the war must be ended and justice done to the Boers. But, so far as my memory serves me, not a single member of this party ever suggested, or dreamed of suggesting, that the British soldiers in the field should be left in the lurch, that there should be any stinting or withholding of their supplies, or that they should be kept so few as to be in danger of annihilation. None of the opponents of the war failed to rejoice when a victory occurred. When Baden-Powell and his garrison in Mafeking were relieved after a long and dreadful siege, the exultation among the "pro-Boers" was not less genuine than among the Tories.

Soon after this war ended, as everybody knows, there was a change of Government in England. The party responsible for it suffered the heaviest political defeat in the history of the country, and their successors in office (many of whom during the contest had been howled at as white-livered traitors, and in some cases had actually gone in peril of their lives) proceeded with general consent to bestow on the Boers a far more satisfactory form of self-government than that which had been taken from them. Have we not here, then, it may be urged, an instance of the application of Decatur's maxim in its best sense?

In reply to this, there are two things to be urged. The first is that there has never been a case in which those who mouthed the watchword "My country, right or wrong," have applied or thought of applying it to such a course of conduct as that pursued by Mr. Lloyd George and his associates in connection

with the Boer War. This doctrine was constantly invoked against the “pro-Boers” by their opponents. The Chicago journal which hurls it at its readers in large type every day, has also demonstrated in a hundred editorials that it means the precise opposite of such an ethical and critical patriotism. In the very spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardt, it repeatedly suggested (before April, 1917) that America should seize Mexico, because that was easy, but keep clear of the European War, because that would be difficult and costly and its profits problematical.

The second reply is that nobody who really meant to insist that his country should be always in the right, even though he recognized that in the event of her making war in a wrong cause he would be obliged to stand by her, would dream of embodying his conviction in such a silly expression. It is the maxim not of one who intends vigilantly to use his moral judgment, but of one who seeks an excuse for abandoning it. It is the doctrine not of a free man but of a slave; and not even of a manly slave who revolts against his servitude, but of one who loves his bonds, and dreads the responsibility of independence.

But in this maxim there lurks a further confusion of thought. What is “my country”? In earlier chapters we have attempted, with the help of Mr. Franklin Lane as well as by our own analysis, to answer this question; and the conclusion to which we were led is that our country consists essentially of the idealizing will which brought it to the birth through the struggle of the Revolution, and has

ever since been growing more fully conscious of its own nature and direction. If this be true, — if America be in very fact the spirit that begot Washington and Lincoln, that freed the slaves, worked out salvation for the Cubans, and returned the indemnity to China, — then it must follow that America *ceases to be herself* whenever she acts in a spirit contrary to these precedents. In other words, when she is wrong she is not our country. When a man becomes insane, he is no longer himself; he is alienated from his true nature and character. Your mother drunk is not your mother. America wrong is America de-Americanized, making shipwreck of her faith, undoing her own history, reverting to the type of the ancient despotisms against which her very being is a protest.

Let a militaristic and aggressive party grasp the reins of government in this Republic, and set out on a policy of conquest and annexation. It well may be that, with the immense resources in men and munitions that could be mustered, it would succeed in building up a world-empire, and find leaders who could extend the dominion of the American people as widely as Julius Caesar spread the sway of what he pretended was the *populus Romanus*. But before this process had been carried very far, it would begin to be seen that America had utterly changed her nature in embarking upon such an enterprise. She could not do this and remain the Republic that we know and love. The commanders who carried out her perverted will would quickly become, as the servants of republican Rome became, her tyrants and

dictators; for such imperialism brings the imperator, with the certainty of natural law. And all who, against their reason and conscience, acquiesced in the perversion, justifying their cowardice by the cry of "My country, right or wrong," would live to learn the truth of the contention that *our country wrong is not our country at all*; that America is synonymous with America *right*; that the Republic free and freedom-loving, free and working for freedom everywhere, is the only alternative to the suicide of the real America.

Logical and moral consistency is never the strong point of your jingo counterfeit-patriot. Consequently, it was not surprising to discover that the people who from 1914 to 1917 dinned the Decatur motto into our ears, were throughout that time clamorous in their criticism of the Administration for its conduct of our foreign affairs. Yet, after they had thus violated their own favourite maxim, when America was at last forced to enter the European War, they at once became sternly insistent that nobody, on penalty of being classed as a traitor, should attempt in any way to safeguard the Republic against being false to itself in the objects for which it fought.

Now, while Decatur's maxim, the moment one scans it closely, is seen to be either false or foolish, and thoroughly unsuitable as a watchword for rational men in a free country, it nevertheless must be conceded that the problem of conserving the right of free speech in war time, while not abusing it, is one of the most difficult in the whole range of theo-

retical or practical ethics. Freedom without free speech cannot exist. The liberty to utter one's convictions is its heart; and if the heart is injured, the body must die. Yet, at the same time, it is obvious that if even a small minority — say, ten per cent. — of the population of a country at war with a powerful enemy were allowed to fill the newspapers and the public forums with denunciations of the Government and its policy, the effect of their action must be precisely the same as if they were deliberately committing treason. They would not only be giving aid and comfort to the enemy, but they would be in serious danger of enlisting the sympathy of the neutral world on the enemy's behalf and against their own nation. Their voices would be worth more to the foe than many thousands of soldiers and tons of munitions. If this happened here to-day, and our Government were driven by the recognition of these facts to a gagging of all opposition and a temporary withdrawal of the right of free speech, our enemy would promptly pervert this into a plausible contention that the watchwords of American freedom were nothing but the mouthings of conscious hypocrisy.

Difficult as this problem is in every democratic country in time of war, the confusion is worse confounded in the United States than anywhere else, by reason of the heterogeneity of its population. It would be the same, so far as the nature of the problem is concerned, if we were at war with Russia or Italy as it is now that we are at war with Germany; although probably the extreme ability and

unscrupulousness of the German system of espionage makes it more acute in fact. The two great complications are the instinctive leaning of a few Americans of German origin to the side of the enemy, and the exploitation of this sentiment by the agents of the enemy's Government.

The way in which, ever since August, 1914, German propaganda in America has been organized, inspired and paid for by Berlin is notorious and undeniable. Plot after plot has been traced to the doors of the German Consulates and to the Embassy at Washington. Since we entered the war, we have seen our Courts convict official representatives of the Prussian autocracy for having, with one hand, sought to induce a neighbouring people to arise and stab us in the back, and to bring about the incendiary destruction of our munition-plants and other supply-centres, while with the other they have been exploiting the pacifist sentiment and paying for the promulgation of the idea that war is in itself, and under all circumstances, wicked and inhuman. The result of these disclosures is to prove, to everybody except those who will not learn, that the expression of pacifist sentiments, or of the opinion that America has sinned in entering this particular war, is a playing into the hands of the enemy. Americans who so act are doing exactly what the Prussian autocracy would have them do; they are doing gratuitously what that autocracy would be willing enough to pay them for doing.

Under such circumstances, recognizing, as they needs must, that they are a small minority, and that

the general judgment not only of their own countrymen but of the rest of humanity is decisively against them, it becomes the duty of pro-German Americans in general, and of pacifists in particular, to impose upon themselves a self-denying ordinance, a voluntary censorship. A most honourable instance of this kind of action was furnished when England entered this war. Lord Morley of Blackburn (better known to his American admirers by his plain name of John Morley), veteran statesman, brilliant historian, biographer and philosophic thinker, dissented from the opinion of his colleagues in the Cabinet and of the country at large. His dissent was shared by Mr. John Burns, then also in the Cabinet. These two gentlemen were not pro-German; heaven forbid that I should insult them by suggesting that they were! But they thought that it was not England's quarrel, and that she should have been neutral. Finding, however, that the tide of the national judgment was against them, and realizing that their country was fighting for its very life, they instantly resigned their offices, and retired into a silence which neither of them has broken by a single word throughout these desperate years. No coercion was exercised upon them. Had they chosen, they could have gone from end to end of Britain, preaching their doctrine to the whole nation;—yes, and to all the world. But they recognized that in the circumstances which the war produced the exercise of their constitutional right of free speech was morally impossible. Accordingly, like Milton, they "preferred a blameless silence"; thereby manifesting a high and fine

patriotism, and also the self-control which is an implied condition of all democratic privileges.

The most specious form which the business of giving aid and comfort to the enemy has taken among us was the organization of public meetings to inquire why we were at war, and to nag the Government into publishing a full and detailed statement of the terms on which we should be willing to conclude peace. We must make allowance for the simplicity of youthful zeal in the case of some of the organizers of these meetings, and for the naïveté of sentimental provincialism in others. Yet it was obvious to everybody who scanned the lists of promoters and endorsers of this propaganda (and still more to those who looked over the audiences they convened, and noticed what points in the speeches were received with stony silence and what points evoked deafening applause), that the whole thing, *in fact and effect, whatever it may have been in intention*, was a move to prevent America from striking hard and effectually in the war, to lame its arm, to discourage its soldiers and sailors, and correspondingly to strengthen and encourage the enemy. The very question, “Why are we at war?” is one that cannot be asked by any grown-up American who knows the history of the Republic and has followed intelligently the course of events during the last four years. The assertion that our war aims were unknown was absurdly false. Before we entered the war, the President, in his Address to the Senate of January 22nd, 1917, had made a full and splendid statement of them; and since then, in his

various public utterances, he has not abandoned a single one of the principles he then laid down. There is something strabismic about the mental vision of an American who could read these speeches and not recognize them as classical extensions to mankind in general of the principles upon which the Republic was organized and has lived for a hundred and forty years. The President's words are not only *a* statement of America's aims, they are *the* statement; that is, they are such an assertion of our position as any competent committee of patriotic Americans, of any party, desiring to interpret the spirit and purposes of the American nation, must have drawn up. They can be overlooked or mistrusted only by persons who are either strangely ignorant or are blinded by secret affection for that colossal embodiment of all that is un-American and anti-democratic, the Prussian State.

The duty of true "pacifists" at this juncture is to see that our terms of peace are vigorously fought for and lived up to when our cause triumphs. Their demand for a statement of America's principles and objects is as superfluous as it is unpatriotic. Let them see to it that the terms drawn up and promulgated before we went to war are made known to every person the country over, as well as to the rest of the world. Their duty is not to back what they believe to be wrong, but to insist on the maintenance of what they cannot deny to be right. In the programme for world-organization and for the super-national control of the forces of mankind which Mr. Wilson has repeatedly outlined as the only

means of securing and maintaining an equitable peace, we have the very voice of America right, America true to its own genius, faithful to the gospel by which it lives. Let, then, our peace-lovers take the stand that these principles must be kept in every American mind and heart, so that, when the time for establishing peace arrives, there shall be no danger of our swerving from the true path by reason of the hatreds and resentments which the war has engendered.

CHAPTER XII

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF AMERICANISM

SEVERAL times in these pages I have insisted, in a way which some of my readers may have thought strange, upon the identity of spirit between the ideals of the Republic and the Christian religion, regarded in its historic aspect as a movement for the spiritual unification and reformation of the present world. I have not been unconscious of the questions and objections to which this identification might give rise; but I have of set purpose deferred them for elucidation in this chapter. It will now be possible, I trust, to make it clear that the view I advocate can be adopted by Christians of all denominations, and also by Jews, without involving the rejection of any doctrine which may seem to them material to the soundness of their faith.

That most of what we call the world-religions have included among their objects such a unification of mankind and such an abolition of the evils which infest the life of nations, is a statement to which history in every page bears testimony. Nor can Christianity be considered an exception to this rule, without a violent distortion of the language of its Founder and his immediate followers, or without ignoring both the manifest purpose of St. Paul and the principles on which the Christian Church con-

sistently acted, from the time of St. Paul down to and beyond the Reformation. When the Massachusetts Puritans made it their object to establish a society which should be Church and State in one, however narrow and biassed their conception of a Christian Commonwealth may have been, they were unquestionably true to the genius of their religion in feeling that it demanded an organization of governmental character. Christianity reduced to the dimensions of a "Sunday religion," a private enterprise *merely* for prayer and worship, cut off from the life of business, science, art and politics, and declared to have no real bearing on the common life, is Christianity denatured. It was meant, as its Jewish predecessor and parent had been meant, to animate with a living soul each nation that adopted it, and at last to bring all the nations of the earth together in a free brotherhood of mutual beneficence.

Now if this be true, every enterprise which is directed towards the same goal, whether or not overtly associated with a theological creed, and whether it bears the Christian name or not, must be of the same spirit with Christianity.

But the identity of goal is not the only point of contact between Americanism and the historic faith of Europe. There is also, in several vitally important respects, an identity of method as well. Both Christianity and American democracy insist on the sacredness and worth of the individual human being, and both insist, at the same time, that the individual is to seek his true self-fulfilment by abdi-

cating his exclusive, egocentric individuality and finding a larger and freer life in the service of the Whole whereof he forms a part.

Both have grasped the truth that man needs a twofold emancipation. He must be set free first from external tyranny, from the dictation of kings and overlords, and secondly from internal tyranny, the debasing slavery of self-absorption and self-worship. If America has been less successful in realizing the latter of these conditions than the former, that fault or misfortune does not destroy the fact that the attainment of inward liberation has been as much her object as the destruction of external tyranny. Experience demonstrated to the Fathers of the Republic the soundness of the Christian psychology. It was in freely sacrificing their self-interest and dedicating their lives and fortunes to the perilous cause of their country's freedom that they found their own souls, and became the heroes and patriots whom subsequent generations have venerated.

When we recognize that every religion in its mature development is *a moral ideal which has become the living dynamic of the will of a nation or nations devoted to its actualization*, the propriety of assuming that Americanism possesses a religious aspect is seen to be incontestable. Now, such a living ideal was Judaism in antiquity; such, indeed, it still remains at the present day. This, too, is what Christianity was from the beginning until the seventeenth century; and if it has ceased — or rather, in so far as it has ceased — to be this, it has been false

to its own nature and to the inspiration of its founders. Its greatness lay always in its national rather than in its merely individual appeal; and even in its degenerate form, — when, instead of looking for a renewed society of men on earth, it placed its *civitas Dei* wholly beyond the grave, — the very retention of the word *civitas* shows how inseparable from it was the notion of a governmentally organized society.

Using, then, the word “religion” in the sense above defined, which, I submit, is a sense that all history justifies, it may next be affirmed that there can be no nation without a religion, however formless or rudimentary it may be. Some ideal, some standard of what human life should become, some sense of a mission to the world at large, is an indispensable condition of nationhood. And America, as we have seen, has a very definite and conscious contribution to make to the democratic federation of mankind. Mazzini, with a soul fired by the great struggle for Italian unification, passionately declared that “Italy is itself a religion.” In the same sense, we may say that America is itself a religion. America, as a spiritual being, is animated by an ideal and charged with a gospel which it needs must preach. It could not rest while it was itself half slave and half free, nor can it ever rest until freedom has been won for all nations.

But neither, without being false to its own nature, can it ever seek to impose its ideals or forms of government by force upon any other nation. It recognizes that government for the people is only

half, and the less important half, of genuine democracy, the heart of which is government *by* the people. "Work out your own salvation," is its watchword, since it is in and through the "working" that men discover, or create, their higher selfhood. The American evangel, therefore, must always seek to propagate itself by means of an appeal to the independent moral judgment of others. America is, as we have elsewhere said, an example and working model of free and peaceful federation to the race. It can never fight except in self-defence, or in the defence of some weak struggler engaged in upholding the ideal of autonomous democracy against the aggression of autocracy.

Now, in order to be an internationalist, one must first be a nationalist. It is impossible to believe in a relation without believing in the terms that it connects. It is preposterous to believe in a peaceful federation of nations unless one begins by believing in the integrity and inviolability of those distinct collective personalities which we call nations. The mission of a democracy in the world is to encourage national aspirations everywhere, and to work for the voluntary acceptance by all nations of a super-national government, which shall not only secure their freedom from aggression, but shall also provide scope for the achievement by each of its distinctive contribution to the universal welfare. Only by taking such a view of its mission in the world can a free people escape both the Scylla of aggressive jingoism and the Charybdis of a denationalized cosmopolitanism.

This must mean that, instead of living directly and exclusively for itself, and seeking its own aggrandizement at the expense of others, a nation must, in a very true and real sense, die to itself, and find its true life in promoting the free life of other nations. In such a statement there is nothing either mystical or quixotic. Ethics recognizes that every man must be regarded simultaneously as an end in himself — that is to say, as precious and worthwhile on his own account — and as a means to the ends of others. On the same principle, it regards the family as an end in itself which must never be violated, as a group which must under no condition be made merely an instrument for the benefit of others. Yet, at the same time, the family achieves its own purpose and its own happiness only when, through the discipline of which it is the vehicle, it equips each of its members for some career of efficient service to the nation, and through the nation to the world. If it were only an end to itself, if it lived exclusively for its own sake and with no outlook beyond, it would degenerate, and all its members with it. Now, the view of the nature and destiny of a nation which is here suggested is simply an extension of that which nobody denies to be the true conception of the nature and purposes of the family.

Why is the history of organized mankind so full of tragedy? What is the basis of fact which explains, though it does not justify, the terrific pessimism of Schopenhauer's conviction that the will-to-live is the sin of sins, the very root of evil which must be extirpated? Why was it that the passionate

humanity of Buddha could find refuge only in the prospect of the utter extinction of individual self-consciousness? At bottom, the explanation is that individuals, families and nations have missed the true law of their relations, and madly sought to live by the law of death instead of by that of life. The doctrine "He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall find it" is too much of a paradox, does too much violence to the animal instincts and the unenlightened reason of men, to secure general or speedy acceptance. After these measureless aeons of evolutionary struggle we have at last begun to perceive the soundness of this ethical law as regards individuals, and perhaps even as regards families; but its application to the life of nations can scarcely even yet be said to have begun. The law of the jungle, the conviction that each must live at the cost of all other life, has been the practical creed of nations; and the tragedy of their history results precisely from this.

If there were no other way, — if human communities were so constituted that they never could transcend a principle the following of which inevitably precipitates them into disaster, — there would be ample justification for the pessimism of Buddha and Schopenhauer, which at its root is the same with the pessimism of St. Augustine. But when experience has demonstrated the possibility of an alternative course which will avert the evils that the law of the jungle brings upon its own trail, it becomes inexcusable to groan with Koheleth that all is vanity, or with Schopenhauer to advocate the suicide of the

will-to-live. Believers in the uniformity of nature cannot feel that a principle which is valid and fruitful in one department of human life will fail when it is extended to a larger sphere. Moral laws are as constant as any of the other regularities of the world. If, then, in the paradox of achievement through renunciation we have found the true way of life for the individual and the family, it is distinctly unscientific to thrust aside the probability that a like procedure in the case of nations will produce like effects.

Let me anticipate an obvious objection by reminding the reader that I am not preaching the doctrine of non-resistance, or passive submission by the weak to the tyranny of the strong. I am no Tolstoian; on the contrary, I am, at all events in this matter, the extreme opposite of a Tolstoian — *viz.*, a Christian. In an earlier volume ¹ I have attempted to show that Christ's injunction about non-resistance to evil was given not to the world at large, but only to a handful of His immediate followers, and not even to them as a counsel for ordinary life, but distinctly as a rule for their guidance in a special and particular line of work. In His own practice Christ's life was one long resistance to evil, — a resistance which, when necessary, took the form of personal violence. No sane man can be a lover of war; we must all agree with Mr. Hosea Biglow: "Ez fer war, I call it murder." But neither will any sane man deny that resistance to the murderer is a high and holy enter-

¹ *Some Outlines of the Religion of Experience*, p. 101. (New York: Macmillans, 1916.)

prise. When, therefore, murderous aggression is attempted, whether by one man or by a whole nation, it is right and humane (and, one may add, Christian) to meet it not with peace but with a sword.

The Western world in general assents, at least with its lips, to the Christian-democratic valuation of man, and to the principles of political organization which are necessary to express this valuation in practice. But our generation is confronted with a philosophy, expressed by a great literary genius in books which have been read with eager admiration in several languages, which denies this valuation utterly and rejects democracy and all its works root and branch. As I am convinced that the issue between Nietzsche and democracy is one of war to the knife, I may be pardoned for quoting at some length from this magnificent philosopher of despotism and slavery, and afterwards presenting the case for democracy as against him.

In his treatise entitled "The Antichrist," Nietzsche uses with regard to Christianity language more opprobrious than has ever been employed in controversy since the days of Tertullian. He literally foams at the mouth, his eyes distend, he turns purple in the face, and seems on the point of bursting a blood-vessel, in the impossible attempt to find epithets foul and vituperative enough to characterize the religion which has incurred his hatred. As thus: —

The Christian concept of God — God as the deity of the sick, God as a spider, God as spirit — is one of the most cor-

rupt concepts of God that has ever been attained on earth. Maybe it represents the low-water mark in the evolutionary ebb of the godlike type. God degenerated into the *contradiction of life*, instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yea! With God war is declared on life, nature, and the will to life! God is the formula for every calumny of this world and for every lie concerning a beyond! In God, nonentity is deified, and the will to nonentity is declared holy! . . .

This miserable God of Christian monotonous-theism! This hybrid creature of decay, nonentity, concept and contradiction, in which all the instincts of decadence, all the cowardices and languors of the soul find their sanction! . . .

In Christianity all the instincts of the subjugated and oppressed come to the fore: it is the lowest classes who seek their salvation in this religion. Here the pastime, the manner of killing time, is to practise the casuistry of sin, self-criticism, and conscience inquisition. Here the ecstasy in the presence of a *powerful being*, called "god," is constantly maintained by means of prayer; while the highest thing is regarded as unattainable, as a gift, as an act of "grace." Here plain dealing is also entirely lacking: concealment and the darkened room are Christian. Here the body is despised, hygiene is repudiated as sensual; the church repudiates even cleanliness (— the first Christian measure after the banishment of the Moors was the closing of the public baths, of which Cordova alone possessed 270). A certain spirit of cruelty towards one's self and others is also Christian: hatred of all those who do not share one's views; the will to persecute. Sombre and exciting ideas are in the foreground; the most coveted states and those which are endowed with the finest names, are really epileptic in their nature; diet is selected in such a way as to favour morbid symptoms and to over-excite the nerves. Christian, too, is the mortal hatred of the earth's rulers, — the "noble," — and at the same time a sort of concealed and secret competition with them (the subjugated leave the "body" to their master — all they want is the "soul"). Christian is the hatred of the intellect, of pride, of courage, freedom, intellectual *libertinage*; Chris-

tian is the hatred of the *senses*, of the joys of the senses, of joy in general. . . .

Christianity aims at mastering *beasts of prey*; its expedient is to make them *ill*, — to render feeble is the Christian recipe for taming, for “civilization.” . . .

— I cannot, at this point, stifle a sigh. There are days when I am visited by a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy — the *contempt of man*. And in order that I may leave you in no doubt as to what I despise, *whom* I despise: I declare that it is the man of to-day, the man with whom I am fatally contemporaneous. The man of to-day, I am asphyxiated by his foul breath. . . . Towards the past, like all knights of knowledge, I am profoundly tolerant, — that is to say, I exercise a sort of *generous* self-control: with gloomy caution I pass through whole millennia of this mad-house world, and whether it be called “Christianity,” “Christian Faith,” or “Christian Church,” I take care not to hold mankind responsible for its mental disorders. But my feeling suddenly changes, and vents itself the moment I enter the modern age, *our* age. Our age *knows*. . . . That which formerly was merely morbid, is now positively indecent. It is indecent nowadays to be a Christian. *And it is here that my loathing begins*. I look about me: not a word of what was formerly known as “truth” has remained standing; we can no longer endure to hear a priest even pronounce the word “truth.” Even he who makes but the most modest claims upon truth, *must* know at present, that a theologian, a priest, or a pope, not only errs but actually *lies*, with every word that he utters, — and that he is no longer able to lie from “innocence,” from “ignorance.” Even the priest knows quite as well as everybody else does that there is no longer any “God,” any “sinner” or any “Saviour,” and that “free will,” and “a moral order of the universe” are *lies*. Seriousness, the profound self-conquest of the spirit, no longer allows anyone to be *ignorant* about this. . . . All the concepts of the Church have been revealed in their true colours — that is to say, as the most vicious frauds on earth, calculated to *depreciate* nature and all natural values.

The priest himself has been recognised as what he is — that is to say, as the most dangerous kind of parasite, as the actual venomous spider of existence. . . . At present we know, our *conscience* knows, the real value of the gruesome inventions which the priests and the Church have made, *and what end they served*. By means of them that state of self-profanation on the part of man has been attained, the sight of which makes one heave. The concepts “Beyond,” “Last Judgment,” “Immortality of the Soul,” the “soul” itself, are merely so many instruments of torture, so many systems of cruelty, on the strength of which the priest became and remained master. . . . Everybody knows this, *and nevertheless everything remains as it was*. Whither has the last shred of decency, of self-respect gone, if nowadays even our statesmen — a body of men who are otherwise so unembarrassed, and such thorough anti-Christians in deed — still declare themselves Christians and still flock to communion? ¹ . . . Fancy a prince at the head of his legions, magnificent as the expression of the egoism and self-exaltation of his people, — but *shameless* enough to acknowledge himself a Christian! . . . What then does Christianity deny? What does it call “world”? “The world” to Christianity means that a man is a soldier, a judge, a patriot, that he defends himself, that he values his honour, that he desires his own advantage, that he is *proud*. . . . The conduct of every moment, every instinct, every valuation that leads to a deed, is at present anti-Christian: what an *abortion of falsehood* modern man must be, in order to be able *without a blush* still to call himself a Christian! ²

Now these passages have not been arbitrarily or maliciously selected from a work produced when the author was on the verge of mental collapse. Nietzsche’s insight into his own meaning, his power of

¹ “This apparently applies to Bismarck, the forger of the Ems telegram and a sincere Christian.” — *Note by Nietzsche’s translator*.

² Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §§ 18, 19, 21, 22, 38 (English trans. by A. M. Ludovici).

perceiving what things favoured his philosophy and what were its natural enemies, was never clearer or more unerring than when he dipped his pen in gall to write these envenomed paragraphs. They contain the quintessence of his doctrine; they represent his concept of the Superman and the self-justifying will-to-power, fully conscious of its meaning and end, armed at all points, and brought face to face with its immortal and most implacable foe.

His disciples invariably tell us that the fact of his ultimate insanity must not be taken as discrediting his philosophy; and in this they are perfectly right. But when, taking them at their word, one quotes such passages as the foregoing, and does Nietzsche the honour of assuming that he knew exactly what he meant and was capable of conveying his meaning in the plainest of plain language, those same disciples furiously declare that one is misinterpreting or has failed to understand him. Now, to this we are entitled to object. Such a defence is really an insult to their master. Why should those who have read their Plato and Aristotle, their Schopenhauer, their Berkeley and Hume, their Bradley and Green and Bergson, and shown themselves not incapable of understanding and interpreting them, submit to the imputation that they cannot get out of the text of Nietzsche the meaning he intended it to yield? Why acquiesce in the suggestion that he, who was a great literary artist, a master of concise and precise utterance, was less capable than any other philosopher of saying what he meant and guarding himself against misunderstanding? It looks rather as though

his followers were somewhat halting in their allegiance, somewhat chary of the real meaning of the doctrines they have embraced.

The passages I have quoted, and the context in which they appear, do not represent any vagary, any departure from previous positions, on Nietzsche's part. What he here says so explicitly was implicit in his doctrine from the first. In these sentences we have "Thus Spake Zarathustra" and "Beyond Good and Evil" in a nutshell. He is perfectly consistent in his main thought, and (unlike some of his admirers) he does not shrink from following it out to its logical and practical consequences. He sees and knows that a philosophy which on one side is a gospel of self-assertion *must* be on the other side a gospel of slavery. He realizes that you cannot affirm autocracy without denying democracy; you cannot worship the "beast of prey" without assenting to the devouring of the prey. Like any well-thought-out doctrine, his must be taken or rejected as a whole. The attempt of his half-hearted admirers to keep the self-assertion and leave the slavery, to have the tyrant without the victims, to cultivate the tiger but not provide him with his food, is sheer muddle-headed fatuity, which Nietzsche himself would have been the first to stigmatize in the severest terms.

When Mr. Bernard Shaw, for example, makes this attempt; when he speaks about a "Democracy of Supermen" as though such a thing were a practical possibility, without realizing that to ask for it is exactly like asking for a range of hills without any

valleys; we have a perfect illustration of the impossibility of fusing these opposites, of running democracy and autocracy, Socialism and Nietzscheism, in double harness. Mr. Shaw speaks much of Equality, and sneers (*more suo*) at the rest of the world for not understanding it.¹ But has he understood it himself? Has he realized that men are and must always remain unequal in every respect save one — that of moral worth, inviolability, the unconditional right to be regarded as ends *per se* and not merely as means — but that this one all-important Equality is the thing which democracy insists upon and which Nietzsche utterly denies and rejects? Admit this Equality, and you are committed once and for all to democracy; deny it, and you can be a Nietzschean, a believer in the Superman, — which means in practice the right of the Prussian sinkers of hospital-ships to govern the world on the same principles on which for the last four years they have governed Belgium. That is what Nietzsche believed in and frankly advocated. You cannot have it both ways; you cannot serve these two masters. His hatred of Christianity was due to his clear perception that in its essence — that is, in its ethical valuation of the common man, in its insistence on his inviolability — Christianity was the deadly enemy of his creed. He tells us this; we understand him; and we reject his doctrine root and branch and altogether.

According to Nietzsche, as we have seen, every-

¹ "Englishmen hate Liberty and Equality too much to understand them." — *Man and Superman*, p. 223, in the American edition.

body who even pretends to believe in Christianity is a conscious liar, a hypocrite and an impostor, or else a doddering idiot. This religion, he declares, is the curse of the world, the enemy of all that is grand and noble in mankind and in the universe. It is the religion of slaves, the nauseous self-protective device of the weaklings and failures of the world, whereby they essay to safeguard themselves against the just and necessary self-assertion of the higher type, the predestined Superman.

From his own standpoint, then, Nietzsche was entirely right in selecting Christianity as the object of his hatred, and in pouring out upon it the floods of his literary billingsgate. For it is certain, not only that one cannot be at the same time a democrat and a superman-worshipper, but that the *only* choice for the world lies between the Christian estimate of humanity and the Nietzschean. It is Christ or Nietzsche; it is Man or Superman; it is Democracy or Despotism. To this alternative we are shut up, in practice as well as in theory. Either, with Christianity and democracy, we must trust to the higher nature of the common man, and make him the sovereign and the law-giver, in the faith that this will at last result in the just and fraternal organization of human society; or we must take our stand, as Nietzsche so frankly did, on the doctrine of slavery, relinquishing the world into the hands of a few self-elected exploiters, whose "will-to-power" is to be regarded as self-justifying. The law of equality and mutuality, or the law of the wolf against the lamb: that is the only real choice before us.

Which is it to be? For Americans, the answer cannot remain a moment in doubt. By all our traditions, by all our inherited instincts, and by the unexampled success of our national experiment, we are committed to the democratic horn of the alternative. Among common people, within the common man, we look for the kingdom of God. In the history of the world is writ large the menace of the Nietzschean ideal. It must begin with a spurning of the elementary principles of morality; love and sympathy, the protection of the weak, justice to the poor — these things it spews out of its mouth. The prototypes of the Superman, the Caesars and the Alexanders, the Borgias and the Napoleons, come century after century, with their ever-renewed attempt to degrade human nature into a footstool beneath their feet. Rapidly, like comets, they shoot across the earth, leaving behind them their trail of blood and fire; but the end in all cases is the same. The gospel of power is shattered by its own impotence; but not, alas! until it has arrested for ages the growth of civilization, blasted the world, and demonstrated ever anew that in its path lie only madness and ruin.

The terrible fate of its most brilliant literary expositor cannot be separated from his doctrine. The Nietzschean philosophy is from beginning to end the premonition of the mental ruin into which Nietzsche collapsed. A man's beliefs, as we now know, affect not only his conduct but also his health. Nietzsche's choice from the outset was a doctrine which alienated him ever further and more com-

pletely from the kindly world of common men. Whether it was his temperament that determined his philosophy, or his philosophy that moulded his character, the interconnection of the two things was constant throughout. The gospel of the Superman, with its rejection on the Superman's behalf of all participation in the common nature and the common life of men, is the gospel of insanity; for what is insanity but precisely this alienation carried to completion?

It is arguable, indeed, that the state of consciousness of the lunatic is something altogether higher than that of the sane man, — that he has an intuition of ultimate reality, a private and incommunicable revelation of the undiscovered and uncharted realms of nature lying beyond our senses, beyond the reaches of our souls. Yet, even if it be so, the closer this experience approaches to absolute uniqueness, the more completely is it insane. For the condition of normality and of healthful evolution is that the whole species shall evolve together, the pioneer being the man who carries to new perfection qualities which he shares in common with his race. When, therefore, a man deliberately repudiates the garnered tradition of the myriad-peopled centuries, tramples on morality as the expression of the feeble cowardice of the unfit, denies the objective validity of the norms of human reason, and looks to a future being who is to represent not the natural unfolding of what is general in mankind, but a catastrophic breach with its previous life, he is necessarily on the way to complete alienation from “the kindly race

of men." Then it becomes natural for him to proclaim his "contempt of man," his anger with "this madhouse world." But we know what to fear for a man when he declares his whole race insane. Such abnormality, in more or less advanced degree, is traceable in all the would-be masters of the world, from the legendary Sesostris to the God-patronizing Wilhelm II and the epileptic chorus in "Hurrah and Hallelujah."

It would be presumptuous in a volume of this kind to intrude, even in this connection, upon the province of the theologian. Yet one may be permitted to point out that the conception of nations as "the citizens of humanity," each with a distinct blessing to contribute to the unified whole, is not insusceptible of assimilation to those forms of theism which hold by the doctrine of the immanence of God. If I have studied these aright, they all assert the identity of the higher attributes of humanity (and especially of humanity regarded in its collective aspect) with the divine nature. They affirm, to be sure, that God is transcendent as well as immanent; but this affirmation raises no difficulty for my argument. They cannot consistently maintain that the drama of history is a gradual unfolding of the scheme of the Divine Providence without conceding that the results which this Providence, through its human instrumentalities, has achieved, evince the identity of *man-at-his-best* with God.

The doctrine that God is finite, being, in fact, the author only of the good in the world and not of its evil, is an ancient one. It was taught with great

depth of conviction and keenness of insight by Socrates, and powerfully reiterated in modern times by John Stuart Mill in his *Essay on Theism*, and by the late William James in several passages of his later books. This idea has now been thrust upon the attention of the man in the street as a new discovery by Mr. H. G. Wells. Whether such a belief is philosophically sound or morally satisfactory we need not here discuss. My own judgment is that a thorough philosophic and ethical analysis of the facts would not sustain it. But it has at least the practical value of stressing the distinction between good and evil, forcing us to recognize the finality of that distinction and the fallacy of the Nietzschean attempt to pass beyond it. It also heightens our sense of the value and dignity of the good, making us realize that no idea of God which presents Him as alien or hostile to any manifestation of the good, whether in man or the sub-human world, can be permanently satisfactory.

The bearing of these considerations upon our theme needs little elaboration. Whoever believes in the divine immanence must recognize that the ethical and social ideal of America, and the nation itself in so far as it is true to that ideal, is one manifestation of God, one incarnation of the Transcendent, one epiphany in time of the Eternal. Patriotism, conceived as the self-surrendering acceptance of that ideal, and the devotion of men's lives to the never-completed task of actualizing it in the world, is thus raised to the dignity of religion. And religion ceases to be a mere Sunday affair or a monopoly of

priests and pastors, and becomes the inspiration of the collective effort of the nations after perfection, the task of God, renewed century after century, unshattered by a thousand disasters, inextinguishable by war and bloodshed or by the cowardice and unworthiness of its instruments, and destined to make the law of the spirit at last universally triumphant over the blind animality of the jungle.

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